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
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CETSHWAYO'S DUTCHMAN

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CETSHWAYO

(From a Photograph by J. E. Bruton)

CETSHWAYO'S DUTCHMAN

BEING THE

*PRIVATE JOURNAL OF A WHITE TRADER IN ZULULAND
DURING THE BRITISH INVASION*

BY

CORNELIUS VIJN

TRANSLATED FROM THE DUTCH AND EDITED WITH PREFACE
AND NOTES BY THE

RIGHT REV. J. W. COLENZO, D.D.

BISHOP OF NATAL

With a Portrait of Cetshwayo

(from a Photograph taken at Capetown)

LONDON

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO

1880

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PREFACE.

MR. CORNELIUS VIJN is a young Hollander, 23 years old, who has been $4\frac{1}{2}$ years in Natal, during three-fourths of which time (as he states) he has been trading in Zululand, and has thus learned to speak the Zulu language well, though he would not undertake to write it, and has become thoroughly conversant with the Zulu people, and their ordinary habits and customs. He was educated at the Town Burgher-School of Hoorn, in Holland, and, of course, speaks and writes European Dutch, in which language the narrative of his sojourn in Zululand during the late war was written by him. But since his arrival in Natal he has learned to speak freely in the English tongue—very well indeed for a foreigner—though, as his letters printed in the ‘Notes’ will show, he does not write English

quite grammatically. On the whole, however, he is a young man of fair education and good intelligence; and his character is such, on the authority of an English Colonist who knows him well, as to warrant entire confidence being placed in his statements as to what he has heard, or seen, or known, in Zululand.

Mr. Vijn has placed his manuscript in my hands with the request that I would cast my eye over it, and say whether it would be worth while to publish it in England, at the present crisis of Zulu affairs. Having perused it I found that it was well worthy of being published and made accessible to English readers. And I have accordingly undertaken to translate it, and supply a series of Notes,¹ which may throw further light on the matters referred to in it, and especially on the character and conduct of Cetshwayo.²

¹ Some of the information in the Notes has been obtained by my head-printer 'Magama,' who, under authority from Sir G. Wolseley, was sent, in October, 1879, into Zululand to recover, if possible, the watch, or other relics, of the late Prince Imperial, and ascertain the manner of his death (Note 46).

² In this name C represents a click; but, if the English readers pronounce the name as 'Ketsh-wa-yo' (a sounded as in

My own very strong conviction is that the Zulu King has been grossly misrepresented by those who have wished to find some support in his doings for waging, in the name and with the power of Christian England, the late most unjust and wicked war—a war which at first was said to be waged against the King, and not against the Zulu Nation, a figment which was afterwards abandoned by Lord Chelmsford, who says that, though ‘at its first commencement such an announcement, that our quarrel was with Cetshwayo alone, was politic and proper, as it afforded an opportunity to those Chiefs who were averse to Cetshwayo’s rule to come over to our side’ [2318, p. 56], yet ‘it is clear that the Zulu People themselves are not prepared to accept the distinction it was thought desirable to make’ [*Ib.* p. 81], and which Sir G. Wolseley, in the face of the plain facts, has again revived.

In particular Sir B. Frere has been unceasing in his efforts to blacken Cetshwayo’s character and to make him appear odious in the eyes of Englishmen, ‘father’), they will come near enough to the native pronunciation for all practical purposes. It is quite wrong to spell and pronounce it as a word of *four* syllables, *e.g.* ‘Ce-te-wa-yo.’

who would never have endured, as they have done hitherto—very reluctantly, it is true, and with grave misgivings—that such things should have been done in their name in these parts, if they had not been led to suppose that the Zulu King was really the loathsome monster which Sir B. Frere has persistently represented him to be. Indeed when we read the touching account of the devotion of the Zulu People to their King in his hour of utmost need (Note 32), and of their respect for him even after his fall,¹—of

¹ Mr. Cross is reported to have said at Leigh (*Guardian*, Oct. 15, 1879):—‘Of the result of the Zulu War I may safely say this—because I have personally conversed with a great number of persons who have come from that country—that, if anybody is glad at that result, it is the people of Zululand themselves, who have escaped from the tyranny to which they were subjected.’ It is difficult to see who the ‘*great number of persons who have come from that country* (Zululand),’ and with whom Mr. Cross has ‘personally conversed,’ can have been. He can hardly have meant military persons, who almost all left Natal before the capture of Cetshwayo, and could have known nothing of the feeling of the Zulu People towards their King, except very superficially, and then through an interpreter. And I doubt much if any single person who has resided in Zululand—*e.g.* Trader or Missionary—has visited England since the capture of the King or even since the beginning of the war, except Mr. John Mullins, who would not, I imagine, support Mr. Cross’s statement, which is contradicted by all the evidence that has hitherto reached us upon the subject, *e.g.* the statements of Mr. Longcast (Note 32) or the following extract from a letter (*Natal Colonist*, Nov. 8) by ‘a late visitor to Zululand,’ dated Nov. 7, 1879:—

the people who were supposed to abhor him as a cruel tyrant and to long only to be released from his bloody rule—it is painful to read the highly-coloured language in which Sir B. Frere in the Blue-Books labours at this point, again and again repeating his invectives and piling up his epithets, until at one time, no doubt, he succeeded in prejudicing the minds of the Government and People in England against the unfortunate King, whom from the very first and long before the raids occurred which have been put forward as the chief *casus belli*, he was, it is very plain, preparing to crush (Note 13).

Thus Sir B. Frere speaks of the ‘grinding despotism’ of ‘their cruel Sovereign’ [2222, p. 5], ‘his faithless, cruel character’ [*Ib.* p. 29], ‘his atrocious barbarities’ [2260, p. 24]—of the ‘irresponsible, bloodthirsty, and treacherous despot’ [2369, p. 1],

‘On the highlands I found that, although the natives fully accept their defeat, they give excuses for every battle they have lost. *They speak in affectionate terms of their absent King.*’ But the very same *Guardian*, which reports Mr. Cross’s speech, contradicts it by the following from the Correspondent of the *Times*, dating from ‘Utrecht’—‘Had Cetshwayo been a tyrant hated of the people and reigning over them against their will, it would never have taken all the labour we experienced to capture him.’

the 'bloodthirsty, aggressive despot' [2316, p. 20], 'Cetshwayo's power of murder and plunder' [2269, p. 1], 'the present despotism of a ruthless savage' [2318, p. 51], the 'ignorant and bloodthirsty despot,' who is only 'anxious to emulate the sanguinary fame of his uncle Chaka' [*Ib.* p. 214], whose 'history is written in characters of blood' [p. 183], whose 'murders and massacres are simply part of a settled purpose to imitate Chaka' [*Ib.*]—'in cruelty and treachery he is no degenerate representative of Chaka and Dingane,' 'with Chaka as his avowed model' [*Ib.* p. 6]—'the monster Chaka is his model, to emulate Chaka in shedding blood is, as far as I have heard, his highest aspiration' [2220, p. 26]—'we have not a shadow of excuse for doubting that he is in his later utterances expressing his real intention to resume the most sanguinary of his predecessors' practices' [*Ib.*]—'he was, as I believe, inclined to break loose from all restraint and to re-establish the régime of Chaka's unmitigated barbarism' [2260, p. 25], &c. &c. &c.

Nor am I aware of one single expression, in all the numerous Despatches of Sir B. Frere printed in

the Blue-Books, which qualifies the above language, by recognizing some act or quality not altogether fiendish in one whom Englishmen generally, I trust, have learned by this time to know as a brave and not ignoble ruler—who had, of course, as Mr. Vijn says, ‘to enforce from time to time the laws of his country, and, if he had not done so, where should I have been?’—who never, since he began to reign, has sent his *Impi* on the war-path—who did his best to avoid war with the English, until it was forced upon him—who never used his opportunities for ravaging this Colony, when it lay at his mercy—who sent repeatedly messengers suing for peace, but only to be ‘detained’ or ‘manacled’ for weeks together by the English Authorities (Note 39), or sent back with the mockery of utterly impossible demands (Notes 37, 41), except the last (published in the *London Gazette* of Aug. 21), which never reached him (Note 46),—and who has been throughout hardly, ungenerously, and unjustly dealt with by the representatives of the English People.

It has been terrible to see this great wave of wickedness rolling on, and to be powerless to help

it, to be debarred all possibility of showing the injustice of the war, until it was too late—too late to prevent the shedding of innocent blood and the ravaging of a whole country—too late to save the lives of 2,000 of our own soldiers and natives, and of 10,000 patriotic Zulus—too late to prevent the name of Englishman from becoming in the Native mind the synonym for duplicity, treachery, and violence, instead of, as in days gone by, for truth, and justice, and righteousness. The venerable South-African Missionary, Dr. Moffat, addressing a meeting on May 21, is reported (*Cape Argus*, June 17) to have condemned the Zulu War as ‘brutal and unjust.’ ‘He had admired Sir B. Frere as a Christian; but he never imagined that he would have precipitated the War as he did. With regard to the influence of the war on Missions, he believed that it would put them back at least 50 years in that part of the world.’ With what face indeed can men teach Christianity to the Natives of these parts for many years to come, while they can point to such deeds of rapine and bloodshed, as done by the orders

of Christian rulers, in the name of a Christian Nation, within the memory of living men ?

Dr. Moffat probably supposed at first, as some of us here did in Natal, that Sir B. Frere, after making a judicious exhibition on our frontier or, if need be, in Zululand itself, of the power of England, would have sought, by wise and peaceful measures of negotiation, to bring about gradually the desired improvements in the Military and Marriage Systems of Zululand, in accordance with the principle laid down by himself on another occasion [2079, p. 7] that ‘ such changes, like all great revolutions, require time and patience to effect peacefully ; ’ and there is every reason for believing that this work, worthy of the English Name, might have been done successfully. But we did not expect that, in order to accomplish these ends, he would direct a ferocious onslaught to be made on unprepared and unoffending Zulus, who were sitting quietly at their homes, ‘ cattle grazing on the hills, men, women, and children at their kraals, cows being milked ’ (Note 18) as usual, when, immediately after crossing the frontier, Lord Chelmsford’s force

swooped down upon them, and he reports his work for the first two days as 30 killed, 4 wounded, 10 captured, together with 13 horses, 413 cattle, 332 goats, 235 sheep ; while Col. Wood's captured 2,000 cattle.

I sympathise, in short, entirely with the words of a friend, who with full knowledge of the facts states his conviction that 'the Zulu War, discreditable to our arms, disgraceful to our civilization, and injurious to our good name and to the discipline of our army, was not necessary, and therefore was without just cause'—who is 'disgusted to hear (so calling themselves) Christians speak of cruel murders as if they were the finest feats of arms,' and who mournfully adds, 'It makes one despair of ultimate good, to see such a Saturnalia of wrongdoing and such an apotheosis of Force in this lower world.'

Cetshwayo is now a prisoner at Capetown,¹ sup-

¹ The following appears in the *Daily Telegraph* from its Spec. Corresp., dating 'Capetown, Sept. 23' (*Pall-Mall Gazette*, Oct. 10, 1879):—

'Cetshwayo, now confined in the Castle, fully acknowledges that he has been properly punished. His statements most completely vindicate the policy of Sir B. Frere. He says that

plied, no doubt, with food and clothing and other comforts, but deprived of all such resources as

Shepstone was to blame for the war by annexing the Transvaal, and that, as England was bound to maintain the Transvaal dispute, he was equally bound not to disband his army. He would long have ceased to have been a King had he done so. He saw from the Whiteman's [point of] view how requisite it was that the military power of Zululand should be broken. He denies emphatically that at any time overtures were made to him to use his army against the Boers. This was the allegation which aroused such intense indignation through South Africa. The frankness of the King is extraordinary, and he seems quite content to pass the remainder of his life away from the cares of State.'

In reading the above it should be remembered that all such communications must be regarded as having something of an *official* character; since no English *friend* of Cetshwayo is allowed to speak with him on political matters, or in most cases (from want of acquaintance with the Zulu tongue) would be able to converse with him at all, except through the Government interpreter. Mr. F. E. Colenso, who speaks Zulu freely, on his way to England requested permission to see Cetshwayo, who had just arrived at the Cape, but was refused by Sir Bartle Frere, on the ground that Sir G. Wolseley's leave must first be obtained, 'to whom all applications to communicate with the prisoner should be referred'; though at the very same time the Editor of the *Cape Times* (Government organ) had a long—it is said a two-hours'—interview with him. In fact, the above statement bears a curious resemblance to a series of telegrams from Capetown and other communications from these parts, which appeared in English Journals during some months before hostilities began against the Zulus, and were evidently intended to create a prejudice against Cetshwayo, as if he had been threatening and aggressive towards Natal, and so to prepare the English People for the war. I drew attention at the time to some of these false and misleading telegrams, &c. in a letter to the *Daily News*.


relieve the weary hours of civilized men—utterly cut off from friends and country, except a few followers (two men and four girls, but none of his wives) imprisoned with him—surrounded by Whitemen, but unable to exchange a single idea with them, except through a half-caste interpreter; while the name of the only Whiteman who, he believes, would be willing and able to speak a word for him, is not allowed to be mentioned before him, as it ‘excites the prisoner.’ Through an order from Sir G. Wolseley, however, I sent a message to say ‘Sobantu salutes Cetshwayo—he is grieved for him—he does not forget him’; and I received this message in reply, ‘Cetshwayo thanks Sobantu for his message, and is glad to learn that he does not forget him. He hopes Sobantu will speak well for him.’ In this little book I have spoken the truth on his behalf, and collected some important and striking evidence, which shows, as indeed does each fresh piece of evidence which comes to light, that he has not deserved the treatment he has received. But there he lies—in spirit bound hand and foot, and gagged—awaiting his judgment at the hands of the

English People. May God grant that for their own sakes, as well as for that of the Zulus—for the raising up again of England's good name among the tribes of South Africa, who stand aghast at our recent doings—they may do what is just and right towards them in the name of Him of whom it is written--

‘A GOD OF TRUTH AND WITHOUT INIQUITY,
JUST AND RIGHT IS HE!’

J. W. NATAL.

BISHOPSTOWE: Nov. 16, 1879.




CONTENTS.



	PAGE
THE PRIVATE JOURNAL OF UETSHWAYO'S DUTCHMAN .	1
NOTES BY THE BISHOP OF NATAL	83

APPENDIX.

THE ZULU MILITARY SYSTEM	189
A PROTEST AGAINST THE ZULU WAR	193



PRIVATE JOURNAL

OF

CETSHWAYO'S DUTCHMAN.

Oct. 29, 1878.—I set out from New Guelderland¹ with six Natal Kafirs, one wagon, sixteen oxen, and a load of goods, consisting of woollen blankets, baize blankets, lined² cotton blankets, picks, knives, beads, saddles and bridles, &c., for Zululand, in order to trade for cattle and hides. Having started about 10 A.M., and the weather being rainy, I could not get further than the Isinkwazi River, after crossing the Nonoti River.

At the store and canteen, belonging to Mr. W. Weber, and built on the N.W. side of the river nearly up to the crown of a hill, I outspanned my oxen to let them graze, the ground being for the

¹ *New Guelderland*, a Dutch settlement in Natal, near the coast, about thirteen miles from the Zulu Border.

² *Lined Cotton Blankets*—i.e. calico sheets, lined or covered with coloured handkerchiefs.

most part free for anyone—at all events, for travellers. I told my Kafirs to prepare their food, which consisted of ground mealies (maize) and salt; and I said further that at sundown the oxen must be tied to their yokes to prevent their running away. I myself went to Mr. W. W.'s house, to remain there until the next morning. There I met a certain Mr. B., who wished me to take his oxen among my herd to his son in Zululand. I was quite willing to do so, but was obliged to require that they should be with me early next morning, as I wanted to go on, and should not wish to be kept waiting. Mr. B. promised this, and thereupon set off, as did also Mr. W. W., for New Guelderland, so that I and Tony Weber remained behind together. After sundown, not knowing what else to do, and there being moonlight, we saddled two horses and took a little turn. We came back about 9 P.M., and, after supper, lay down to sleep.

Oct. 30.—Next morning I was up and about an hour before sunrise. Of course my first care was my oxen, to loose them and let them get their morning feed; for I meant to inspan about an hour after sunrise, and outspan across the Tugela (or Border) River, not supposing that I should be disappointed through Mr. B. of carrying out my intention of making an early start. At 9 A.M. no oxen were to

be seen, at noon it was just the same, at sundown still there were no oxen of Mr. B. As I did not wish to go back from my promise to take the oxen under my charge to his son, I determined still to wait the following day till 2 P.M., and, if they had not arrived by that time, I would then go on without them.

Oct. 31.—This morning the weather was quite different from yesterday's, the sun giving signs of an exceedingly hot day, whereas yesterday it was not visible.

There was very little news here. Only a gossip went round about a war between the Zulus and the English being near at hand. But, as I had only lately returned from Zululand, and had left everything quiet there, except that now and then a great hunting party was held among themselves, and as the war-talk was mere rumour and had been current for the last two years⁽¹⁾,¹ I gave little heed to it.

Before I was at all aware it was 2½ P.M. And, as still none of Mr. B.'s oxen had appeared, I told my Kafirs to inspan, as I meant to sleep on this side of the Tugela. But, before I had gone two miles, I was met by two native policemen, carrying a large official letter addressed to myself. To open and read it was, of course, only a matter of a few minutes.

¹ The figures in parentheses refer to notes at end of book.

It contained little of special importance for me, nothing more, in fact, than that it came from the Border Agent (Mr. Jackson), who, having heard that I was on my way to Zululand, had sent these two policemen to meet me with this letter, notifying that my wagon could not pass until the Border Agent had first examined it, *i.e.* for smuggled goods, as guns, &c. After examining my goods, he signed my pass and I was allowed to go on. But Mr. Jackson told me that danger was threatening from the Zulu side of the Tugela, not from the Natal side, referring, no doubt, to the 'hunting parties,' which the King had ordered, to show that he had an army as well as the Whites, but not with any intention of invading Natal.

Just about sundown I reached the Tugela, which this year contained very little water, and was now so low that I had no need to be taken over by boats. However I remained that night on this (Natal) side of the river.

I went myself to the house of an acquaintance (a Hollander) to spend the evening with him. Our conversation was about the war so likely to come about. My friend thought it rather venturesome in me to make my way through to the Zulus; 'for,' said he, 'should the war break out while you are

there, assuredly you will then be a dead man, your end will be frightful, to be put to death by the greatest and fiercest of Zulu savages.' I, however, lightminded and determined as ever, crossed over next morning at daybreak. Having once resolved on anything, no earthly power should dissuade me from it.

Nov. 1.—Early this morning, about 9 A.M., I was across the Tugela with wagon and oxen, having got through the river and reached the top of the hill, without the wagon once sticking fast. After outspanning for half an hour, we inspanned and went on, meaning to outspan again about six miles further on. The road here went through an open bush-country, but very far from flat; on the contrary we had to go up and down several high hills. When we had left about three miles behind us, I came across a number of Zulu women, their only clothing being, as usual, a piece of dressed ox-hide or cloth fastened about the middle, the married women or marriageable girls being distinguished by a red top-knot on the back of their heads, and carrying their children on their backs. My attention, however, would not have been drawn to them but for the strange performance in which they were engaged. These women, in fact, were all collected together in one

spot, singing, shouting, laughing, crying, clapping their hands, now standing still, then again briskly running, and so on. As this was all new for me, I asked my own natives what it all meant. They told me that this was a method of *asking for rain*. And truly here, in these parts, the last years have been unusually dry. The season was already half over; no rain would come; all the young crops, which had sprouted out of the ground, were burnt through the heat of the sun and drought. The men and young men of Zululand had all been called up to the King for some reason or other (2), what we knew not—although in Natal it was thought they were coming over to attack the Whites. And so the women had been left by themselves alone in the land, to look after the huts and take care of the cattle and gardens. When, however, the males are at home, they do little or nothing; their women are as good as slaves for them; they have to prepare food for the males and to cook beer for them; almost everything is left for the women to do. The work of the men consists solely in slaughtering cattle, milking, hunting, war;¹ they pass the time also in chatting with

¹ Since Cetshwayo came to the throne (Sept. 1, 1873) the Zulus have never once been engaged in war, until the British forces invaded Zululand (Jan. 11, 1879). His father Mpande (Panda), however, ravaged repeatedly the Swazis and other native tribes.

the girls ; as they do not eat fish, they make no attempt to catch them.

By this time I had outspanned again, the oxen being soon tired, as the sun was very hot. When they were outspanned, there came a middle-aged man and a young man of about 20 years, to lounge by me at the wagon. These two were very much surprised to see a Whiteman enter Zululand with a wagon laden with goods. Accordingly they asked me 'whither I was going ? and how was it possible that I could have entered the land with an honest purpose of trading, when the war was so near at hand, and might break out any day ?' I replied that 'I had nothing to do with the war and knew nothing whatever about it. But I was going to sell to the King for cattle the goods in the wagon, since the King had sent for me.' With this they were satisfied, but it was far otherwise with me. I asked them 'Inasmuch as they had told me that the war might break out at any day, had they heard anything ? and had the King, then, called up his people to go and fight in Natal ?' They said that this was not the case. Cetshwayo had called up his people in order to consult with them what course they should take ; since the greedy and stubborn Boers were on their way to fight with them in their own

land(3), and take away their cattle and girls. But they positively had no intention of fighting against their own (English) people.'

After this conversation I took my mid-day meal, consisting of rice and milk, with a piece of dry bread and a cup of coffee with sugar. Then the oxen were inspanned, as I meant to pass the night at a place about eight miles further on, where there was good feeding-ground by the Umsundusi River.

Among the young warriors, however, at this time there was much braggadocio talk about crossing over into Natal and building a kraal at Stanger, where Chaka's grave was(4), a Military Kraal opposite to the English Kraal where the Resident Magistrate lived. But the King had no wish to invade Natal, and would not allow them to do so; and, though he agreed that the land north of the Umvoti River belonged properly to Zululand, yet he said 'he did not want it, and had no desire to fight with the English.'

Nov. 2.—Splendid weather in the morning, though in the afternoon the sky was overcast. Trekked across the Inyezane River, and there passed the night.

Nov. 3.—Went on to Etshowe,¹ an excellent place

¹ This name (of the Rev. Mr. Oftebro's station) is often misspelt '*Ekhone*,' the error having arisen from the fact that the Norwegian missionaries use a letter somewhat like *k* to represent the sound *tsh*.

for cattle. Here I rested about six days, because the grass was particularly good, and my cattle had need of it, being very thin.

From the time when I crossed over from Natal I had only traded two head of cattle. At this place I was summoned by Dabulamanzi to come to his kraal with my wagon and goods, since he wished to buy goods of me for gold and cattle. But, as I knew him very well as an uncommonly sharp customer, I was not disposed to go to his place, which was about three hours distant from here. So I told his man that, 'if his master wished to buy anything from me, he must come to me, since his place was out of the way and my oxen were very thin.'

Nov. 4.—Next day Dabulamanzi himself made his appearance with his following. On arriving he first asked for spirits, and I gave him a good glass of rum. Then he began to talk with me about goods, and said that 'he wished very much to see the stuff which I had in the wagon.' Of course I let him see all, and I then presented him with a good shawl, whereupon he made me a present of 20s. Before he went away, however, he would make me promise to bring my wagon to his kraal next morning. He then took another glass of rum, and with his following set out on his return.

Nov. 5.—The next day the oxen were inspanned in order to keep my promise according to agreement. About noon we came to his kraal 'Ezulwini,' not far from Bishop Schreuder's Mission Station. As soon as I arrived he sent me a fine young beast for an old debt, and two hours afterwards he came himself to the wagon with two of his men. He first said that he wished to buy from me the piece of black baize (52 yards), and I had to unroll it for him, and say how many blankets he could cut out of it. He then wished to give me 4s. a yard for it, since, as he said, it cost no more than that in Durban. Of course I could not do this, nor could I make him understand that I must have something for bringing it into Zululand. This not having been made clear to him, he wished to buy picks, but wanted forty for a cow. Of course I could not agree to this, and so in the end he bought nothing. However, he still had a great deal to say about all sorts of things, about trade, and about the approaching war. According to his ideas, since they had now as good weapons as the Whites, they would be stronger than the English; for the King was abundantly supplied with powder and lead and caps, and, even should the powder come to an end, this would be no such great hindrance, since there were

Zulus enough who could themselves make powder, so that they would have no want of ammunition for six years to come.

Nov. 6.—Next morning I put the oxen again to the wagon. Just as we were inspanning came Mr. Dabulamanzi once more to the wagon, in order, as he said, to bid me farewell; he said further ‘if I could not sell my goods, I must come back to him, and he would then buy everything from me’—of course at his own price. Dabulamanzi, though a sharp trader and fond of a glass of gin or rum, is held in much respect by the Zulus.

From this place I went back just past one of the King’s Kraals which is built there. Here I bought two sacks of mealies for my Kafirs, and a fine young beast from the Inkosikazi (head-woman). It was a rainy day and few Zulus were to be seen. But before evening there came a Zulu well known to me, and asked, as many had done, about the war. I replied, as always, that ‘I knew of no war, but had come in to trade.’ He asked me ‘Where would I trade, since all the Zulus had gone up to the King, and the White Troops were already at the Tugela, with the purpose of presently entering Zululand?’ I replied that ‘I knew, of course, that the Zulus had gone up to the King; but I had no

knowledge that the soldiers had come to the Border.' But I did not suppose that there was much danger in this, as I thought that they had only come to the Border to protect the Whites in case the Zulus should think of coming over into Natal. I had no fear, therefore, of war and went forward.

After giving my oxen another two days' rest I went on to Nodada's, a place on this bank of the Umhlutuze River. From here I sent back two of my people to Natal, to get a little information about the war. After they had started we had a terrific thundershower, so heavy as I had very rarely seen. I set off from here and went across the river, where I intended to wait for my Kafirs, who would not return very quickly. Another of my Kafirs was so ill that I was obliged to send him back to his family, where, as I heard afterwards, he died.

At the end of four days my Kafirs came back from Natal with a letter from home in which my friend wrote that 'the soldiers, it is true, had come to the Border, but it would probably be some time yet before the war would break out, and I had better go on and buy cattle, since they were at a high price and would become still dearer.' So I went on fearlessly; since Mr. Dunn was also still in Zululand, I saw no danger in advancing further.

On the following days there was little news, nothing but rain and wind, so that travelling was now far from pleasant. There was here an extraordinary demand for mealies among the Zulus, who wished to buy for cattle, since they had very few in store, and their gardens also promised no early and profitable harvest.

Nov. 17.—I met Mr. John Dunn not far from Kwamagwaza. Going from my wagon to his, I asked information from him about the war, and whether it was dangerous to go on. He replied that ‘the Whites would not cross the Border, and Cetshwayo would soon come to good terms with the English. But,’ Mr. Dunn said, ‘you must not listen to the soldiers of the young regiments, who are rather insolent, but do no real harm.’ I was thus set at rest about the war by a person who in my opinion must know all about the state of things within Zululand and without, and who, no doubt, did know thoroughly.

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At this time the Zulus were all dispersing again to their kraals.¹ In a few days a party of chief men were to set out for the Lower Tugela in order to talk about the war. Of course, all that I now got to hear came from the people, and so I can answer very little for the truth of it all. Unfortunately I knew no longer what day of the month it was; for I had lost my reckoning, and, having no almanac I could no more set myself right.²

¹ 'The greater part of the men ordered to the King's Kraal some time back have returned to their homes, in many instances without being regularly dismissed. They express great dissatisfaction at the conduct of the King, *having been set to hoe his crops, instead of being sent out to war*, as they expected—and this without food, as he allows them nothing: all they eat must be brought from their homes.'—Mr. Robson, Border Agent, Dec. 5, 1878 [2308, p. 22].

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The Zulus were very friendly towards me, and trade was unusually good. Chief men came to me continually, both to buy and to talk over the now-impending war. The main part of the talk of the persons of most importance and of the people was that the Whites¹ 'were very bad people. Since they had only just before set the King upon the throne, why had they now come to fight with him, in order to kill him and take away his country from him?' In fact, the Zulus had the idea that the Whites had come to capture all the males, to be sent to England and there kept to work, while the girls would be all married off to (white) soldiers, and their cattle would, of course, all belong to the English Government. Hence, when it came to fighting, they fought not for the King only, but for themselves, since they would rather die than live under the Whites.

According to my notion it was now December 20. I had left the Emahlabatini² district, not out

sire to have conveyed at the same time—may have reached the King about Nov. 24, so that Mr. Vijn, who had 'lost his reckoning,' may be here referring to what he had heard from the people about Nov. 28–30.

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of any fear of the natives or want of good trade, but through want of food. No mealies or Kafir-corn, no milk or beer, could I buy here, so that I was obliged to go on further in the hope of finding food.

Two days afterwards (December 22) I reached the Great Kraals on the other side of the Black Imvolosi, whither I had sent in advance one of my Kafirs; and so, as soon as I had outspanned, I speedily bought mealies, and on the very next day I had bought so much that I was in a position to purchase a beast for mealies.

The weather was daily excessively bad, rain and wind, the rivers always overflowing their banks.

There was very little news about the war. According to report, the persons who had been sent by Cetshwayo to the Lower Tugela had not yet come back(5). Also I now became aware that the Whites had demanded from Cetshwayo three or four persons—Assegai (Sihayo)(6), Mehlokazulu, Nkumbikazulu, and Umbilini. A council had been held about the surrender of these persons. The Chief men generally, and most of the King's brothers, *e.g.* Hamu, Ziwedú, Siteku, and some others, were of opinion, and desired, that the persons demanded by the English should be seized and surrendered. But Cetshwayo and the Zulus were of

quite another opinion; so also were Dabulamanzi, Zibebu, and Maduna the King's full brother. They thought that these persons should on no account be given up; 'since the Whites would here be only acting in their usual fashion, and, very probably, when these had been given up, they would again demand others, and therefore it was better to fight at once, since it evidently must come to that.'

What the King may have said on the return of the Chief men sent by him, I know not, since I was not with him. But I do know that, when the Chief men (Sintwangu, Vumandaba, &c.) had returned, 600 or 800 cattle must have been collected, which, according to what I heard, were being sent by the King to Natal, to pay for the persons demanded by the Government(7); but these cattle, as I was told, were driven back by the Zulus, and slaughtered and stolen, not far from Kwamagwaza. The Zulus, when they were with the King, refused to agree with the chief men, and said that they would take the four persons into their midst, and die together fighting against the English. In this state of things what had the poor King to do? The report came that the English were over the Border. Of course he sent out his host to fight; one part, the

largest, was sent to the Buffalo River, the other portion to the coast.

At the end of the year 1878 I sent one of my Kafirs to James Rorke, who kept a store at Hamu's. Two or three days afterwards, about sundown, he came with his man to my wagon, both on horseback. We had much to talk about that night; for certainly our position was anything but pleasant; if war began between the Zulus and the Whites, very probably we also should be made shorter by a head. In the morning we went back together to his (J. Rorke's) place, partly to have some more conversation with each other, partly because a good horse was for sale in the neighbourhood, which I was minded to buy, so that, in case of need, I might make my way out as quickly as possible. When we came to the place (Reintorf's old Mission Station¹) I found there the person who had the horse for sale; he spoke with me about the price, and promised to send for the horse that same day, since it was not at his

¹ 'I further desire to inform Y. E. (Sir G. Wolseley) that another station, "Esihlengeni," situate near Hamu's head-kraal, during the absence of the Rev. Reinsdorf on duty, was also taken possession of by one James Rorke, under the plea that permission had been granted to him by Hamu, and he refused to give the same up on Mr. Reinsdorf's demand.'—Rev. K. Holts, Superintendent of Hermansburg Hanoverian Missions, Sept. 8, 1879.

house. I looked out for it day after day, but nothing appeared. At last, after six days, the message came back that the person who had the horse in keeping for the owner wished first to have his expenses paid before giving back the horse. The owner, therefore, sent back again the same day, because I was in haste, and wished to have the animal speedily, as I purposed to return back to Natal.

A secret message came from Hamu (Oham)(8) that James Rorke must get all ready for a flight. His Kafirs must carry all their goods to hiding-places, and the cattle must be collected, the news being that the Whites had come over into Zululand.¹

According to my reckoning it was about January 10, 1879, when two of my Kafirs, who had been left at the wagon, set out from it and came to me in the morning with tidings that 'I must be at the wagon that very day, since Zulus had come from the King's place, who had one or more messages for me.' What was I to do? A horse was speedily borrowed with a Kafir, who should bring it back the next morning. On that day before sundown I reached

¹ Colonel Wood crossed into Zululand, and so began the Invasion, on Jan. 6, 1879 [2242, p. 19], whereas the thirty days allowed in the Ultimatum ended on Jan. 10.

my wagon, where I found seven Zulus, who said that 'they had been sent by the King with a notice that I was to collect my cattle and goods, wagon and oxen, whatever I had, and they were to take me to the King's kraal, and then the King would give me other men to accompany me to Natal, so that, as I had only come to trade, no harm might befall me in his land.'

All this seemed certainly very nice and good. But why, then, had they taken away my weapons? If they had nothing in view with regard to us, they ought not to have done this. Should I try to get these back with pleasant talk or with threats? All in vain! they would not give them back to me, because 'they were afraid that I should shoot them!' No! they would not give back to me a single gun, and said that 'I must now go and sleep, and they would come back to me next morning and say what I must do.' Seeing that I could do nothing else, I went and lay down to sleep under the wagon after a cup of coffee.

Next morning, half-an-hour after sunrise, the Zulus came to the wagon and said that 'I must have the oxen inspanned within half-an-hour, and also must have all my cattle collected within an hour.' While we were packing the goods in the wagon and

inspanning the oxen, I heard the Impi (armed party) whispering among themselves, and made out that they had not been sent by the King at all, but by Zibebu, son of the late Mapita. When the wagon was inspanned, the Impi went to the kraal where they had slept, to get their blankets and mats. As soon as they had gone I went forward with the wagon on the way to the King. I had not gone more than two miles when the Impi came running fast and crying after me saying that 'I must stop! Where was I going? This was not the way by which they would and must take me. And where were all my cattle?' I replied that 'I was on my way to the King, and my cattle had been all along at Ulundi, because here I had no pasture.' They replied that 'the King and his people had marched out to go and fight with the English, since the Whites had crossed the Border, and taken away all the cattle at the point of the assegai(9); and they (the Impi) had been ordered to take me and all my belongings into Zibebu's country, and every one of my Kafirs must go away to Natal.' I saw now only too plainly that they had no good intentions towards me, but would kill me in some uninhabited place.

Two Zulus, who worked for me, were now driven away with assegais and sticks. Four of my Natal

knowledge that the soldiers had come to the Border.' But I did not suppose that there was much danger in this, as I thought that they had only come to the Border to protect the Whites in case the Zulus should think of coming over into Natal. I had no fear, therefore, of war and went forward.

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forward to see how I had fared, and to protect me from any further rough attack.

Glad was I when this had thus far come about happily for me, though I knew not what might befall me later on. But, trusting in my good star, I returned to the place where so much trouble had come upon me. On arrival I found that I had still a young beast left to me in one of the neighbouring kraals, which I sent for and gave as food for my people and the two King's Indunas, since they were hungry and I had nothing else for them to eat, for the Zulus had carried off my food as well as everything else that I possessed. The beast was slaughtered about 4 P.M., just when my other men had arrived with the King's Indunas to bring everything back to me. At all events they could now see something to eat, for they were very hungry.

Next morning I set out with two of my young Zulus for the place which the King had appointed for me; while the rest of my people went in the direction in which the Zulus with my goods had gone. I reached the place appointed towards evening, viz. a small kraal close to, and under the shadow of, the Royal Kraal Umbelebele, it was well known to me, as also the natives of that place knew me well. On my arrival they raised a great lamentation over

me; but they wondered that the Zulus had not killed me. Then they enquired how all had happened, and by whose order; whereupon I told them all that I thought proper to tell them, to which they listened with attention, amazement, and disgust. When I had ended my story, they brought me a pot of Kafir beer, which I very soon put inside me.

Two days after I came here my wagon and oxen, goods and blankets, were brought back. Also my people, with the help of the two King's Indunas, had got back into their hands my plundered cattle. But, when they came near, I very soon said that my two Natal Kafirs, who had gone away with the wagons &c. were not there. On arriving, the first words, with which the other Kafirs greeted me, were that 'Mubi and Sopiti had been killed by the Zulus in the bush of the Black Imvolosi River, one of them shot, the other assegaid.' I asked 'Why had they left the wagon?' My Kafirs replied that 'the Zulus had told them that they had gone with the Impi because the Impi had promised to take them to Zibebu, who would assuredly see that they returned safe and sound to Natal. But, when they reached the Black Imvolosi, they were at once put to death, without any notice to the world.' And this, doubtless, would have been my fate also, if I had gone with them.

All my property had now been brought back, except my three fire-arms, two blankets, and some small goods, with three sacks of corn. They had found the oxen and cattle scattered over the whole district, three or four together; the wagon they had found at a kraal, whose inhabitants had used it as a house, thinking that they were now become as good as whites.

Jan. 21.—No news on this or the three following days.

Jan. 25.—About 2 P.M., while I lay in the hut, talking with one of the men of Ziwerdu (Cetshwayo's brother), who had been sent by the King to learn about me, whether I was alive, and how it went with me, our attention was drawn to a troop of people, who came back from their gardens crying and wailing. As they approached, I recognised them as persons belonging to the kraal in which I was staying. When they came into or close to the kraal, they kept on wailing in front of the kraals, rolling themselves on the ground and never quieting down; nay, in the night they wailed so as to cut through the heart of anyone. And this wailing went on, night and day, for a fortnight; the effect of it was very depressing; I wished I could not hear it.

The reason of this was that the headman of the

Kraal, Msundusi, a trusty person and the husband of four wives, had fallen in the fight at ISANDHLWANA. It is true, on that day, the Zulus overpowered the Whites, and killed them in a way which my pen cannot describe, more than 1,200 Whites having been there put to death in a dreadful manner. But also of the Zulus, according to their account, many thousands had been left behind on the field—Dabulamanzi told me they were buried—never more to return to their homes, and still more were wounded.¹

On this same day also (January 22) the English on the Coast fought a battle with the Zulus,² when the Whites routed the Zulus to and over the Umhlatuze River, where the Zulus held their ground in the bush. The Whites now began to build a fort at Etshowe, an old Mission Station (Mr. Oftebro's).

Rough and dangerous were the times which now broke for me. Repeatedly there came a hundred Zulus, with uplifted spear-points flying at me, and

¹ Mehlokazulu, when examined at Maritzburg (Note 6), stated, 'I heard that about 300 Zulus were killed at Rorke's Drift. It is not known how many hundreds were killed at Isandhlwana; there might have been 1,000 killed there. They were buried in the mealie-pits in two kraals, some in *dongas* (gullies) and elsewhere. Zulus died all round Isandhlwana.'

² This was the battle fought by Colonel Pearson's force at the Innyezane River.

threatening to kill me, 'the white dog,' and then to cut me in pieces. Sometimes, in fact, they were almost crying with rage, wanting to kill me. But each time they were afraid of the King's Indunas.

The King was very glad when he heard that his people had gained the victory over the Whites, and thought that the war would now be at an end, supposing that the Whites had no more soldiers.¹ His people, or rather a portion only of his people, brought to him the oxen and cattle captured from the Whites, as also some wagons—I saw only an ambulance-wagon—and two cannons, about which they were wild with delight. But the greater part of the booty, as blankets, fire-arms, cartridges, clothes, gold, had been carried home to their own places by most of the Zulus,² at which the King was much

¹ 'The Zulus told me that, after the Battle of Isandhlwana, John Dunn sent a message to the King that 'he must send his army to the coast, and, if he beat the Whitemen there, he would be all right, for the Whitemen would then be finished off, since the Army on the coast was all they had left.'—C. Vijn.

² 'Only two cannon were taken to Cetshwayo. They remained on the field a long time—I should think about 10 days—and then they were sent for by the King, and brought down in a wagon.

'Only four wagons were taken to the King; but Matshana took a number of wagons, and Sihayo four.

'Each man helped himself to matches and such other property as they could lay hands upon and carry away.

'Each man also helped himself to ammunition. The cases

displeased. The King was angered also because his people had gone over the Zulu Border into Natal; for he said 'It is the Whites who have come to fight with me in my own country, and not I that go to fight with them. My intention, therefore, is only to defend myself in my own country, where they themselves made me King a few years ago(10).'

The King's army on the coast was stationed at the Umhlatuze River, from which they came, from time to time, to fight with the Whites at Etshowe, where they kept them for two months entirely shut up, purposing to starve them out.

According to report there came about this time a Tonga doctor to the Zulu King, offering his services, viz. for killing the Whites by poisoning the springs of water for them. But the King would not listen to this. He said that 'he would not fight with the Whites in any such inhuman manner, but he would fight in honourable fashion, for he had men enough for this(11). Also he gave orders always to his people that, 'whenever they were able to get Whitemen into their hands alive, they were not to kill them, but must bring them to him.'

At a certain time—I think, in the end of February of guns and ammunition were smashed open and broken with stones. It (the ammunition) is in the country; we have returned some of it.'—*Mehlokazulu*.

or beginning of March, but I cannot remember the time exactly—the rumour went through the country that Hamu had gone over to the Whites with his people and cattle. Hamu, in fact, had from the first been opposed to going to war with the Whites, and had advised that it was best to give up the men demanded by the English Government, to which, as I have already said, the Zulus would not agree. Hence Hamu now went over.

Different accounts reached me about this running away of Hamu. At one time, it would seem, he had shut himself up in an underground mountain-cave, so that other chief men came to beguile him with talk, asking 'why he went over to the Whites, and what harm they (the Zulus) had done to him, since he had always been a great and prominent person in Zululand'(12), adding that 'if he of his own accord came out of the cave, no harm would be done to him.' At another time it was said that Hamu had been caught and brought back to Cetshwayo. But nothing seemed to be certain. At all events Hamu got safe and sound to the Whites. Then they told me that on his arrival the Whites had stripped off his head-ring, and all his women and girls had been married off to Natal natives.¹

¹ There was no truth whatever in this report, nor in the

On its being reported that Hamu had deserted to the Whites, the order went round from the King immediately that his people (soldiers) must come up to pursue after Hamu, and bring him back alive or dead. In this pursuit various atrocities were committed. All, old or young, who refused food to them, were killed by the Zulu force, now an old man, now an old woman, now a young girl. When the Zulus saw that Hamu was not to be caught, they went back to the King. He was much vexed that Hamu had not been brought a captive, but said 'It does not matter that Hamu has gone away, if he does not come back again to fight against me. But my cattle, which Hamu has carried off with him, ought according to the law¹ to be restored by the Whites—more especially as they were the cattle which my father (Panda) gave me.'

About this time the Army was again called upon statement, published at one time in colonial papers, that a number of Hamu's wives and children had been massacred by Zulus.

¹ Cetshwayo means the 'custom,' or compact, recognised and acted on for some years past in Natal, of surrendering on demand to the Zulu King the 'cattle' which might have been carried off by male refugees, while their persons were protected. At one time the Natal Government understood women and girls to be included under the designation of 'cattle;' but, of late years, under Sir H. Bulwer, the cattle given for them when married, as *ukulobola*, have been handed over instead of the persons of females.

to oppose the Whites. According to report the Zulus were to be sent to the coast.

All this while I continued still at the place which the King had assigned for me. Repeatedly, or almost every week, Cetshwayo sent to me to ascertain how I was getting on. One day two Zulus came to me saying 'We are come to you, having been sent by the King with the word that all your cattle, which are spread over the Zulu country, must be collected; for he fears lest they should be slaughtered by his people, since the Zulus are now so insolent and reckless that they have slaughtered even royal cattle; why then should they spare yours?' But I did not put much faith in all this, and, in order to see if it was true, I sent a Zulu whom I knew to the King to learn the truth of the matter. After five days he came back with two others of the King's people to get my cattle together, and take them to this place and that, under the name of 'royal' cattle. The Zulus who had brought the word to me previously, appeared to be wholly unknown to the King, and, no doubt, they wanted to get my cattle in this way into their own hands. The King, however, ordered that 'whoever had slaughtered one of the Whiteman's cattle should restore one of the same size'—which was done.

The Army of the Zulu King was called up at this time to the head kraal 'Nodwengu.' It was said that the Zulus were to be sent to the coast, to do battle with the soldiers; but they had first to be doctored by three Basutos. I only know or understand imperfectly in what that doctoring consisted. The Zulus, when they go to battle, are not allowed to make much noise, to go after girls, to discharge a fire-arm, or besmear with blood an assegai. If they abide faithfully by these conditions, the bullets of the Whites will slide off their skins, and they will gain the victory.

We were all under the impression that the Zulu Army had gone to the coast, when all at once the tidings spread that the Zulus had been defeated by the Whites at Kambula. On the day previous the disastrous conflict had taken place at the Hlobane Mountain, where the Whites had been cut off, and surrounded, by the Zulus. Here, indeed, the King's General, Umbilini, managed to get into his hands one Whiteman (Grandie) alive; but all the other whites were killed. This was not done by the King's Army, but by his northern battalions under the command of the aforesaid Umbilini(13). Next morning the entire Army of Cetshwayo arrived, which seems to have gone into fight without much

consideration. As soon as they saw the tents of the Whites, each regiment of the King rushed to get at them as quickly as possible; from all quarters they flew at them. But the Whites too were ready, and received them with a rain of bullets. The Blacks, however, came nearer and nearer; but—what the Zulus had not expected—when they came to the place, there was a stone laager, and they found that the Whites had been too sharp for them, for they were too near to avoid it when they first got sight of it. Still the Zulus did not give up heart; they came at them through the gates; and some brought out of the fort blankets and iron pots, to show the King what they had done. About sundown the Zulus were put to flight, and, when they once began to run, there was no further resistance. But the darkness favoured them, for the Whites then returned to the fort. But for the laager which the Whites had made, they would very certainly have been killed by the Ngobamakosi, before the arrival of another Zulu regiment(14).

Next morning half the King's army was no longer visible; helped by the night they gave themselves only to flight, until they reached their kraals. Not more than a third of the army remained with

Mnyamana, Zibebu, and Maduna.¹ The Whites also seemed to have had enough of it, since they began to retire. When Mnyamana saw that the Whites had come forth out of the laager, he wished those remaining of the army to fight again, since the Whites had no more ammunition. But Zibebu would not hear of this, saying that 'it would be playing a dangerous game, since most of the Zulus had taken to flight.' So those Zulus who remained took their way back to the King.

I now heard an unusual amount of talk from the Zulus. Among other things they said that the

¹ 'The King and his full-brother Maduna are two of the finest men in the whole country. Cetshwayo is every inch of him a king, and whatever he says is to the point. The King's only son is still alive—about 9 or 10 years old, I believe.'—C. Vijn.

Cetshwayo's son, Dinuzulu, is older than Mr. Vijn supposes, having been born before the great fight between Umbulazi and Cetshwayo in 1856; he must therefore now be about 23 years old, and he belonged to the Ngobamakosi regiment. But Cetshwayo has also an infant son, born to him by a daughter of Seketwayo. Cetshwayo's grandmother, the great wife of Senzangakona, was also alive at the beginning of the war. 'When the English force came, the Zulus begged her to quit her home and go away; but she refused, and when they urged it, she said that "she did not wish to live any longer and be troubled; for, when Chaka was killed by his brothers, she was left in charge of Dingani, and, when Dingani died, she was protected by Mpande, and Mpande left her to Cetshwayo, and now Cetshwayo, without having done any wrong, is being killed by the whitemen!" Thereupon the Inkosikazi (Queen) took a knife and cut her throat and died.'—Magama.

mounted red-coats were very much afraid, and quickly cried and ran away, whereas the mounted black-coats and foot-soldiers were generally not afraid of death, but fought on until they died revolver in hand.

Further the Zulus asked me 'what it meant that at the beginning of a battle so many white birds, such as they had never seen before, came flying over them from the side of the Whites? And why were they attacked also by dogs and apes, clothed and carrying fire-arms on their shoulders?' One of them even told me that he had seen four lions in the laager. They said, 'The Whites don't fight fairly; they bring animals to draw down destruction upon us.' Also, 'Why did the Whites cut off the heads of those who had fallen, and put them in their wagons? What did they do with these heads? Or was it to let the Queen see how they had fought?'¹

When the King heard of the lost battle and of the many men who had fallen, he was exceedingly angry, and asked, 'Who had given the word for his people to be allowed to fight against Whites who

¹ There may be an allusion here to some regimental or private 'pets,' while the 'cutting off of heads' may refer to 'skulls,' which (it is well known) were carried off by some Whites from the battle-field.

had already entrenched themselves, since even in the open field one Whiteman was nearly as good as ten Zulus?' The King was much grieved for the people who fell at the laager, many of whom belonged to the Ngobamakosi, his favourite regiment. For the King's plan had always been, whenever the Whites should have entrenched themselves, to make his army pass by them, in order thus to bring the Whites into the open field, or else to surround them from a distance, and make them die of hunger. But his people had not patience enough for all this; and, each time they fought, they must go and rest again for two or three months before beginning another fight.

At this time Umbilini and Mnyamana came to the King with the White prisoner (Grandie) taken at Hlobane; all this, however, I heard only by report. When they arrived, tobacco and gin (or rum) was supplied to the Whiteman by the King.¹ Further the King ordered that no harm should be done to this prisoner, but, at the end of the war, he

¹ 'The King was no drunkard; though he drank a little gin, I never knew him to be the worse for liquor. I had seen the King on several previous occasions; but during the war I was never in his presence until called to interpret Lord Chelmsford's letter.—C. Vijn.'

should return to the land of his own people. For the present, however, he (Grandie) was to go back with Umbilini, to build a kraal for him. Afterwards Umbilini and (so it was said) Nkumbikazulu (brother of Mehlokazulu) were killed, when engaged in stealing horses(15). Then Grandie managed to escape, although I don't believe his story(16); if he had killed a Zulu, as he says, they would not have spared *me*.

Now first I heard that the Zulus a few weeks before had suffered a very severe blow on the coast, whereby they had been put to flight and driven into a flooded river, so that many lost their lives. Also there were Tongas¹ in this force, who had had so much of the war that they had returned straight to their own land. What Cetshwayo said about this I know not. I only know that the Zulus said that the Whites had made a large, wide, round defence of thorns. The general remark of the Zulus was, 'Why could not the Whites fight with us in the open? But, if they are too much afraid to do this, we have never fought with men who were so much afraid of death as these. They are continually

¹ The Ama-Tonga (Tongas), an unwarlike people, living to the N.E. of Zululand, and E. of Swaziland, were subject to the Zulus.

making holes in the ground and mounds left open with little holes to shoot through. The English burrow in the ground like wild pigs. The Boers are of more worth, who dare to come at once into the open field.'

Much had I now to endure from the people; above all they abused me. Then one said that 'he would come stealthily upon me by night in order to kill me'; while another said that 'he would bring another Whiteman to me, and then I should have company. Only I must not be afraid that any harm would be done to me, since no one would dare to venture upon that, through fear of the King; for I was Cetshwayo's property, and would have now to make fire-arms and cartridges for them.'

At this time, in the beginning of May, the girls of the King's brother, who lived not far from me, told me that, having taken beer to Ziweddu, they had seen two Boers with the King at Maizekanye(17), men with large hats and long beards; the King had given them an ox on their arrival, and two oxen at their departure. I asked what the Boers had done with the King or had come to do. They told me that the Boers had intended to join Cetshwayo with all their people, to fight together with the Zulu King against the English. Whether Cetshwayo

distrusted them I know not. He told them, however, that for the present he had no need of their assistance, but, in case he needed them, he would send for them. But then they must fight in front, since otherwise they might deceive the Zulus, and, instead of helping them, might fall upon their rear. 'No doubt,' said the King, 'the Boers are better than the English; for Panda was set up as King by the Boers, and died as King; whereas I, Cetshwayo, was crowned by the English, and, now that I have been King only a few years, my country is taken from me, and I, if they get hold of me, shall be killed or carried off to another land.'

A Zulu once told me that Kafirs had come from John Dunn, to ask if the King would agree that the Whites, since they were tired of fighting, should come and make payment with wagons and chests full of gold(18). Then said the King, 'Why have the Whites come to fight with me? They are in my land: I am not in their land. Let the Whites, therefore, go back with all their gold, which I don't desire. I desire nothing more than to remain King over my own land; that is all. Go back, therefore, and say that I do not want their gold; they might come with soldiers in the chests in place of gold.'

About the beginning of June two men came to

me with two horses, saying that 'I was to mount one of them, and we were to go to the King; for the King wished me to make haste and come to him, in order to translate for him the letters which had come from Natal.' This seemed all very pleasant and good; but I did not place much confidence in the men who had come to me with the horses. However, go I must; there was nothing else to be done.

It was a rainy morning when we started. At every kraal we came to they had to supply us with food, and find also food for the horses, which was always done without a murmur. On the other side of the Black Imvolosi we decided to pass the night in one of the kraals; we got there at 3 P.M., so that there was time enough to slaughter a beast, since we would gladly have something to eat. Also we were so lucky as to find there a good quantity of beer, which was very acceptable after a long ride on horseback.

As we went there were also numerous bodies of Zulus going to the King. At some places they were insolent towards me; some pointed loaded guns at me, others made feints at me with their assegais; but, for fear of the men sent by the King, they never went to extremes, and I got safely through,

though my heart more than once began to beat, and I thought of my parents, brothers, and family, that I should die without their ever coming to know where and in what way I had perished. But thanks to Cetshwayo ! his word was as good as law, at least as far as I was concerned.

Next morning we went on again. Our way was through bush-country the whole day, and we saw nothing but troops of Zulus going up continually to the King. Some of them were amazed to see a Whiteman in their midst ; some or many of them knew me, and said that 'I belonged to the King, and the King had now sent for me to write letters for the soldiers.' All were ready to believe that ; but some were only sorry that they could not, and must not, wash their spears in my blood. An hour before sundown we came out of the bush into the open, and stayed to sleep at the first kraal we came to. We did not get much to eat, there being scarcity of food in the kraal.

Next morning the weather was quite different. The morning-tide promised us a very pleasant day, and we pressed on our way more vigorously to Umbonambi, one of the Royal Kraals, where the King was at that moment. About 11 A.M. I rode into the kraal, and in less than five minutes I had more

than a thousand Zulus about me, who pressed around me rather too closely; but they were speedily dispersed by the headmen of the kraal, with a word that 'whoever dared to touch me would be killed by the King immediately, and, if he escaped, his family should suffer for him.' To this the Zulus replied 'Why did the King assure him that at a later time, when the war should be over, he should go again to Natal?' The headmen answered for the King that 'he never meant to keep me always as a captive; his single object was that, by keeping me safe and taking good care of me, he might give proof to the Whites that Cetshwayo would not allow a White-man to be put to death for nothing, one who had come to him with good intentions, but was just like a White Chief, who also suffered no man, who had not deserved it, to be punished or put to death.'

The horses were now led away, and a hut was assigned to me, lying for my security between those of Mnyamana and Ziweddu. When I had washed, I was called by Mnyamana, who had got a pot of beer ready for me, thinking that I should perhaps be hungry. When I had partaken of my beer, a fine, nice piece of meat was brought to me, so that I was soon able to say that I was all alive again. Then

he brought to me a letter which, as he informed me, had come about seven days ago. It was dated June 4, 1879, and was written by order of Lord Chelmsford, because the King had sent messengers to him asking for terms of peace, 'since quite enough men, white as well as black, had fallen in the war, and it was time now to make peace.' The letter was addressed by Col. Crealock to the White Trader, reported to be at Ulundi, with a request that I would translate it to the King. Its contents were very friendly and very simple; all that Cetshwayo had to do, before the final terms of peace could be considered, was '*to restore all that his soldiers had captured in the war with the Whites or, rather, had carried off*,' all horses, oxen, arms, ammunition, and other property taken during the war; though, on 'the representations of the messengers,' this demand was modified in a *post-scriptum*, dated June 5, to his giving up at once the oxen now with him, and the two 7-pounders, and promising to give up the arms and all the other things demanded, when collected (19).

The bearer of the letter said that Lord Chelmsford would not burn Nodwengu, as it was Panda's kraal.

I translated the letter correctly for them, so that

they quickly understood it, and mastered its contents completely. My work was now done for this day.

Next day—as I suppose June 14—I was called to the King. I saluted him by simply taking off my hat before him, whereupon he greeted me saying that ‘I was a good man, since I had not taken to flight, and had shown that I trusted him.’ The King was sitting on a large roll of matting, with a handsome striped shawl on his shoulders, and a spear in his hand. He appeared friendly, but anyone observing him would see that he was sorrowful and had a presentiment of his approaching calamity.

Very soon he brought up political matters, and bade me take pencil and paper out of my bag, and write down at his dictation. When I was ready he began as follows—‘Ask them how I can make peace when the Queen’s Army is daily capturing my cattle, burning my kraals, and killing my people? I believe that, if they go out of my country, I shall make peace with them. But, if they go on doing what they are now doing, it will not be my fault if a calamity comes; and then they will say, if White-men lose their lives, “It is all Cetshwayo’s doing!” whereas it is they who are doing it.’ The King said also ‘Say that Hulumente (Sir H. Bulwer),

Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone), and Mr. John (Shepstone), who have brought on this war, should come to speak with me in order to bring the war to an end.'¹

I now wished to have a reply to the letter of Lord Chelmsford; whereupon the King said that 'Of all that was there (at Isandhlwana) lost and destroyed, he had received very little; almost all had been carried off by his people to their kraals. What he had received was the oxen, though many of these had been slaughtered by his people before they came to him, and many had died afterwards of lung-sickness, so that only very few survived. But,' said the King, 'all this I did not take from the Whites out of their country; I merely defended myself in my own country, and overcame them there (at Isandhlwana), when, of course, my people took possession of all their goods.' So to Lord Chelmsford's letter he would give no reply, without first having another talk over it with his chief men.

¹ 'He seemed very dejected, and complained that he had been urged on too fast, that he had never objected [?refused to comply with] any of the terms of the ultimatum, but wished to discuss them further with H.E. the High Commissioner, and the Lieutenant-Governor; Somtseu too was to be present and everything was to be freely and fully discussed.'—*Statement of two Christian Natives*, reported by Col. Durnford, R.E., Jan. 8, 1879. [2242, p. 37.]

Thereupon my letter, written with lead-pencil, was sent off by four Zulus(20).

Every day there came large bodies of Zulus to the King, who got cattle from him to slaughter daily, but had also to bring corn out of their own gardens daily into the King's Kraal.

Seven or eight days afterwards we went with the King from Umbonambi to Umlambongwenya. I went with a headman ahead on horseback early in the morning, to seek out a hut for us in the Military Kraal. The King arrived two hours after us on foot, accompanied by all his people, who came singing after him. Before him went about twelve girls, who carried his blankets, mats, &c.

The King stayed here two nights only. From thence we went on to Umggikazi, where he ordered eight fine bullocks to be slaughtered. In two hours more he reached his Kraal 'Ulundi,' where he slaughtered the same evening ten more oxen. On the second day the four messengers came back who had been sent with my note, bringing it back again, and saying that 'they were not high enough persons to talk about Cetshwayo's country; others therefore must come. But, if they came with empty hands, they might as well go back again, since Lord Chelmsford desired to have a strong proof that he

(Cetshwayo) was tired of the war.' The messengers said that 'they were threatened that, if they came back, they would be shot(21); and they were so frightened at the reception they met with that they brought back my note without delivering it.

Next morning therefore I had to write again almost the same words, except that Cetshwayo sent 100 oxen and two or three elephants' tusks, with the assurance that the two 7-pounders were on their way.¹ Thereupon there came back a letter from Lord Chelmsford to say that the King had not fulfilled what he was required to do; but, inasmuch as something had come, he (Lord Chelmsford) gave the King still two days more, to fulfil the other conditions(22).

Next morning there went off a letter from Cetshwayo with another appeal for peace(23); on the outside of which I wrote in pencil, at the risk of my life, a warning to Lord Chelmsford, telling him that he must take care and be strong, since the King had 20,000 men with him. And he sent also, as a token of his sincerity, the sword of the Prince, and 100 of his own white oxen, full-grown and fat,

¹ This letter, which was duly received by Lord Chelmsford, was probably forwarded by him to the War Office. Mr. Vijn only states from memory the substance of its contents.

which, when they had come to Nodwengu (about half a mile), were turned back(24) by force to Ulundi by his people, where they inveighed against him violently, and said that 'the cattle should never be given up to the Whites so long as they lived' (25).

Thereupon he made a powerful speech against his people, during which they stood before him perfectly mute, without saying a single word. His address was to this effect:—'In two battles you, my people, have gained the victory; in three or four others the Whites have gained it. After which of these battles did my people come back to me? After not one of them, whether gained or lost (26). No! At this moment the Whites are on all sides, west, south, east, and north. And, if to-morrow there should be another battle, you will all run away, and the Whites will follow and capture me only, and afterwards carry me away.' Then his people swore to Cetshwayo by the bones of their fathers, that, 'whether the day should be won or lost, they would come back to him.' Cetshwayo, it is plain, meant to save himself with these oxen, for he seemed to have a presentiment that he would lose the ensuing battle.

Towards evening there came down some wagons

and soldiers from Entonjaneni, and next morning the King went back from Ulundi to Umhlambongwenya, I, of course, and his people going always with him. As soon as they reached the Kraal the King went with his people and formed a circle below—i.e. in front of—the Kraal. Then he sent half his people to bar the way on the side behind Nodwengu, and half on the side of Bulawayo, but with orders not to fire first upon the Whites. His intention was to guard against the Whites coming over the White Imvolosi.

On the day before the Battle of Ulundi there came a force of Whites on horseback over the White Imvolosi; but they were driven back with the loss of two or three men. The King was told that 15 Whites were killed.

Afterwards, in the afternoon of that day, the King went away—we knew not whither (27).

Next day at sunrise the Whites came over the river, and formed a square in front of Nodwengu. The battle began; I myself sat with some of the King's brothers and Great Chiefs upon a neighbouring hill to see the fight. About 9 A.M. the Zulus began to take to flight, and, once having shown their heels, they did not so easily come back again. Consequently we also took to flight; they would

not let me go back, thinking that I might be of use to them. Would it not also have been dangerous to meet full-butt the Blacks in their flight? Assuredly an end would have been made of me in that case.

After fleeing three miles in an open country we came into the bush. There was seen a sight indeed—women, old men, girls, children, cattle, and even wounded men from the battle among them! If Lord Chelmsford had pushed on after the fight, he would have captured them all, and the King also, and brought the war at once to an end.

Where the King was no one could tell us. We ourselves slept that night in the bush. After that we went, for eight or ten days together, from one place to another, without knowing where the King was. All the Zulus near the Black Imvolosi had left their kraals with their cattle and belongings; part went to the Bombo mountains, and part to the Ngome forest. The King gave orders for all the people to return with their cattle to their kraals at this time. He wished to collect four of his regiments, Ngobamakosi, Umcijo, Umbonambi, and Nokenke, to build a kraal for him, as his own were burnt. But this order was not carried out.

The troops captured at Ulundi two Zulus, who

had brought to the King a letter from Sir G. Wolseley addressed to Mnyamana, Tshingwayo, Seketwayo, Zibebu, telling them to come in with all the King's cattle and their guns, &c.(28). The King had sent for me to his hut, and told me to write a letter to Sir G. Wolseley and another to Mr. Fynney (Border Agent). I had to tell Sir G. Wolseley that Hayana, brother of Zibebu, Mzilikazi, Vumandaba, Mavumengwana, Sintwangu, and another, were sent to say that 'the King was getting his cattle together to send in, but they must give him time, as they were scattered all over the country, and his people were killing them one after another—that the English should take pity on him and leave to him the country of his father.' I was to say to Mr. Fynney that, 'if he would say a good word for him to the Government, he would be paid well with a good herd of oxen.' I know that the letters were delivered; but I saw no more of the messengers who took them, and who were captured by the troops at Ulundi, nor do I know the result.

Mnyamana, Tshingwayo, &c. did come in with some of the King's cattle; but they were detained, and were sent to a small kraal, Esindeni near Ulundi(29). Also three of the King's brothers,

Ziwedu,¹ Sukane, and Mgidhlana, came in soon afterwards to surrender, but were not allowed to go away. They were afraid that the Swazis, with whom they were threatened by Sir G. Wolseley, would come and kill their women and children, and were told that they must send out their people to bring in the King, and that they would not be released till he was caught. Ziwedu told me this. In fact, even after the Battle of Ulundi the Zulus treated me very well.

At last we found the King in one of Mnyamana's kraals, not far from the Ngome forest. While I was with the King at this kraal, I had a talk with him in which he asked 'What did the English want him to do?' I said 'I did not know certainly; but I supposed that they were angry because he had turned out the Missionaries(30). He said 'Well! the Missionaries were very troublesome; they wanted to be King over me, and, when I wished to talk with the Governor of Natal, they came and told me that I must do so and so, as if they were kings in the land, whereas it was not their country, but mine.' As to the marrying of the young men

¹ 'Ziwedu' is not mentioned in the Official Notice (Note 29) as having surrendered; in fact, he 'came in' the day afterwards (Aug. 16) and was 'detained.'

he said that 'he was quite willing to let all the regiments marry, except the three youngest.' He said also that 'he was willing to give the English all the country on this (the Natal) side of the Umhlatuze; but, if they divided it at the White Imvolosi, they would take away the whole country.'

After staying there fourteen days he went back and remained ten days in Ziweddu's kraal in the land of Nongome. While there he received more than one notice that he must come himself to the Whites. Also I did my best to persuade him in that direction; but, being made afraid by others, he dared not venture to come in, lest he should be shot dead or carried over the sea to Robben Island.¹

When he heard that the troops from England had again come back into Zululand, he asked himself the question 'What to do now?'—since he had heard from a Kafir sent by Mr. Dunn that 'the Whites had not come back of their own accord, but had been brought back by the coast Zulus, who said that Cetshwayo had again collected other troops

¹ Of course Cetshwayo knew the story of Langalibalele. But he had also (Note 29) been warned by Dabulamanzi that this would be his fate, if he surrendered, and he had probably heard the same from others, white or black, before the war began.

and was up in arms, and so the English forces came back again.'

The King has complained much about John Dunn, 'who,' said he, 'has enjoyed so much from me, and who was as good as King, on which account he has now come to fight against me, in order to kill me and be King alone.'

The Zulus also told me that John Dunn had sent to say that 'he was buying up all the King's cattle for him, but his money was at an end, and he could not buy any more.'

After the Battle of Ulundi 600 or 700 of the King's oxen were sold to Dunn and Woodhouse (butcher) privately, not by auction, for 2*l.* a head, each well worth 5*l.* in Natal, and splendid King's white oxen, worth 20*l.* each in Natal, most of them inoculated, were sold to the same men for 10*l.* each.¹

One of the King's brothers told me that, if it came to 'talking over' the matter with the English Chiefs, as Cetshwayo so often desired, John Dunn would get into a scrape with the Whitemen. For Cetshwayo himself did not want to get guns until

¹ From a perfectly independent and trustworthy source it appears that such private sales took place more than once, at prices ridiculously low compared with those which might have been obtained in open market.

John Dunn told him that, 'if he did not, he would be a fool, and be a child in the eyes of other nations, and they would invade his country and take away his cattle. So he bought the guns—chiefly from John Dunn himself.' In fact, Mr. John Dunn has introduced many thousands of guns into Zululand, which cost him 10s. 6d. each, and each of which he sold at first for ten head of cattle, which gradually dropped to one head; and finally, when other traders brought in the same guns, he tried to keep them out by selling two or three guns for a beast. In fact Mr. Dunn has made a very large fortune by the King, against whom he has now been fighting.

Well! on a certain day the King told me to go to Sir G. Wolseley and tell him that 'he (Cetshwayo) had no more army, and was employed in collecting his cattle to hand them over to the Whites.' When I brought this message to Sir G. Wolseley he asked me to go by myself and find the King and persuade him to surrender. Being a Dutchman and having been in close intimacy with the King, I was afraid of the consequences of refusing to do his bidding and I undertook the task. But I said, 'He will have gone away from the place where I left him, and I don't know where he is now.' Sir G. Wolseley then offered me a bribe of 200*l.*, and promised to keep

the matter of this payment secret; he told me to go to-morrow before sunrise; he would give me three days to bring him in; but, if I managed it in two days, he would give me 50*l.* more.

Accordingly next morning I started early from Ulundi, and before sundown I reached the place where I had left the King. Here I offsaddled for an hour and took food, and at sundown saddled-up, having made enquiries, but not having got any information, except as to the direction in which the King had gone. I set out for the kraal of Ziwedu, the King's brother, which I reached about 10 P.M., when it was dark. I off-saddled and went into his hut, where I found him and several other brothers of the King and other headmen. He asked me what I had done. I said that 'I had told Sir G. Wolseley that the King had no *Impi*, and was quite alone, and was collecting his cattle to give them up.' They asked what Sir G. Wolseley said about that. I said that 'Sir G. Wolseley had sent me with a message to the King and his brothers. I must tell his brothers that they must surrender and bring in guns and royal cattle, and, if they would do well, they must try to persuade the King to come in, and, if he would not, they must take him by force, and bring him in. And I must tell the King that he

was no longer king, that, if he surrendered, he would be treated well, no harm would be done to him, and his life would be spared, but all his cattle belonged to Sir G. Wolseley.' Then I told Ziwedu to send the others out of the hut, and when they were gone I asked him to tell me where the King was. At first he said that he did not know; but I said 'I must see him and speak with him.' He then told me I could sleep now, and in the morning he would give me men who would bring me where the King was.

Next morning I saddled-up and started with one native guide to bring me to the King, and after ten miles came where he was on the Mona River. I went to the King's hut; he called me in and allowed no one else to enter, so that we were alone. He greeted me and asked me what I had done. I said, as before, that I had told Sir G. Wolseley he (the King) had no *Impi* and was collecting his cattle for surrender. He asked anxiously what Sir G. Wolseley had said, and I told him that Sir Garnet had said that he was no longer King, and never should be again, that he must surrender, and his life should be spared, if he came in of his own accord.' He asked me what kind of man the Great Chief was. I described him as well as I could. But the King said

'That is not the Great Chief, because he is not travelling with Dunn, as this one is, and he is very tall; and the one who is travelling with Fynney and this one travelling with Dunn are two deceivers, who are trying to get my land.' In fact he was greatly confused to know who was really the Great Chief, as there appeared to be so many who claimed to be so.¹

I tried hard to get him to go with me to Sir G. Wolseley; but he said 'It was not safe for him to do so; so soon as he appeared he would be shot.' I said that he might trust me that he would not be shot. But he would not go, saying that 'he could not believe the English, he could not depend on them; they play crafty tricks (*ba namacebo*)'(31); and he bade me go back that same day and see the Great White Chief. He also said that 'the White people ought to leave his country, taking all his cattle and all the guns, and leave him in peace with his people, to dig the land and get food.' At that

¹ Sir B. Frere, Lord Chelmsford, Sir G. Wolseley, Sir H. Bulwer, had each been called 'the Great Chief.' At one time also, no doubt, Sir T. Shepstone, who had installed Cetshwayo, and had been received with the royal salute 'Bayete!' was 'the Great Chief' for the Zulus. But Mr. Vijn says, 'At the Blood River Meeting with the Zulu Indunas Sir T. Shepstone was angry because Mnyamana called him by his name "Somtsen," and said that he was only an Induna like himself.'

time the Zulus would have given up all their guns at the King's command.

I went away on my return and came to Ziwedú's, to get another horse. He asked me what the King had said; I told him he was afraid to come in. Ziwedú wanted to go with me to Sir G. Wolseley, together with his brothers Sukana and Gidhlana, but did not like to do so without the King's knowledge. So I went away, slept in the bush, and reached Sir G. Wolseley on the third day, going right into the camp. They asked what I wanted, and one went to Sir G. Wolseley, who came to meet me, and told me to go to Dunn's wagons (half-a-mile off) and he would come directly. He came very shortly after me, and asked me if I had found the King. I said that 'the King was afraid to come, but his brothers were coming.' He told Dunn to give me food, and said that we were to start at 3 P.M. with 500 mounted men under Major Barrow to capture the King, I and E. Thring going in front as guides.

We started as ordered, and went on till sundown. When we were going down the Emahlabatini, about ten or twelve miles from Ulundi, having been about two hours on the road, it was very steep, and all dismounted, except myself, being lame.

But it soon became very dark, and the country

was thick with bush, and, though we were on the wagon-road, it was impossible to see the track, the grass being as high as a man. Just as it became dark, twelve shots were fired in the bush, the sounds coming from different quarters. We could not imagine what they meant; but the troops thought that the King's Army was in the bush, and that they would be presently surrounded. I assured them that there was no Impi. Then they found out that one of the soldiers was lost, and that this was the cause of the firing, and they fired twenty-five shots themselves. We then went on with eight or ten lighted lamps, very judiciously giving notice of our coming. Twice we missed our road and so lost from two to three hours. At last we came out of the thick part of the bush, and E. Thring went to a kraal well known to him, where he got two natives as guides. We now went on very well to the Black Imvolosi, which we reached about midnight, and then stopped an hour, without off-saddling, lighted fires and cooked some coffee, and started again about 1 A.M. Between 1 and 5 A.M. we only went $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles; it was always 'halt! halt! halt!' I told Major Barrow that, if we went on at this rate, it would be impossible to reach the King's place before 8 A.M. (whereas I had expected to get there by 5 A.M.). Major Barrow

said it was impossible to go any quicker, as they could not leave behind any stragglers for fear of an Impi. We changed guides at the first kraal we came to, and went on and reached the top of the Nongome ridge about an hour after sunrise, the men having all dismounted for the ascent, and I also, though lame, as the horses were tired.

On the top of the ridge Major Barrow wished me to point out the place where the King was. I pointed out the direction in which it lay, but could not see the place itself. He asked how many miles further it was. I said 'About ten miles.' He did not like that, being, I suppose, tired and sleepy. When we came near Ziweddu's kraal Major Barrow asked me whose kraal it was. I told him it belonged to Ziweddu, one of the King's brothers. Major Barrow proposed to seize him, and tie him up, to make him tell where the King was. I did not agree to this, as he had always treated me very well. So we passed by. At every kraal natives brought guns and assegais, wishing to surrender, but were told to take them to Sir G. Wolseley at Ulundi. We descended a steep hill, crossed a little spruit, and then climbed up another steep hill, where the soil was of red clay and slippery with dew. All dismounted again here, and had great difficulty in getting up.

When we reached the top it was now about 11 A.M., and we halted for an hour, without off-saddling. Major Barrow asked how many miles further it was now. I said 'About six miles, I supposed.' We went on about four miles, and I then pointed out the spot, though the kraal itself was not visible. Major Barrow asked how many miles further it was, as we had come four miles, and it seemed to him a long way off yet. I said 'I do not understand English miles, not being an Englishman'—four English miles make about one Dutch mile—'I had only gone this way once, and had not measured the distance.' Major Barrow said 'I don't believe you know where you left the King. I think you are misleading me.' I then said 'If I told you six miles before and we have gone four miles, you should know that there are two more without asking me.' Major Barrow said 'You must know that I am in command of these troops and you are under me.' I said 'I am not a soldier, but a private individual.' He again demanded the distance to the kraal where the King was. I then said 'I did not know or, rather, I could not tell him.' He told me to point out the direction. I said 'I think it is that way' (pointing). He said 'You only think; you don't know.' I replied 'I think that is the right direction—two hills up

and two hills down.' After that he was angry with me and disliked me.

A quarter of an hour afterwards we reached the kraal where I had left the King, which seemed empty and deserted. The troops rode up and surrounded it; it was now about 1 P.M. At last three Zulus appeared, one of whom said that the King had left in the afternoon of the day previous, and pointed out in what direction he had gone. 'The King,' he said, 'had gone to a kraal in a valley by the Mona River about a mile away.' This river runs between very high, steep, and stony hills, between which are lateral ravines covered with bush.

We off-saddled here for three hours, and the troop was divided, half the men remaining, the other half advancing with picked horses. I saw no more of those who remained behind; but I believe that they stayed there three or four days. We went on to the kraal where the King had slept the night before, and heard that he had killed a beast there the very morning on which we arrived. As soon as we had topped the Nongome ridge, he was informed that troops were coming, and went away no one knew whither. A Zulu told us that he had gone to Mbopa's country (Kwa' Hlabisa). After many difficulties in crossing rivers and mounting hills we

reached Mbopa's kraal. On topping the hill just before reaching the kraal we saw the flash and heard the report of a gun a long way off, which was meant, I think, as a signal for Cetshwayo. We off-saddled close to the kraal, the horses being tied in a square on the outer sides of which we lay. We asked Mbopa and his men to tell us whither the King had gone; but they either could not, or would not, tell us.

Next morning at sunrise we saddled-up, taking possession of Mbopa and his men, and went on to the kraal of his son Nkabanina. On arrival we found the kraal deserted by its inhabitants, but full of royal cattle, some of which we seized for food; I don't know what became of the rest. We off-saddled and sent out scouts, who by noon had collected forty Zulus. I did not know at the time that Lord Gifford had gone on with part of the force to three other kraals of Nkabanina. Major Barrow required the forty Zulus to tell whither the King had gone, and said that he would shoot one of them if they did not tell him. They could not, or would not, tell him. At this time one of Jantje's mounted natives came with the news that they had caught one of the King's horses and three of his followers; but, on one of the latter running away, the other two were sent

after him, and all three disappeared together. We then went after Lord Gifford, came up with him about 4 P.M., off-saddled, and slept at two kraals of Nkabanina.

Here Major Barrow and Lord Gifford tried to get information from the people as to Cetshwayo's whereabouts. All the huts were plundered of their little valuables, and the stores of grain were taken for the horses, but without success. Among the Zulus here I recognised an old man, one of the King's household-officers. The people told us to ask him, as he had left the King that morning. He stated that, 'though this was true, he knew nothing about his hiding-place now.' At last, about 8 P.M., he agreed to show us next morning the direction in which the King had gone.

We saddled-up at sunrise, the troop being again subdivided into two parties, each with four Zulu guides to trace the footsteps of the King. At first our progress was difficult, owing to the thickness of the bush. We found many spoors, but could not make much of them. At 9 A.M. we met again, and went on together, following a spoor which we thought was the right one, as we saw a broken pot that had contained beer, which had probably been used by the King. But we lost the spoor on the

north side of the Black Imvolosi. A few men crossed the river which was here wide and low, but bad through quicksands. Three men, with their horses, were spilled and rolled over in them, and could not cross. We were now about twenty in number, Major Barrow and Lord Gifford being with us. We fell in with a Zulu who told us that he had been sent by Mnyamana to tell the people to surrender their guns, and he was allowed to go. He said that he had heard at a kraal of Somkele, three miles further on, that the King had been there. Lord Gifford went on with a few men to that kraal. I wished to follow, but Major Barrow would not allow me to go, as I was riding his favourite horse which was tired, and said that I must go back with him across the Black Imvolosi. I did not, however, cross the river, but remained with three mounted Natives whom I found there. Major Barrow with a few men rejoined those who had been left on the other side of the river.

Half-an-hour before sundown two mounted men arrived, who had been sent back by Lord Gifford to Major Barrow to say that Lord Gifford had information about the King, and would go on in pursuit. We then started to follow Lord Gifford, but, it being dark, we missed our way, and were unable to

find him and his party. At daylight we went on, but could not overtake them. Lord Gifford had gone on to Emkandhlwini, a Military Kraal on the coast. An officer (Capt. Nourse, I believe) with ten or fifteen men went to seek information at a kraal at a junction of the White Imvolosis. Major Barrow told off four guides to await his return, and then started for Ulundi with the remainder of the force. I remained with the four guides. Thring told me that Major Barrow wished me to go to Ulundi. I said that I did not wish to go. Afterwards, two mounted men, sent by Major Barrow, came to know why I did not join him, as I was not allowed to go with Lord Gifford. So I went with Major Barrow to Ulundi. After I had joined him, about two miles from where the four guides were left, Major Barrow collected all the food he could spare, and sent Jantje and some of his men to take it to Lord Gifford.

That night we slept at Maizekanye, which had been fired by the Zulus, as had been ten of the thirteen Military Kraals near Ulundi, including Ulundi itself. There were twenty-seven Military Kraals altogether. I wished to go on to Ulundi, but was not allowed to do so, because the horse which I rode (Major Barrow's) was tired.



Next morning we started for the camp at Ulundi. When we had passed Umbonambi, we met a detachment of foot-soldiers with John Dunn's wagon-driver as guide. They were searching for goods hidden away in caves. Major Barrow went to the camp, and I to John Dunn's wagon, where I slept, sending back Major Barrow's horse to the camp.

Next day John Dunn went early to the camp, and on his return said that I had better go to Sir G. Wolseley and tell him all about the matter, as Major Barrow laid all the blame of failure on my shoulders, saying that 'I had taken him by a road twenty miles longer than was necessary.' I went to Sir G. Wolseley about 8 A.M. He came out of his tent, and I told him that the fault was not mine, as he had sent too many men with me, who could not travel fast enough, and made too much noise, firing guns and displaying lanterns.' I said 'if he had given me fifty Natal Volunteers, the King would have been in his hands before now.' He said 'Why the devil did you not tell me that before?' I reminded him that 'I had told him that I only required fifty men; but perhaps he did not remember that. And I could not tell, when we started, that five hundred men would go so slowly.' Sir G. Wolseley said 'You took them by a wrong road, and up and down

steep hills, where the men had to dismount.' I said 'I did not make the country myself; it is as it is. I took them the same way I had gone before.' He said 'I am sorry,' and I said 'So am I,' and he 'But you are not so sorry as I am. However, go your way, and I will send you a little present.'

Dunn told me that, when Major Barrow came up, Sir G. Wolseley said to him 'Why have you come back? You are not the man who ought to have come back. If you had been out for ten months, you ought not to have come back without the King.' A party was sent out again that very morning before 8 A.M., to follow up the pursuit of the King. But they did nothing but capture King's cattle, and burn kraals, and plunder all the huts of curiosities. I have seen a soldier with four milking-bowls over his shoulders, two in front and two behind, four or five girls' bead-fringes round his waist, three men's tail-pieces slung over one shoulder and below the other, like a shawl, a number of bangles on his wrists, on his hat a Zulu's ball of feathers, four or five assegais in one hand and six or seven knobkirries in the other. Many of the officers also wore copper and brass bangles as the spoils of war.

In the evening I received from Dunn ten sove

reigns for my trouble from Sir G. Wolseley through Sir P. Colley.

Next day I got a note offering me the post of interpreter at 1*l.* a day, and, as I was doing nothing, I agreed to the proposal.

Next day I was sent out under a staff officer (whose name I forget) with twenty-five men. We went through the bush over the Black Imvolosi, and slept not far from Zibebu's Kraal. I do not know what particular object we had in view.

Next day we went as far as the first kraal belonging to Zibebu, where we offsaddled. We found here some guns which we smashed, but no Martini-Henrys. Then we made the owners of the kraal give up their stored mealies for our horses, which they did very unwillingly, being afraid of starvation, and one actually cried, saying that 'they would have nothing now to eat.' The officer took only half the mealies from that kraal, and took the rest from another kraal. He then sent for the headman of this second kraal, and sent him with a message to Zibebu that he must surrender, and bring in his guns and royal cattle, and if he did not come in two days' time, they would come and burn all the kraals in his country and take all his cattle. At 2 P.M. we saddled-up again and started on our

return to Ulundi, but slept not far from the Black Imvolosi.

Next morning we saddled-up and reached Ulundi safely. That same day a large force was sent out, horse and foot and natives, to the Black Imvolosi wagon-drift, to prevent the King passing there. Troops were spread at this time in every direction over the country.

Next day I stayed at Dunn's wagon, who was out with the force, but separate from them.

Next day Dunn and I, while at supper, received a summons from Sir G. Wolseley to come at once to him. When we arrived Sir P. Colley told me that 'I was wanted to go on an expedition that night; he had a good horse for me, and our party would be about twenty-four Whitemen and sixty Natives on foot, with two Zulu guides, who had brought information that a sick Zulu had seen two *ingcekus* (household-officers) of the King with the Umtunzi (King's shadow, meaning the King himself), and we were to go and capture the King.'

We started and went all right till midnight; but then we came to the bush, and we had to go down a very stony hill, where they all had to dismount except myself. I was in front with one of the guides, the other being with the Natives in the

rear. And every now and then a cry was heard 'Where is the guide? Where is the interpreter? They go too fast.' When we had got down the hill, the officer in charge said 'I was to tell the guide not to take them by such bad roads, by which it was impossible to go, and I was to ask him how many miles further we had to go.' I told the officer that 'the Zulu could not tell him anything about miles;' but I could not make him understand this.

Now we went on through bush and stony places, sometimes dismounting, sometimes halting to pick our hats up (I lost my hat three times). We crossed the Black Involosi about an hour before daybreak, and came to the place where the King and his two servants had been seen. We surrounded four kraals there, but did not find any trace of the King, although he had been there three days before and had killed a beast there.

We now killed a beast and tried to get information as to the direction in which the King had gone. They pointed out where the King was. But the officer said that, 'inasmuch as we had neither blankets nor food, and the King was three days ahead, it would be impossible to follow him up.' So we returned to Ulundi. And, although I wished to follow the King with the Natives, I did not mention



my wish, because previously Major Barrow had not allowed me to follow up Lord Gifford. We came upon the other troops stationed at the wagon-drift of the Black Imvolosi, where we off-saddled, and had food, and at 4 P.M. set off again for Ulundi.

My road to Dunn's wagon branched off about two or three miles from Ulundi, and I wished to go on to the wagon with the horse I was riding. But I was not allowed to do so, and was told that I must go on with the horse to the camp, which I did not like to do. So I had to dismount and proceed to the wagon on foot, and got there about an hour after midnight.

Two days afterwards I went to the place where my wagon and oxen were, and made ready to start for Natal. The day on which I got it ready the news reached us that the King was caught at a kraal on the Ibululwana, a small stream which runs into the Isikwebesi, where the country is open, on the border of the Ngome forest (32).

Next morning I started with my wagon and oxen, and seventy head of cattle I had left,¹ and went on to Ulundi, having to pass it on my

¹ It appears that these cattle, the produce of his sales of goods in the early part of his trip, together with his wagon and oxen, were kept safely for Mr. Vijn under the King's protection.

way to Natal. When I got to Ulundi the King was now in front of me about seven miles, having reached Ulundi the day before I did, so that I had no opportunity of seeing him, as he was gone before I arrived. When the King was captured, about 4,000 head of cattle taken from the Zulus was restored to them.

I now went to Mr. John Shepstone and stated my claims for compensation from Zibebu for two hundred head of cattle, either stolen from me by his people—probably under his orders, for he bears a bad name—or destroyed by disease which they had caught in his kraal, also for three guns stolen at the same time, and for the murder of my two men. Mr. John Shepstone said that he had nothing to do with it, being only here as interpreter, and ‘I must go to Sir G. Wolseley.’ So I went to Sir P. Colley, and he told me to set my claim down on paper, and he would lay it before Sir G. Wolseley. I did so, and the same day in another paper I represented my claim for the 250*l.* promised me by Sir G. Wolseley, as I had done my work in two days and a half. Having delivered these letters I went away to John Dunn’s wagon, and came back in the afternoon, when I was told to go to Sir G. Wolseley’s secretary, who said that Sir Garnet

would not allow me the 250*l.*, because the King had not been caught through me ;¹ but he would give me 50*l.*' So I was paid 40*l.* more. As to the claims against Zibebu he said that 'he (Sir G. W.) could do nothing ; even if they had killed me, the murderers could not have been punished, because it was their own country, and we traders went in at our own risk.'

I went back to Dunn's wagon and there I met Zibebu, and I asked him for ten head of cattle he owed me for goods obtained on a previous trip. He said 'he had no old debts now ; the war had cleared off everything, and he would not pay me.' Of course he had just been made one of the thirteen petty Kings in Zululand, together with John Dunn, Mlandela, Somkele, Mgotshane, Hamu, Seketwayo, Mgitsho, Mfanawendhlela, Gaozi, and three others, whose names I do not know. The Zulus told me that, when Hamu left to join the English, he said that he should be made King of the country, and they asked me how it was possible that he should be made King by the English, when he was much more bloodthirsty than Cetshwayo, and had killed

¹ It would seem that the troops were put upon the right scent by Mr. Vijn, who took them to the place where he had left the King, from which they tracked him to his last retreat.

through his doings many more men than Cetshwayo, for it was he that gave the order to the Tulwana regiment at the Umkosi (Feast of Firstfruits), January, 1878, to attack the Ngobamakosi, who were disliked as the King's favourite regiment, and who had nothing but stakes to fight with, whereas the Tulwana went and got their assegais out of their huts nigh by. The King blamed him for that, and Hamu, not liking the reproof, went away (33).

After that I went home to Natal. I am now going to trade in Swaziland, as under the present system it is impossible to trade in Zululand. How can a man trade there, when he has to make arrangements with each Chief, and John Dunn alone demands 25*l.* from everyone who wishes to trade in his territory, even though he has but a single wagon.

It is equally impossible, in my judgment, that the present 'settlement' of Zululand should last. The Zulus are certain to fight among themselves, and there is no central Government to restrain them. I believe that, if Cetshwayo were brought back and set to rule the country under the supervision of a Resident, it would be far better governed for the good of all parties than it can possibly be

under the present arrangement. I believe that the Zulus would be glad to see him back again, the army being broken up, and the young men left free to marry. And Cetshwayo, after this terrible war, would, I am convinced, readily agree to all this, or he would even be glad to have allowed him in his father's land a place where he might live as a private individual.

C. VLIN.

P.S.—During my four years' experience I never heard that the King was killing many people, nor do I believe that he has killed to anything like the extent with which he has been credited. My belief is that the statements made in 1877 to the Natal Government [1883, p. 2] by two of Mr. Oftebro's converts, that 100 people had been butchered in one day, shot with guns, not killed with assegais, and that the Zulu People, great and small, were tired of the rule of Cetshwayo, are absolutely false. I have been in the country three-quarters of the whole time since October, 1874, and I never heard anything of the kind. As to the killing of girls in 1876 it is utterly impossible that *many* girls were killed(34). I deny emphatically, and totally disbelieve, that Cetshwayo was a bloodthirsty tyrant; though he had, of course, to enforce from time to

time the laws of his country, and, if he had not done so, where should I have been, who owed my safety to the order maintained by the King?

I remember distinctly two cases of killing which came under my notice. In one case a man had committed adultery with one of the King's women, and, on confessing his fault, he was pardoned. On a second offence, which he also confessed, he was put to death. In the other case a man, Umkogwana, was charged with witchcraft, and said he knew that he was brought up to the King as an *umtagati*. John Dunn, who was present, said 'then he must be an *umtagati*, else he would not know why he was brought up.' Umkogwana said 'I am not an *umtagati*, but there (pointing to Dunn) is the snake who will kill you and be King over your land.'

I heard the above from trustworthy Zulus, and they are the only two cases of which I have certain knowledge. I have heard of other cases, where men have been brought up as *umtagatis*, and not killed. In fact, it was not the King who killed in most cases, but the jealousy or superstition of their own people.—C. V.



NOTES

BY THE BISHOP OF NATAL.

Note 1, page 3.

‘I found that there were all sorts of wild rumours going about from station to station (in Zululand), one that *the British Government intended to annex Zululand at once* (1877). I am afraid that this and the like rumours have done harm. Several of the missionaries have been frequently to the King of late, and, as he has told me, have worried him to such an extent that he does not want to see them any more.’—Mr. Fynney, July 4, 1877 [*Blue Book*, 1961, p. 47].

‘I observe that an impression prevails in Zululand to the effect that the country is likely to be annexed to the British dominions at an early date. I should much regret to see this belief gain ground either in Zululand or in any of the neighbouring countries.’—Lord Carnarvon, Aug. 31, 1877 [1961, p. 60].

Note 2, page 6.

'I found the Zulu King in a very excited state to-day. He said that rumours had reached him from Natal that the Natal Government had taken steps to completely surround him, and that their intention was, if they could, to seize Cetshwayo, as a message had come from the Queen across the water to ask if it was true that Cetshwayo had said that he was equal to Her Majesty, and, if so, he was to be bound and brought to confront her, and that I was only blinding him as to the movements of the Natal Government, and that he intends taking steps to *protect himself*, as he could not be taken as a child. He is quite correct about the reports which reach him as regards the movements on the Natal side, raised, I am sure, by a lot of inconsiderate Whites, for the sake of mischief.'—Mr. John Dunn, Oct. 10, 1878 [2260, p. 53].

'Three Zulu messengers, sent to me by the King, just arrived, inform me that the Zulus are all arming by order of the King.

'It would appear that some one has informed the King that the Natal Government intends to invade Zululand with the purpose of taking him, and that the arming of the Zulus is a precautionary measure.'—Mr. Fynney, Oct. 24, 1878 [2260, p. 55].

Note 3, page 8.

The Zulus supposed that the *northern* column (Col. Wood's), as it came from the direction of the

Transvaal, had been sent by Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone), and accordingly they spoke of it as 'Somtseu's *Impi*.' This idea was, no doubt, confirmed in their minds by the fact of its including a Volunteer Mounted Force of Border Boers under Piet Uys.

The allusion here made by the Zulus to 'the Boers being on their way to fight with them in their own land' probably refers to this column, and especially to the fact that about the middle of October, 1878, Col. Wood 'sent from Utrecht a detachment of troops to Lüneberg' [2260, p. 46], in the district north of the Pongolo claimed by the Zulus—and apparently not without reason—as part of their territory which the Boers had 'annexed,' as well as that south of the Pongolo, which the Commissioners declared to belong to the Zulus, and which was actually given to them by Sir B. Frere, but a considerable portion of which has since, for reasons of policy, been again 'annexed' by Sir G. Wolseley and given to the Transvaal under English rule.¹

Accordingly Mr. Dunn says [2260, p. 54], 'One report is that *a large troop of mounted men have gone to take possession of the disputed land on the Pongolo, where the kraal was built.*'

¹ 'The *Transvaal Argus* has reason to believe that the new boundary-line between Zululand and the Transvaal will remove many of the heart-burnings which existed among some of the farmers living in the disputed territory.'—*Natal Colonist*, Oct. 2, 1879.

Sir Garnet Wolseley has stated that the tract of land he has re-annexed includes all the farms—which, according to the Commissioners, had been eaten out of Zululand—except two.—*Official Statement.*

And on Nov. 10, 1878, he writes in the King's name [2308, p. 16], 'Cetshwayo states that he thanks H.E. for the message brought by Umgwazi, and states that the reason of his calling his men up was on account of hearing the reports brought to him about *an armed body of men being sent to the Transvaal Border*, and the reason for his sending to Mr. Fynney and Mr. Jackson was on his hearing that there was an armed force to be sent into the Zulu country to seize him.

'Cetshwayo hereby swears, in presence of Mnyamana, Hamu, Ntshingwayo, and all his other Chiefs, that he has no intention or wish to quarrel with the English.'

Note 4, page 8.

'Chaka was assassinated on Sept. 23, 1828, by his brothers (Dingane and Mhlangana), at his residence, "Dukuza," in this colony (on the Lower Umvoti); and he lies buried where he was killed in one of the *erwen* of the newly laid-out town called "Stanger."—Sir T. Shepstone [1137, p. 4].

The grave of Chaka has not been disturbed, nor rifled of its contents by sacrilegious hands, as that of our faithful ally and friend, the late King (Panda), Mpande, has been at the end of the war, to add another disgrace to the English name.

'We were going with some soldiers and natives under Col. —; there were 400 soldiers and 180 natives. In the morning the Colonel and officers asked John Dunn—"Where is the grave of Mpande?" He

pointed with his hand and showed where it was—a long way off. We started after breakfast, and got there about noon. The soldiers took with them four spades and a pick. John Dunn went with us, and pointed out the place again when we came to it. Mpande's grave was in the middle, fenced in with stakes, and with other graves around it. It was in the midst of a thicket of bush; but some of the trees had been burnt last year by a grass-fire. The soldiers first pulled up the stakes and made fires with them to cook their food. Then came two soldiers with spades, and another with a pick, together with Col. — and Mr. —. They dug up the King's grave, and came first upon some stones and wicker-work, and then they took out his bones wrapped in his blankets. I stood near enough (about ten or fifteen yards off, as indicated) to see that there had been four blankets of different colours wrapped round the body, one inside the other, and outside there had been a kaross made of jackal-skins; but this last was quite rotten, and three of the blankets also were much decayed, though one seemed to be sound and held together. The white men were surprised and said, "How is it that the blankets have lasted so long (seven years)?" The black people asked our captain, "What are you doing, digging up a man's bones?" Said he, "We are doing it in order to catch the King; for, now that we have dug up his father, we shall soon catch him." So they took out all his bones, a soldier belonging to the hospital handling them, and I saw the bones of the King, and the skull with the teeth, and the leg-bones—they took them all, and

put them into a box which had held food (biscuits), and shut it up, and put it in a mule-wagon to carry it away. We asked our captain, "What would be done with them?" Said he, "They will be carried across the sea to be looked at." Then they put back the stones upon the grave, and covered it over, and we went away. John Dunn did not stay all the time; he showed the place, and saw them pull up the stakes, and then went on.—Statement of a Natal Native Pioneer.

The conduct of the English in rifling Mpande's grave contrasts strangely with that of the Zulus, as described by the Correspondent of the *Times of Natal*, dating 'Umlalazi Plains, July 22, 1879.'

'I have just been talking to a man who has been to Etshowe with the Staff, and he tells me that the church and houses are all burned, pulled down, or destroyed. *The cemetery has not been interfered with in any way by the Zulus, and the whole of the monuments remain as left.*

Will Mpande's bones be sent to England? If so, where will they be kept—or (?) exhibited? And by whose orders was this deed of shame committed? Besides the infamous act of sacrilege, could a greater and more deliberate insult have been offered to the whole Zulu Nation than this?

Note 5, page 16.

As the meeting at the Lower Tugela took place on Dec. 11, the Indunas would in fair weather have returned to the King about Dec. 16. Mr. Vijn says that, according to report, they 'had not yet come back,

on Dec. 22, having very probably been detained by the rivers always overflowing their banks.'

This simple instance shows how hard and unfair it was on the part of Sir B. Frere to insist on strict punctuality on the part of the Zulu King with reference to his Ultimatum, as where he says [2222, p. 222], '*But rigid punctuality with respect to time will be insisted on, and, unless observed, such steps as may appear necessary will be immediately taken to ensure compliance.*'

Note 6, page 16.

It was not Sihayo himself, but his brother Zuluhlenga, together with four of his sons (Mehlokazulu, Bekuzulu, Nkumbikazulu, and Tshekwana), whom Sir H. Bulwer 'requested' Cetshwayo to send down 'to be tried by the laws of this country for the serious offence they have committed in it' [2220, pp. 126, 197]. Of these four Bekuzulu was afterwards dropped out of the list, as having been with the King at the time of the raid [2260, p. 32]. Nkumbikazulu was identified among the sixteen killed by Lord Chelmsford's force on Jan. 12, the day after it had crossed over into Zululand [2242, p. 47], and nothing more has been heard about Tshekwana. But Mehlokazulu gave himself up after the Battle of Ulundi under an assumed name, with a number of others, and, being recognized, was arrested and sent down to Maritzburg, where he arrived on Sept. 4, and was lodged in the Gaol, but was subsequently examined and discharged and sent back to Zululand.

Before this act of Sihayo's sons, however, which oc-

curred towards the end of July, 1878, Sir B. Frere had been laying his plans with a view to the Invasion of Zululand, as appears from Comm. Sullivan's statement, April 12, 1878 [2144, p. 32]: 'H. E. (Sir B. Frere) pointed out to me that, as it appeared almost certain that serious complications must shortly arise with the Zulu Tribe of Kaffirs on the borders of Natal and the Transvaal, which *will necessitate active operations*, he considered it better that the "Active" should remain here, *in order to render such assistance by sea and land as may be practicable*;' and again he writes on Aug. 12 [2220, p. 136]: 'The object of my visit here (Natal) . . . to *make myself acquainted with such points on the Coast as might be available for co-operating with Her Majesty's land-forces by landing troops or stores*.' It appears also from the fact that early in July, 1878, Lord Chelmsford made particular enquiries of a gentleman from Durban, then in Capetown on his way to England, as to the time of the year when he went up with Sir T. Shepstone for the Installation of Cetshwayo in 1873, and as to whether cannon could be taken into Zululand, and, being told that cannon were taken up on that occasion in September, he turned and said to one of his Staff, 'That is just the time when we shall be in Zululand.'

This is the same gentleman, a leading member of the Natal Bar, to whom, in June, 1878—just after the Missionaries, acting on Sir T. Shepstone's advice [2252, p. 22], had quitted Zululand, but before the raid of Sihayo's sons had occurred—Cetshwayo sent Mr. John Dunn with a message to this effect—'Tell Mr. — that, in conse-

quence of various rumours and reports that have reached me from Natal, I begin to be uneasy, and afraid of getting into trouble with the English, and I wish to be advised what I am to do. I have no desire to fight, and I want all the English to know that I wish for peace. I want Mr. — by means of the paper (*i.e.* newspaper) to make this known to all.'

At this time Mr. — was completing his arrangements for a voyage to Europe, and was unable to give the subject that serious consideration which he would otherwise have done. He, however, desired Mr. Dunn to inform the King that, so long as he remained quiet within his own territory [which he did] he would be perfectly safe, and he (Mr. —) and all the White colonists would see that no harm was done to him; but, if Cetshwayo sent his men across the border to commit any depredations in British territory, then he (Mr. —) would be one to lay down the 'paper' and take up his gun.

Note 7, page 17.

There were many indications in the Blue-Books that Cetshwayo was in good faith collecting cattle in order to pay the fine, or more than the fine, demanded.

'The headman Sikonyana reported to me yesterday that the young chiefs, just down from the King's kraal, had informed him that Cetshwayo had collected 500 head of cattle; Mnyamana and the other chiefs were to make up the number.'—Mr. Fynney, Dec. 23, 1878 [2308, p. 33].

'The cattle are still being collected, and it will be im-

possible now for them to be up in time'—Mr. J. Dunn, Dec. 24 [*Ib.* p. 34].

'They (two Christian Zulus) say Cetshwayo is getting the cattle together, to pay the fine demanded by the English Government. He is making Sihayo's and Mabedhla's people pay the fine between them. The latter is the headman of the Zulus who assaulted Messrs. Smith and Deighton. The King is also fining those who have been concerned in damaging the various Mission premises.'¹—Mr. Fannin, Dec. 25, 1878 [*Ib.* p. 35].

'He (Cetshwayo) proposed at his Council that all the high chiefs and their tribes should subscribe a certain number of cattle, so as to make up a sufficient number to soften the heart of the British Government and induce it to abate its demands. The chiefs refused to give a single beast, saying that he and Sihayo had got the country into this dilemma, and that they must get out of it the best way they can. Upon this, the King has sent Mehlokazulu, Sihayo's son, to collect all the cattle belonging to his father's tribe, and bring them down to Ulundi, to see what number they can muster alone.'—Mr. Robson, Dec. 25 [*Ib.* p. 35].

'The cattle for the fine demanded by the English Government are being collected; but he (the native teacher of Bp. Schreuder at Entumeni) thinks it very doubtful if the sons of Sihayo will be given up. The King can understand a demand being made for the persons of the culprits or for a cattle fine, but not for *both*;

¹ 'The King punished the men who destroyed Kwamagwaza, by taking away all their cattle.'—C. Vijn.

they regard it like being punished twice for the same offence, or paying twice for the same article.'—Mr. Fannin, Dec. 27 [*Ib.* p. 37].

'A Zulu headman, called Tusasana, with whom I have had for some years friendly relations, sent to inform me that Cetshwayo had sent to fetch all the best of the cattle belonging to the tribe of Sihayo, and among others had taken five head from him (Tusasana). These are to be offered to the British Government.'—Mr. Robson, Dec. 27 [2242, p. 11].

'By Cetshwayo's orders Mehlokazulu is collecting the 530 cattle fine, Mabamba (? Mabedhla) 100; and in addition Hamu and Cetshwayo 400 head, in order to settle matters entirely.'—Mr. Fynn, Dec. 28 [2308, p. 38].

'The cattle of the tribe along the Border (Sihayo's) have been collected. It is said by Sihayo's people that cattle will be paid to the English, but the offenders will not be given up, especially Mehlokazulu, the head of Sihayo's company of the Ngobamakosi regiment, who object to give him up.'¹—Mr. Fynn, Dec. 30 [*Ib.* p. 41].

'They will pay the fines, and more, but not give up the offenders.'—Mr. Fynn, Dec. 31 [*Ib.* p. 42].

'I was unable to get to Hamu on the second day after leaving Blood R. I was taken by an *Impi* of Cetshwayo's men near the Mhlazatshe Mountain. They had

¹ 'The King did not like to give up the two offenders; but he would have done so had his people allowed it. The chiefs and the King's brothers, generally, wished to give them up.'—C. Vijn.

been sent to take Sihayo's cattle, and give them up to the Whitemen. They forced me to go with them : I was with them three days. They turned back, when near Rorke's Drift, on hearing that the Whitemen had already begun to take Sihayo's cattle'—referring probably to the 2,000 cattle of Sihayo captured by Col. Wood on Jan. 11 [2242, p. 45].—*Magidigidi*, Native Messenger, Jan. 12, 1879 [2252, p. 67].

But Sir B. Frere sweeps aside all such reports, and writes, Dec. 30 [2222, p. 231]:—

'He is stated to have collected cattle for the purpose; but it is useless to conjecture whether he will do more in the way of compliance than sufficient to support excuses for asking for delay.'

Note 8, page 19.

The Special Correspondent of the *Cape Argus* states, on the authority of Mr. John Dunn:—

'Of the other surviving sons of Panda, Hamu is the one most known outside the Nation; but he is represented as possessing all the vices of Cetshwayo, *minus* some of the more essential virtues. The favourite of the Tribe, and a man of good natural parts, is Ziweddu, whose name is but little known.'

'Nsuka, son of Sipuka, told us a bad story about Hamu's doings. When the war was ended, during the past month, Hamu, who had now returned to his country, killed by an *Impi* an old woman, and a lad, and a wife (the men ran away), and ate up the cattle of the kraal *beni*.'

‘The reason for his killing them was that, when he went over to the English, those people would not follow him, but clung to their King. So, when the war was over and he had returned from his flight, having a grudge against them, and seeing them living quietly in their kraals, he (Hamu) killed them and ate up their cattle.’—*Magema.*

Note 9, page 21.

Lord Chelmsford crossed into Zululand on Jan. 11, and rode at once to have an interview with Col. Wood, who met him (by previous arrangement) about midway between the two columns, and who writes [2242, p. 45]: ‘Shortly after leaving the General on Jan. 11, I seized some cattle belonging to Nkomo and Sihayo,¹ about 2,000; the Zulus made only a show of resistance, stating that they were surprised. In addition to these cattle I have taken some 2,000 or 3,000 head from the Tondolosi tribe. This tribe made some show of resistance, and one Zulu was killed by Wood’s Irregulars in self-defence. I am assured by the Commandant that the Zulus offered resistance to the capture of the cattle, firing on the native levies.’

Lord Chelmsford himself marched with Col. Glyn’s column, and on Jan. 12 gives the return of losses inflicted on the enemy by that force since Jan. 10, as 30 killed, 4 wounded, 10 captured, together with 13 horses, 413 cattle, 332 goats, 235 sheep [*Ib.* p. 47].

¹ Probably Col. Wood captured the cattle of Sihayo, which had been collected to pay the fine (Note 7).

After peace had been declared at Ulundi, Colonel Villiers had a brush with Manyonyoba's people who had sought refuge in a number of caves near Lüneburg.

'From one cave nine head-ringed men were induced to come out on solemn promise of their lives and fair treatment, given them by the word of Doyle, who was staff interpreter with General Wood. They came out and a few minutes afterwards they were killed¹ by Teteleku's people, who formed part of the British force.'

At another of the caves those who were inside offered effective resistance, whereupon the mouth of it was walled up, and bricks of gun-cotton (?dynamite) were thrown inside, and *blew up the cave, destroying 400 or 500 men, women and children who were in the inner recesses of the cave.* My informant, a Whiteman, said that 'there is no doubt about this, as the prisoners taken assured them that *all their women and children were inside.*'

The following occurred in the attack on Morosi's mountain (*Cape Argus*, June 17, 1879):

'When we were on our return, Colonel Brabant, with the 1st Regiment, attacked a cave twelve miles from here—three men wounded, none seriously; one boy accidentally shot by our own side through ball of big toe. Three days' fighting, aided by a mountain gun, made no impression. But by good luck a fissure in the rock opened right above the cave, through which dynamite and green bushes were thrown in and they were smoked

¹ 'On the same day, the natives of Russell's column, by mistake (!), killed eight of his (Manyonyoba's) men.'—Correspondent of *Natal Mercury*, Sept. 6, 1879.

stained from attacking the entrenched posts of Her Majesty's troops, which are from 50 to 100 miles apart.'

About a week after the Battle of Isandhlwana, four native wagon-drivers, who had escaped from the slaughter, stated that, just as they had crossed the Buffalo, a Zulu Induna on horseback on the other side 'shouted with a loud voice' to his men who were about to cross into Natal, 'Has he said you were to cross? He is not invading! He is only defending the land of the Zulus! Come back!' This Induna, it appears, was Vumandaba, and his men obeyed and did not cross, whereas his colleague, Dabulamanzi, led the force which attacked Rorke's Drift. They said that themselves and Sikota (one of Cetshwayo's refugee half-brothers, a resident in Natal), and the four men with him, and also some whitemen who had got across, began first to draw breath after hearing those words of the Induna. 'We were saved by that alone; for, if they had come across, we should just have been killed, being utterly exhausted.'

Cetshwayo's war-song, in fact, was *Uzitulele! ka-gali'muntu*, 'he keeps himself quiet! he does not begin the attack!' = 'Defence, not Defiance.'¹ Whereas Din-

¹ The following is another Zulu war-song, said to have been composed after the Blood River Meeting (Oct. 18, 1877), between the Zulu Indunas and Sir T. Shepstone, whom they identified at that time with the Boers, the sound of whose trousers is referred to in its last words.

Umlungu wahlab'inkosi!

The Whiteman struck at the
King!

Uzingele inkonyana yesilo!

He persecutes the Leopard's

gane's was '*Us'eziteni ! asiyikuza sababona !* 'thou art among the enemy ! we shall never get to see them !' = 'they will all be killed before we come up'; and Chaka's was *Wagedageda izizwe ! uyauhlasela-pi na ?* 'thou hast made-an-end, made-an-end, of the tribes ! where wilt thou make a raid now ?'

But this moderation on the part of Cetshwayo was ascribed by Sir B. Frere to the 'half-heartedness' of a savage—'I can give no reason, save the half-heartedness of a suspicious barbarian despot, to account for his not having taken advantage of the many favourable opportunities which have presented themselves in our difficulties during the last eighteen months,' Jan. 24, 1879¹ [2252, p. 51]—and he has been spoken of repeatedly as having 'missed his opportunity !' True, he did 'miss his opportunity' of deluging the colony with blood ; but he missed it *purposely*, having never wished to quarrel with the English, and supposing that his forbearance would have been appreciated, as it would have been by a generous foe, not bent upon his destruction at all hazards, and at the sacrifice of the right and the just.

Siyayitanda inkosi ;
Bangepinde bayihlabe.
Aingene !

We, however, love the King ;
They won't strike at him again,
Let it (the invading *Impi*)
enter ? [liked !

Nkonyana ka'Ndaba, uy'aliwa !

Steer of Ndaba, thou art not

Ntshwayintshwayi,

Ye corduroy swishers, [again.

Ningepinde nimhlab'u Cetshwayo ! You won't strike at Cetshwayo

¹ That same evening, after writing these words, Sir B. Frere heard of the disaster at Isandhlwana on Jan. 22.

Note 11, page 31.

No doubt, Cetshwayo was right in his decision, according to ordinary principles of humanity. But it is not easy to see where the line is to be drawn in planning means of death for an enemy in war, when 'dynamite' has been employed in Zululand (and elsewhere in South Africa) to destroy the ignorant savage, and 'smoking out' of caves has been practised in Natal, and terrible engines, horribly destructive of human life, though requiring only skill in their use, and not any special display of valour, as Gattling-guns, shells, rockets, &c., have swept away the legs and arms and heads, or cruelly smashed the bodies, of thousands of brave, but helpless, Zulus. Thus General Pearson said at Yeovil (*Times*, Oct. 6, 1879): 'The first time the Gattling-gun was used in war by British troops was at the Battle of Inyezane by my column on our way to Etshowe, where it did excellent service.'

But if civilised men by their secret arts may poison the *earth*, as in the following instances, why may not savages poison the *water*?

'A trap was eventually set for them, and at the end of one of the poles a torpedo was placed, it being so arranged that the pulling up of the pole would set it off. All turned out as expected. The Zulus, with their usual coolness, when the working party had retired, went and pulled the pole up. With it a few of them disappeared skyward.'—Corresp. of *Natal Witness* with General Pearson's column, dating 'Etshowe, March 16.'

'They always followed us up in the evening when we knocked off work. We got rather sick of this; so one evening the engineers put down 18 cns. of dynamite at the point we had left off working at, with a pole stuck in the ground and a friction tube connecting it with the dynamite. We had hardly left it when about 30 Zulus came down, saw the pole with "Torpedo" written on it, and at once tried to pull it up. It was driven down so tight that one man could not pull it out by himself; so two or three more caught hold of it, and up it came, blowing about six Zulus to atoms, and frightening the rest out of their wits.'—Corresp. of *Daily Telegraph* (*Guardian*, May 14, 1879).

This morning a strong force crossed the river under command of Colonel Russell, with the intention of drawing the Zulus from the caves where they had been secreted since our arrival. Colonel Malthus likewise accompanied the force with four companies of the 94th Regiment, who will probably surround the heights in skirmishing order, to induce the enemy to leave their caverns. If this fails, I understand that gun-cotton will be used to blast the entrances of the caves, which undoubtedly will have the desired effect. . . .

'The troops have just returned to camp. The Engineers, under Captain Courtney, R.E., have been successful in blasting the caves.'—Correspondent of *Times of Natal* (Sept. 22, 1879), dating 'Near Lüneburg, Sept. 8.'

'Manyonyoba has fled. A few of his people having taken refuge in caves were incautiously approached by

Colonel Bray, who lost a sergeant-major and corporal of the 4th Regiment. These men, thrusting their heads through a crevice leading into a cave, were shot by the Zulus from inside. *The caves have been blown up, the people concealed in them dispersed, and their cattle taken.*—*Times* Despatches (*Guardian*, Oct. 8, 1879).

‘The attack on the caves was made by the infantry, as the ascent of the rocky mountain was impracticable to cavalry. The operations occupied several hours. After every step had been taken to compel the Zulus to surrender, and several of the troops had been shot and wounded by the enemy from the caves, *the latter were blown up with mines.*’—*Natal Mercury*, Sept. 29, 1879.

‘Advices from Lüneburg, of the 8th inst., report that the “dynamite tactics” had been successfully employed against certain caves, in which some of Manyonyoba’s still belligerent warriors had taken refuge.’—*Cape Argus*, Sept. 30, 1879.

‘The Engineers, under Captain Courtney, were employed blasting the rocks; but I believe their efforts were fruitless, at least as far as the outcasts were concerned. For, despite the incessant shocks from the concussion of the slabs of dynamite, which were employed on the occasion, we were totally unsuccessful in driving them from their hiding-places.’—*Military Correspondent of Natal Witness*, dating ‘Lüneburg, Sept. 9, 1879.’

Was the reason of this ‘total’ want of success ‘in driving them from their hiding-places,’ the very simple one that *they were all dead*, as the following extract from a private letter would seem to imply?

After peace had been declared at Ulundi, Colonel Villiers had a brush with Manyonyoba's people who had sought refuge in a number of caves near Lüneburg.

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¹ 'On the same day, the natives of Russell's column, by mistake (!), killed eight of his (Manyonyoba's) men.'—Correspondent of *Natal Mercury*, Sept. 6, 1879.

out. Ten were smothered to death, and about as many more wounded, by the dynamite. The chief himself, Letsika, had a portion of his hand blown off, while trying to dip one of the cartridges in the water; *unfortunately* (!) he did not succeed, or he and some more would have been blown to atoms. Eighty odd men and 200 women and children were captured. The noise they made during the explosion was something diabolical. Drs. Hartley and Kannemeyer removed a portion of Letsika's shattered hand yesterday. Several men are suffering from inflammation of the lungs, resulting from dynamite fumes and smoke, and may yet die.'

Note 12, page 32.

'A remarkable incident occurred during this conversation. Hamu, who has always been looked upon as the King's brother, and for some time before the installation, as his rival, said he wished to take advantage of my presence to explain publicly what his real position in Zululand was, for, though it was well known to the Zulus, it was not known to the white inhabitants of Natal and of the Transvaal Republic. In both these countries he had been frequently accused of designing to usurp Cetshwayo's place; and, if it were not that Cetshwayo and the Zulus well knew that such a thing was impossible, these accusations would long ago have cost him his life. He then went on to explain that, though he was really Panda's son, he was legally the son of Panda's deceased brother (Nziba), and that he already possessed all the rank and pro-

perty, viz. that which belonged to Nziba, which he could claim, that he had no right to claim anything which belonged to Panda's family, and that, before any such right could accrue to him, every male member of that family in Zululand and Natal (Umkungo, Sikota), and even he who is in the Transvaal (Umtonga), must die and leave no son behind. All present listened attentively to this statement, and earnestly assented to it. Cetshwayo said he wished to assure me that it was strictly true, and he was anxious that it should be known.'—Sir T. Shepstone, *Report of the Installation*, Sept. 1, 1873 [1137, p. 17].

Note 13, page 35.

Umbilini was a Swazi, 'the eldest son of Umswazi, late King of the amaSwazi' [1776, p. 52], who claimed the succession to the Swazi throne, and, being obliged to fly from Swaziland, went to *konza* (do homage) to Cetshwayo, and gave him a great deal of trouble before the war broke out, by attacking natives, Transvaal subjects, both before and after the 'Annexation,' who lived in the disputed territory north and south of the Pongolo. On the first complaint being made of his doings, Cetshwayo paid a fine for him to the Boers of 100 head of cattle; the next time he gave the Boers leave to come into his territory and kill him, and they tried to do so and failed; and then Cetshwayo himself threatened to kill him and his followers, if he offended again [1883, p. 19]. Fifteen months elapsed without any further disturbance from Umbilini. But on Oct. 12, 1878, when the King

was anxious and all Zululand agitated with fears of the impending war, Mr. Rudolph writes [2260, p. 52]: 'The audacious Umbilini has made a daring attack on four or five Swazi kraals,' killed four Swazi men, wounded others, burnt the kraals, and carried off some ten women and girls: and he adds, 'it is further reported that Umbilini about the same time also *attacked a kraal of the Swazi subjects of Cetshwayo*, near his old cave, close to Lüneburg, and that all the people, men, women and children were killed, and the cattle captured and taken to his kraals in Zululand.' But on Oct. 27, Mr. Rudolph writes again [2222, p. 105]: 'Matters on the Swazi border have quietly subsided. I am informed that Cetshwayo sent to summon Umbilini to appear before him in regard to his attack on the Swazis, and, if rumours are true, it will go hard with Umbilini. It is stated that Cetshwayo, at the time of Umbilini's attack on the Swazis, was in treaty for rain with the Swazis,¹ and that he is very angry with Umbilini because rain was refused on account of Umbilini's deeds.

'Everything is quiet at Lüneburg, and along the Zulu Border. The abaQulusi captains, assisted by Seketwayo, are doing their best to find and deliver up Van Rooyen's four cows.'

On Oct. 29, Cetshwayo's messengers state to Sir H. Bulwer [2260, p. 58]: 'Cetshwayo also told us that we might say that Umbilini was giving him trouble—he had been troublesome to the Boers some months ago, and

¹ He wished to obtain rain from the common ancestors of the Zulus and Swazis, whose graves are in Swaziland.

• After peace had been declared at Ulundi, Colonel Villiers had a brush with Manyonyoba's people who had sought refuge in a number of caves near Lüneburg.

‘From one cave nine head-ringed men were induced to come out on solemn promise of their lives and fair treatment, given them by the word of Doyle, who was staff interpreter with General Wood. They came out and a few minutes afterwards they were killed¹ by Teteleku's people, who formed part of the British force.’

At another of the caves those who were inside offered effective resistance, whereupon the mouth of it was walled up, and bricks of gun-cotton (?dynamite) were thrown inside, and *blew up the cave, destroying 400 or 500 men, women and children who were in the inner recesses of the cave.* My informant, a Whiteman, said that ‘there is no doubt about this, as the prisoners taken assured them that *all their women and children were inside.*’

The following occurred in the attack on Morosi's mountain (*Cape Argus*, June 17, 1879):

‘When we were on our return, Colonel Brabant, with the 1st Regiment, attacked a cave twelve miles from here—three men wounded, none seriously; one boy accidentally shot by our own side through ball of big toe. Three days' fighting, aided by a mountain gun, made no impression. But by good luck a fissure in the rock opened right above the cave, through which dynamite and green bushes were thrown in and they were smoked

¹ ‘On the same day, the natives of Russell's column, by mistake (!), killed eight of his (Manyonyoba's) men.’—Correspondent of *Natal Mercury*, Sept. 6, 1879.

out. Ten were smothered to death, and about as many more wounded, by the dynamite. The chief himself, Letsika, had a portion of his hand blown off, while trying to dip one of the cartridges in the water; *unfortunately* (!) he did not succeed, or he and some more would have been blown to atoms. Eighty odd men and 200 women and children were captured. The noise they made during the explosion was something diabolical. Drs. Hartley and Kannemeyer removed a portion of Letsika's shattered hand yesterday. Several men are suffering from inflammation of the lungs, resulting from dynamite fumes and smoke, and may yet die.'

Note 12, page 32.

'A remarkable incident occurred during this conversation. Hamu, who has always been looked upon as the King's brother, and for some time before the installation, as his rival, said he wished to take advantage of my presence to explain publicly what his real position in Zululand was, for, though it was well known to the Zulus, it was not known to the white inhabitants of Natal and of the Transvaal Republic. In both these countries he had been frequently accused of designing to usurp Cetshwayo's place; and, if it were not that Cetshwayo and the Zulus well knew that such a thing was impossible, these accusations would long ago have cost him his life. He then went on to explain that, though he was really Panda's son, he was legally the son of Panda's deceased brother (Nziba), and that he already possessed all the rank and pro-

perty, viz. that which belonged to Nziba, which he could claim, that he had no right to claim anything which belonged to Panda's family, and that, before any such right could accrue to him, every male member of that family in Zululand and Natal (Umkungo, Sikota), and even he who is in the Transvaal (Umtonga), must die and leave no son behind. All present listened attentively to this statement, and earnestly assented to it. Cetshwayo said he wished to assure me that it was strictly true, and he was anxious that it should be known.'—Sir T. Shepstone, *Report of the Installation*, Sept. 1, 1873 [1137, p. 17].

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their brains out against stones before their mother's face [1748, p. 86].

'Johannes and his men were killed by the amaSwazi, after a brave defence. They died for what they thought was their duty to their nation and king. Most of them were Christians.'—Rev. A. Merensky, Aug. 18, 1876 (*Natal Mercury*).

'The Swazis (2,400) are described as having executed their part of the programme with great bravery, unsupported by the Boers, except so far as artillery was concerned. They actually carried the kraal (of Johannes) and set fire to the huts, *ruthlessly killing the women* whom they found in them.'—Sir H. Barkly [1748, p. 84].

'After a few shots were fired by the cannon, the flag was hoisted, and the Swazis went up as coolly as though nothing was taking place, under a heavy fire from Johannes' fortifications, stepping over those who fell, and never breaking the order of their march till they arrived at the forts, when with a yell they scrambled over, assisted by their comrades' backs, and the work of death began, lasting about half-an-hour, when all the men and *women and children were assegaid*, except a few who escaped into a cave, and three or four women they brought out with them, Johannes' principal wife being one.

'The endurance displayed by the Swazis was wonderful. Men bleeding down their back from an assegai stab, shot through both legs, &c., walked into town here (Lydenburg). About thirty were killed and the same

reason as the work of an advanced guard of the Zulu Army' [2222, p. 51], and of the latter as 'made by Umbilini with the connivance, if not under the orders, of Cetshwayo, with the help of the Zulu Chief Manyonyoba,' and saying that 'the indiscriminate massacre of every human being, armed or unarmed, including women and children, is by no means a new feature in Zulu warfare' [2308, p. 62]; whereas Manyonyoba was a *Swazi* Chief, and it is absurd to suppose that Cetshwayo sanctioned this petty raid being made in contradiction to his whole policy, and at the very time (Feb. 10, 1879) when for months together, before the reinforcements had arrived, he might have ravaged Natal from one end to the other, if he had desired to do so.

But, as the Swazis were at one time called out by Sir G. Wolesley to make a raid into Zululand (Note 28), and it is reported that 3,000 or 5,000 Swazis are to be employed by him in the attack on Sikukuni, it may be well to exhibit the character of these allies of a great civilised and Christian people, as described in the following extracts from the Blue Books, which refer to the time when the Swazis were called out by the Boer Government to attack Sikukuni's captain, Johannes, who with his people were mostly Christians :—

'The Swazis are fiends! One of their own men was dying from his wounds just as they were leaving here; so they buried him alive. He struggled and kicked off the earth; so they tied him, and sat upon him, till he was again buried. And two babes with their mother were too much trouble to take with them; so they dashed

their brains out against stones before their mother's face [1748, p. 86].

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'The endurance displayed by the Swazis was wonderful. Men bleeding down their back from an assegai stab, shot through both legs, &c., walked into town here (Lydenburg). About thirty were killed and the same

number wounded. The noise that Friday night was terrible, and a great destruction of property took place, beams, planks, bed-planks of wagons, doors, &c., being taken to cook meal and mealies rifled from empty houses, no one daring to say much, as the Swazis were in a bad temper from the way they had been sold by the Whites, the Chief swearing he would spit in the Commandant's face and assegai him' [*Ib.* p. 85].

'The day before yesterday the Revs. Thorne and Bawen went out to Johannes to see if they could be of service to any of the wounded, and after waiting were admitted to the kraal. But the people declined all assistance, and Johannes upbraided Mr. Thorne for allowing the English people to take part in the attack upon him, saying that he had always understood that the English were brave and noble, and did not murder women and children, nor allow it to be done, nor even countenance it by their presence, and said the attack had been made like an attack of wild beasts, and not like Christians, and that they employed the Swazis to do what they dared not do themselves, and *they had killed his women and children*' [*Ib.* p. 86].

'He (Johannes) was lying sick of the measles at the time of the battle, in the same kraal in which *his wives had been butchered by the Swazis*, and received on the occasion an assegai wound in the chest from the effects of which he eventually died.'—Sir H. Barkly [*Ib.* p. 100].

'In 1864 the Swazis accompanied the Boers against Mahali. The Boers did nothing but stand by and wit-

ness the fearful massacre. The men and *women also* were murdered. One poor woman sat clutching her baby eight days old ; the Swazis stabbed her through the body, and, when she found that she could not live, she wrung her baby's neck with her own hands to save it from future misery' [*Ib.* p. 13].

'Neither of the cases referred to (Hottentots and Fingos) are of the *uncontrollable ferocity* which the Swazis exhibit.'—Sir H. Barkly [*Ib.* p. 246].

'The amaSwazi have since the Sikukuni affair become impatient of restraint, and *even aggressive towards the Transvaal*.'—Sir T. Shepstone, March 6, 1877 [1776, p. 110].

'The amaSwazi have 10,000 men in regiments, *well drilled and disciplined*, and their bravery can be judged of by what a contingent furnished by them did for the Boers during the Sikukuni war. Their experience of the prowess of their White allies on that occasion has destroyed their respect, and made them *both defiant and aggressive* ; and *they show signs of intending to occupy by force lands which they consider to have been wrongfully taken and alienated by the Republic*.'—Sir T. Shepstone, March 12, 1877 [*Ib.* p. 127].

After reading the above, the question naturally occurs, 'Was not Cetshwayo fully justified in maintaining an army "as well drilled and disciplined" as that of his ferocious neighbours, the allies of the Transvaal Government, as also for the purpose of checking the constant encroachments of that Government (the last made in 1875, for which even Sir B. Frere could find no justifica-

tion), since for sixteen years the Natal Government had trifled with his complaints, and "the replies he received seemed to him to be both temporising and evasive"?'—Sir T. Shepstone [1748, p. 24]. And then there is the further question, 'Are the Swazis to be allowed to retain their formidable military organisation, their army of "man-and-woman-slaying gladiators," whether "celibates" or not, while that of the Zulus has been broken up, and they are not permitted to have any soldiers, even for the purpose of protecting their homes from Swazi ravagers?'

Note 14, page 36.

'We lost many more men at Kambula than at Isandhlwana. Our regiment, the Ngobamakosi, was so anxious to distinguish itself that we disobeyed the King's orders, and went on too fast, without waiting for our supports. When we got to the camp we were so tired that we could do nothing, and by the time our supports came up we were beaten back. Had we waited properly for our supports, we should have attacked the camp on three sides at once, and we should have taken it.'

'We encamped for the night, and then in the morning we went on to attack the Kambula Camp. When we were a long way from the camp we saw it, and it appeared as if an entrenchment had been made. When we got as near to the camp as the Victoria Bridge is from this Court-house (about half-a-mile), the White people came towards us on horseback. They commenced firing first: we did not commence there. We fired, and they fired:

they retired, and we followed them. That was the Ngobamakosi regiment. We thought the Zulu Army was not far off; but it appears that at this time the main body had not got up—I mean that portion of the Army which subsequently rose in the rear of the Laager. The horsemen galloped back to camp as hard as they could; we followed and found ourselves almost close to the camp, into which we made the greatest possible efforts to enter. The English fired their cannon and rockets, and we were fighting and attacking them for about the same time we have been here to-day (about one hour)—I mean the Ngobamakosi regiment, before the main body of the Zulu Army came up. When it did come up, we were lying prostrate, we were beaten, we could do no good. So many were killed that the few who were not killed were lying between dead bodies, so thick were the dead. The main body of the Zulu Army attacked the camp from the rear, and tried for a long time to get in. The Nokenke regiment succeeded in getting into the cattle-kraal. The Umbonambi regiment suffered much loss. Indeed the two regiments last named were almost annihilated. It was unfortunate for the Zulus that the Ngobamakosi regiment should have marched quicker than was expected; we had no intention of attacking the camp, but were drawn on to do so by the mounted men, before the main body of the Zulu Army came up. At Kambula the Ngobamakosi suffered the most. At the conclusion of the fight we were chased by the English forces over three ridges, as far as from here to Bishopstowe (five or six miles), and were only saved from entire destruction by

the darkness. Night came on and they left following us. Had we all come up and attacked the Kambula Camp at the same time, we should have entered the camp on that day; it is at any rate probable, if the attack had not been spoiled, as I have said. Mnyamana was the Induna in charge; Ntshingwayo also commanded under him. Cetshwayo's orders were not to attack the entrenchments, but to pass them by. If they attacked us, we were to attack them; if they remained in their Laager, then we were to pass on into the Transvaal territory, and that would bring the English forces out. But, as it happened, we found ourselves by accident in action with the English forces. Cetshwayo was very angry with us, and said we had no right to attack the Laager. He blamed and said that he would kill the officer in command [*i.e.* the commander of the Ngobamakosi], but he did not. We acted contrary to instructions at Isandhlwana, and were successful; and then we acted contrary to instructions at Kambula.' —*Mehlokazulu*.

The following facts have also been ascertained from Mehlokazulu [*Natal Witness*, Oct. 2, 1879]:—

'It must now be considered as established beyond doubt that the Zulus had no intention of making an attack that day (at Isandhlwana), because it was the day of the New Moon, on which they never transact any important business. What led on to the attack was the fact of their being themselves fired on by (as Mehlokazulu states) the Volunteers and Mounted Police, who were not supported by the Mounted Natives till they had fallen back on the first *donga* (gully).'

up the heights'—is misleading. For Colonel Durnford sent a force of mounted natives (with whom went Captain George Shepstone, as one of his Staff) 'up the heights on the left,' to 'ascertain the enemy's movements,' which, getting sight of Zulus, fired at them, and found that they had roused the Umcijo Regiment at the extremity of the right wing of the Zulu Army, which was lying quiet, having no intention of attacking, but, being fired at, arose at once, and returned the fire, and drew on the rest to its support. But Colonel Durnford himself had gone with his mounted Basutos in a different direction, 'to the left front of the camp.' Thus, Lieutenant Cochrane says [p. 82]:—'Several messages were delivered, the last one to the effect that the Zulus were retiring in all directions. On this message, Colonel Durnford sent two troops of mounted natives to the top of the hills to the left, and took with him two troops, &c., on to the front of the camp,' and 'met the enemy some four or five miles off in great force, and, as they showed also on our left, we retired in good order to the drift [*!donga* or gully] about a quarter of a mile in front of the camp.'

Hence the statements of Captain A. Gardner [2260, p. 81]—'I met Captain G. Shepstone, who was also seeking Colonel Pulleine, *having a message from Colonel Durnford, that his men were falling back, and asking for reinforcements*;' 'Colonel Pulleine sent two companies to support Colonel Durnford to the hill on the left' [2260, p. 81]; 'I met Captain G. Shepstone, who told me he had been sent by Colonel Durnford for reinforcements, that his (Colonel Durnford's) troops were heavily

opportunity of escaping. So he mounted and rode off, but all his force died, only Noju and another were left. They chased him a long way, but he dismounted, and ran away on foot, and escaped them.'

Lord Chelmsford, describing the movements of the force which he himself accompanied on the morning of Jan. 22, gives this account of the above affair [2252, p. 75]:—

'A general advance was then made, and the enemy retired without fighting. On the extreme right, however, the Natal Carbineers, under Captain (Theo.) Shepstone, managed to cut off about 300, who took refuge on a difficult hill, and in some caves. These were finally dislodged, with the assistance of some of the Native Contingent, and fifty were killed'—without (apparently) any loss to Captain Theo. Shepstone's force in killed or wounded.

And Colonel Crealock says [2252, p. 99]:—'During the three previous hours we had been advancing with Colonel Glyn's column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill to hill as we advanced, giving up without a shot most commanding positions.' In other words, the Zulus had no intention that day of attacking.

Lord Chelmsford goes on to describe the disaster at Isandhlwana on that same day. But the statement [p. 77]—'Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford asked Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine to give him two companies of British Infantry, in order that he might *move up the heights on the left and attack them* (the Zulus),' and not having obtained the two companies, '*then took his 450 natives*

up the heights'—is misleading. For Colonel Durnford sent a force of mounted natives (with whom went Captain George Shepstone, as one of his Staff) '*up the heights on the left*,' to '*ascertain the enemy's movements*,' which, getting sight of Zulus, fired at them, and found that they had roused the Umciyo Regiment at the extremity of the right wing of the Zulu Army, which was lying quiet, having no intention of attacking, but, being fired at, arose at once, and returned the fire, and drew on the rest to its support. But Colonel Durnford himself had gone with his mounted Basutos in a different direction, '*to the left front of the camp*.' Thus, Lieutenant Cochrane says [p. 82]:—'*Several messages were delivered, the last one to the effect that the Zulus were retiring in all directions. On this message, Colonel Durnford sent two troops of mounted natives to the top of the hills to the left, and took with him two troops, &c., on to the front of the camp*,' and '*met the enemy some four or five miles off in great force, and, as they showed also on our left, we retired in good order to the drift [? donga or gully] about a quarter of a mile in front of the camp*.'

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engaged to the left of our camp, beyond the hill, and were being driven back' [2252, p. 101]; and that of Mr. Drummond, 'when, on the morning of Jan. 22, the mounted Basutos, under the command of Colonel Durnford, R.E., discovered their position, and fired at a portion of the Umciyo Regiment, that regiment immediately sprang up without orders and charged; it was at once followed by the Nokenke, Mbonambi, and Ngobamakosi Regiments, the Ulundi Corps holding its ground' [p. 102]—are incorrect, as regards the clauses italicised, since Captain G. Shepstone came to ask support for *his own force* (containing Zikali's mounted men, but no 'Basutos'), and not for that far away under Colonel Durnford, saying that 'the whole Zulu Army would be upon them,' a statement which was received at first with incredulity.

Mr. Drummond, however, says [*Ib.*]: 'Colonel Durnford arrived with 250 mounted men and 250 native infantry, who were at once divided into three bodies, one being sent to the left [Captain G. Shepstone], who came in contact with the Umciyo Regiment, one to the left front [Colonel Durnford], and one to the rear.' And he adds: 'They had no intention whatever of making any attack on Jan. 22, owing to the state of the moon being unfavourable, from a superstitious point of view. The usual sprinkling of the warriors with medicine, previous to an engagement, had not taken place, nor had the war song been sung, or the religious ceremonies accompanying been performed.' In fact, Jan. 22 was the day of the New Moon, a day of abstinence or rest from serious labour, on which no business of importance

dogs to hunt, and they do any damage, why should my dogs suffer, when I am the one to blame?" And, acting in accordance with his expressions, he gave Sihayo's sons the opportunity to escape to Umbilini's district, where they remained till two or three days before the Battle of Isandhlwana, when they rejoined their regiment.'

No doubt, the King showed 'generosity of feeling' towards his young men,¹ by taking their fault upon himself, as he did the first fault of Umbilini (Note 13). But Mehlokazulu's assertion, 'the King sent me,' is flatly contradicted by Magema's informants of high respectability in Zululand.

'Mfunzi says that, when the messenger came to report Mehlokazulu's crossing and killing his father's wives, he was on duty, in attendance on the King. Sihayo was amazed, and so was the King, when he heard of Mehlokazulu's evil deed, and all the men present were amazed. Mehlokazulu speaks falsely. The King never ordered him to go and kill his father's wives, and his father knew nothing about that matter. That wife had run away to Natal, committing adultery with a young man. She was seen in Natal by another Zulu, who informed Mehlokazulu; for that woman jeered and said 'he was to tell Mehlokazulu to come and kill her. And so he did.' 'I talked with the Ingceku (household-officer) uMnukwa, who was always about the King. He says most posi-

¹ 'He is willing to risk the Zulu monarchy rather than that Sihayo's sons should be flogged, which he thinks will be the punishment given them.'—Sir H. Bulwer, Jan. 10, 1879 [2242, p. 29].

about 1.30, Major Gosset riding away in the direction of the General. Colonel Harness had gone over about two miles of his way to the camp, when he was overtaken by Major Gosset with an order from Lord Chelmsford to march back to the rendezvous, which order he obeyed, and the Zulus had their way in the camp undisturbed.

Again the report in the *Witness* of Mehlokazulu's statement goes on to say:—

‘Speaking of the occasion of his raid into Natal, he again justified his conduct. ‘*The King sent me,*’ he said, ‘*and I was obliged to go.* I do not see why your people should have interfered with me. *Whenever the Natal policemen came over into my country to arrest fugitives, we never hurt them, and always rather helped them.*’¹ We told everyone we did not wish or intend to fight, and no damage was done to anything belonging to the British people.’ This allusion to what was, I believe, a not unfrequent occurrence—the sending of Natal policemen into Zululand—is of some importance.

‘With regard to the feeling of the Zulu nation, he asserts that there was a large majority in the Great Council in favour of giving him up on the first demand. Cetshwayo, however, would not hear of it, and, with considerable generosity of feeling, insisted on taking the blame on himself. “If,” said the King, “I send out my

¹ According to the Special Correspondent of the *Cape Argus*, Mr. John Dunn stated, ‘There formerly subsisted an arrangement by which women and cattle were both reckoned as property, and, when they crossed the river in either direction, it was customary to send them back. Latterly, as far as women were concerned, the understanding has not been carried out.’

shots with them. One of the Zulus was wounded by a bullet, and the friendly natives coming up, was assegaid. He was recognised as a younger son of Sihayo, the other, who got away, being ascertained to be Umbilini.'—*Official Notification.*

'The spy, whom they brought in captive, has given information to the effect that Umbilini had received a wound in the right breast; but he does not say whether it is fatal to him or not.'—Corresp. of *Natal Colonist*, dating 'Kambula Hill, April 10, 1879.'

But the 'younger son of Sihayo,' who is said to have been killed on this occasion, could not have been Nkumbikazulu, as Mr. Vijn supposed, if he was 'distinctly recognised' [2242, p. 43] among those killed by Lord Chelmsford's force on Jan. 12 [Note 6].

'Only one of Sihayo's sons has died in the war; that was not one of Sihayo's who was killed with Umbilini.'—*Magama.*

Note 16, page 40.

This agrees substantially with the statement made by the Zulu who was captured at the Battle of Ulundi and examined by Captain Theoph. Shepstone (Supp. to *London Gazette*, Aug. 21, 1879):—

'The two cannon taken at Isandhlwana were at Nodwengu, but are now at the King's other kraal in the thorns (Maizekanye). No one knows how to use them. The Whiteman who writes the King's letters (C. Vijn) is a trader, who came trading at the beginning of the year,

tively that Mehlokazulu speaks falsely if he says that the King told him to cross and seize and kill his father's wives. uMnukwa says that he was in attendance on Cetshwayo when the messenger came from Sihayo's kraal to report that matter, and Sihayo also was there with the King, and he too knew nothing whatever about that affair. On the arrival of the messenger the King was exceedingly surprised, and so was Sihayo surprised and shocked to hear of the evil doing of Mehlokazulu, and so were the other Indunas who were present. uMnukwa says that he now hears that Sihayo himself says that, and he is amazed to hear it. He says, however, that he sees that Sihayo himself suggested those words to Mehlokazulu, thinking that so he will escape, since they saw the King was as good as dead.'

Note 15, page 40.

'On April 5 Captain Prior, 80th Foot, proceeded from Lüneburg with a mounted patrol in the direction of the Upper Pongolo Drift. Having come up with twenty friendly natives, and received information that the Zulus were sweeping horses and cattle from the valley, he went in pursuit, and came within 800 yards of a few mounted men, who were hurrying on horses and cattle, which they abandoned and fled. After capturing the horses (18) and leaving them in charge, he himself went on with Private Bowen, their horses being freshest, following two Zulus who had taken the direction of Dombie (Intombe). They came eventually within 400 yards and exchanged

shots with them. One of the Zulus was wounded by a bullet, and the friendly natives coming up, was assegaid. He was recognised as a younger son of Sihayo, the other, who got away, being ascertained to be Umbilini.'—*Official Notification.*

'The spy, whom they brought in captive, has given information to the effect that Umbilini had received a wound in the right breast; but he does not say whether it is fatal to him or not.'—Corresp. of *Natal Colonist*, dating 'Kambula Hill, April 10, 1879.'

But the 'younger son of Sihayo,' who is said to have been killed on this occasion, could not have been Nkumbikazulu, as Mr. Vijn supposed, if he was 'distinctly recognised' [2242, p. 43] among those killed by Lord Chelmsford's force on Jan. 12 [Note 6].

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and the King kept him, and he is always watched [? guarded, protected], his property is not touched; he is a lame man. *A Whiteman was made prisoner at Hlobane, and taken to the King, who sent him back, and ordered him to be let go near Kambula.*

But it differs entirely from the very sensational story reported in the *Natal Mercury*, April 26, as told by Grandie (Grandier) himself, which says that he was 'threatened and beaten, with very little respite,' and was sent back to Umbilini's Kafirs to be 'sacrificed to the *manes* of Umbilini,' because 'some messengers came and reported to Cetshwayo that Umbilini and his brother had been killed in the attack on Colonel Wood's camp,' and that he was sent back with a guard of two Zulus, who had one gun and several assegais, and that 'on the 13th April about noon they were resting, and, the Zulus being sleepy, he watched his opportunity, snatched an assegai, and pinned one man to the earth, when the other woke up in a fright and ran for his life (!),' and Grandie then made off, and was at last found by Mr. Rudolph's party and brought in—which has been made the subject of a monstrous picture in one of the London illustrated papers. Besides the inherent improbability of this story for one who knows what careful precautions would be taken by Zulus sent to conduct a prisoner, white or black, by the King's order, Grandie goes on to say that 'the two guns captured at Isandhlwana were at the King's kraal, but *were both spiked*,' which, though stated at the time in one of the Natal journals, is now known to be untrue. Perhaps the above wild story may be accounted for

by the fact that, as an officer, who saw him when brought in, has stated, he was 'quite off his head,' as he well might have been after wandering about on the hills without food.

But the following statements also confirm Mr. Vijn's account.

'A short time since I had a talk with Mnyamana. On being asked what he thought about affairs after Isandhlwana, he replied, very truly, "I went straight to Cetshwayo and advised him to make peace." He saw that, whatever struggle they might make, it was only a matter of time. He also contradicted the story told by Grandier. His (Mnyamana's) version is that Cetshwayo handed Grandier over to the Zulus to conduct him as near as possible to the British lines, and there let him go—that there was no intention of harming him. By a curious coincidence one of these very guards was Klaas (who found the Prince Imperial's uniform), and he confirms Mnyamana's story.'—Corresp. of *Natal Mercury*, dating 'Kwamagwaza, Oct. 28, 1879.'

'What the Zulus know about Mr. Grandier is this. He was caught at Hlobane by the force of the abaQulusi, who took him to the King. When he came to the King, he forbade that he should be harmed, gave him two horses and an ox for slaughter on the way, and gave him guides who should accompany him until he got out of the dangerous places where the Zulu forces were, and then he would travel safely till he reached his own force.

'That force of the abaQulusi was quite one with

Umbilini. It is said that Umbilini did a very crafty thing on the top of that mountain (Hlobane). He blocked up with stones some of the entrances, so that the Whitemen would have to go together in one body. When they got to the top, seeing the mountain a nice level plain, seeing good streams of water there, but not seeing the abaQulusi, who were hiding, they said "Hlobane is a fine place! it's like a man's head-ring!" But the abaQulusi heard all that, and sprang up on all sides and stabbed them. Some of the Whitemen flung themselves into a pit of death, where there was no escape, and they were mercilessly assegaid—even two girls stabbing, one 5 Whitemen, the other 3. Mr. Grandier was seized at that time and taken to the King.'—*Magema*.

The *abaQulusi* (misspelt in various ways, e.g. *Makulusi*, *Bakulusini*, &c.), though under the authority of the Zulu King, were yet distinct from the Zulus, and formed a separate regiment. 'Umkabayi, daughter of Jama, of the same House (i.e. Mother) as Senzangakona, was the eldest of her family, and governed while Senzangakona was a minor. The kraal of the *abaQulusi* belonged to her, and that of Sebeni (Note 8) to her sister Mama. These are the daughters of Jama, father of Senzangakona, father of Chaka, Dingane, and Mpande.'—*Magema*.

Note 17, page 41.

'The King is at present busily engaged in erecting a Military Kraal among the hills between the Black and White Imvolosi Rivers, not far from the junction, in

what he considers a very strong position, and one near to which (in his opinion) an army with cannon and baggage could not get, and consequently he is contemplating the removal of other Kraals to that locality. The large Kraal in process of erection he has named "Maizekanye," or "Let it (the enemy) come at once [once for all]."

'Cetshwayo, supported by Matshana Mondisa (his new brother-in-law), wishes to remove the Royal Kraal from near Umlambongwenya to the junction of the Imvolosi Rivers as soon as possible. But the old Zulu Councilors are against his proposal.

'Matshana Mondisa says that *in less than three years the English will have advanced over the western portion of Zululand*, and they (the Zulus) had better move before them.'—Mr. J. Shepstone, Jan. 3, 1877 [1776, p. 51].

Note 18, page 42.

This must be taken for what it is worth, as merely heard by Mr. Vijn from the Zulus.

But it would seem from the following statement that some word about making peace had reached the King from some quarter, while Col. Pearson's force was shut up at Etshowe.

'As to the coming of Dabulamanzi and Mavumengwana, they had been sent by the King—so says Lutsha, who was with the King at that time. For the White-men had sent to Dabulamanzi to ask for peace from the King, and Dabulamanzi went to inform the King of these words. The King sent Dabulamanzi and Mavu-

mengwana to say that "he (the King) did not wish for war. If the Whitemen speak about peace, they ought to retire to their own land." At that time Dabulamanzi's Kraal was not yet burnt.'—*Magama*.

Note 19, page 46.

The following is a copy of Lord Chelmsford's Letter, transcribed from the original now in the possession of the Bishop of Natal.

' Message from Lord Chelmsford

' To Zulu King

' June 4th, 1879.

' Camp, Nondwini River.

' Your three messengers, by name Umgcwelo, Umtiyibela, and Umpokotigayo, arrived this day at General Wood's Camp, where I personally heard their words, asking why war had been made—and I gather they wish to take back to the King the terms on which peace would be made.

' My answer is this :—

' 1. If Ketschwayo wishes for peace, he must give substantial proof of being in earnest.

' 2. He must, at once, restore all horses, oxen, arms, ammunition, and other property taken during the War.

' 3. One or more Regiments, to be named by me, must come under a flag of truce and, at a distance of one thousand yards from my camp, lay down their arms as a token of submission.

' 4. If this is done, I will order a cessation of hostili-

K

It may be noted that Lord Chelmsford says that 'the next message from the King must be brought by one of his Officers who was present at the delivery of the Ultimatum,' and that 'Sintwangu (Usitwango) or other well-known messenger of the King must accompany him'—being apparently unaware or oblivious of the fact that Sintwangu was himself present on that occasion [2222, p. 216]. In like manner Sir B. Frere says that Cetshwayo 'had not sent, in the customary form, any acknowledgment' of the Ultimatum, 'no proper acknowledgment of its receipt or any intimation, through messengers of the usual rank,' that it would be considered by the King and his Council; and again he writes [2374, p. 110] 'He might at any time send an Induna of rank, or even one of the respectable men, though not of the highest rank, who were deputed to receive the Lieut.-Governor's message at the Lower Tugela. Envoys of such standing could be sent as easily as men of doubtful position.' Whereas on Dec. 29, 1878, Sintwangu and Mpepa, who were both among the representatives of the Zulu Nation at the delivery of the Ultimatum [2222, p. 216], brought this message to the Lower Tugela, 'The King directed us to say that *he has heard the words of the Government*; but the land is great, and *he has to put them before the Zulu Nation*, and he asks for time to do so.' This message, however, appears first in the Blue-Book of April, 1879 [2308, p. 39]; though a *later* message (Jan. 11) appears in the February Blue-Book [2242, p. 24], where three messengers state 'Cetshwayo has not yet refused to listen to the voice of Government; but the Zulu Nation is

terous demand was ever made upon the King as that in Paragraph 2, whether in its original or in its amended form, which latter required a 'promise' from Cetshwayo to do what he was utterly unable to perform, and which would therefore have only been a snare to trap him on some future occasion, because he had not fulfilled his engagement. And it was equally impossible for Cetshwayo to have compelled 'one or more Regiments'—or, as amended in the Postscript, 'one Regiment'—'to be named by Lord Chelmsford,' to come in person and 'lay down their arms.' Not even Sir G. Wolseley, after the Battle of Ulundi, has thought it necessary or expedient to insist on such demands as these in his terms of peace.

And these, be it observed, were not the 'terms of peace' laid down by Lord Chelmsford, but merely *preliminary* demands, which must be fully complied with before he would proceed to 'discussion of the final terms of peace.' But what would have been the nature of those 'final terms' may be gathered from the fact that not three weeks previously (May 16, 1879) Lord Chelmsford had written 'I consider the King should not be allowed to remain on the throne' [2374, p. 101]; nay, only two days previously (June 2, 1879) he had declared 'I would beg to say that I entirely agree in the views of Mr. Brownlee, and that no permanent peace can be counted on as long as Ketchwayo remains on the throne.' [*Ib.* p. 112].

In short it was evidently part of the unrighteous programme that no reasonable opportunity should be given to Cetshwayo for making peace with the English.

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gathered with the King at the Ondini (Ulundi) to consider those words. Cetshwayo asks the Great Chief to give him and the Zulu Nation time to send their reply,' and say that 'Sintwangu and Mpepa [misspelt Seboandu, Mpeppa] are being sent with the reply of both the King and the whole Zulu Nation.'

But the word had gone forth—*Delendus est Cetshwayo!* The Invasion of Zululand, it is plain, had long been a settled thing in the minds of Sir B. Frere and Lord Chelmsford (Note 6); and considerations of fair-play and justice must give way to a crafty and, as it turned out, though not contemplated in the first instance, a ruthless and bloody, policy.

Note 20, page 49.

It may have been supposed that the 'White Trader,' without whose help in reading and interpreting the letter would have been useless, was actually with the King, and in that case the long delay before any reply reached the Camp may have seemed to indicate hostile intentions on the part of the King. But, in point of fact, Cetshwayo lost no time in the matter. Mr. Vijn, it appears, reached the King's Kraal on the 3rd day, that is, probably on the 6th day after the messenger started with the horses to fetch him. If, therefore, the letter, with its Postscript of June 5, reached Cetshwayo (say) on June 6, Mr. Vijn, if sent for *immediately*, might have reached the Kraal 'about 12th June, 1879,' the date he wrote upon his reply; and on June 14—he says 'as I suppose'—he writes in pencil at the King's dictation, on

a leaf torn from an account-book, the following letter, copied also from the original, which was taken by the messengers to the English outposts, but (under the circumstances stated in Mr. Vijn's narrative) was carried back by them, and never reached the hands of Lord Chelmsford.

‘Message from the Zulu King (Cetswayo)

‘To Lord Chelmsford Esq.

‘*about 12th of June, 1879.*

‘The King has received Lord Chelmsford Esq. letter from 4th June; the matter that an answer come so late is, while I was not at the King's Kraal, he had to send up for me, far away the other side of the Black Umfolozi. I arrived here yesterday, and now in the morning he has called me to write a letter to Lord Chelmsford Esq. at Nondwini River.

‘The three messengers from 4th June they are coming, and shall bring the words from the King about that letter.

‘He wants me to write this letter to say, of course they must bring soon an answer back to the *whites*.

‘The King says that “how can he talk with the Government? while the messengers are on the road, the armee is burning my kraals and taking my cattle; how can I forcome a fight?” He says that the armee must go backwards and leave of burning my huts and taking my cattle.

‘The King wants to come here to talk with him Mr. Shepstone Esq. [Sir T. Shepstone], and Mr. J. Shepstone,

and the Governor from Natal, so that all may come right again.

‘C. VIJN for CETSWAYO.

‘Sent by four messengers Unkekokin, Mapongaan, Kotjan, Umslomunvoelou [names misspelt].

‘His Worship—I’m in short of paper, if you will send me some paper, ink, and pens, I will write you state of the Zulus.

‘To H.E. Lord Chelmsford Esq.

‘I hope you will do one a favour to put this next small note in a envelope and send it to its place.’

The four messengers carrying the above letter appear to have reached Col. Collingwood’s Camp at Fort Marshall, who sent them on to the D.A.G. at Head Quarters with the following note, dated June 22—

‘I have the honor to forward 4 messengers from Cetayo who arrived this afternoon about 4 o’clock. I would not allow them to come near the fort.’

It would seem that the messengers must have been scared away from the Camp by some kind of threatening, if not by the measures, whatever they were, adopted at Fort Marshall to prevent their ‘coming near the fort.’ And, as Mr. Vijn’s letter would seem to have been written on June 14, the question arises why they did not reach Fort Marshall before June 22. Had they (*e.g.*) been previously ‘frightened’ or ‘detained’ at some other outpost?

Note 21, page 50.

At Etshowe two of the King's messengers, sent to ask for terms of peace, were put in irons for six weeks, on the pretence of their being spies, and were brought down, manacled, with Lord Chelmsford's force to the Lower Tugela, after the relief of Etshowe.

And two other peace-messengers, well known and thoroughly respectable, who during the last six years had been sent repeatedly on important matters to the Natal Government, Mfunzi and Nkisimane, were first fired at on coming to the other side of the river, together with four of Bp. Schreuder's converts, dressed men, because they had not brought a white flag—of which they hardly knew the meaning at that time. They were not hit, and, a white flag of some kind having been extemporised, they were allowed to cross, when the two messengers were examined, and were afterwards bound with cords, by order of some juvenile military authority, and lay that night painfully with wrists tied behind their backs, which bonds, however, were removed next day by order of Mr. Fannin. But these messengers were also detained for more than six weeks at Kranzkop (Ntunjambili)¹ [2374, p. 111].

¹ Probably Sir M. Hicks-Beach had not been officially informed of the above facts when he stated in Parliament in reply to Mr. Richard, 'I do not know that in more than one instance his messengers have been treated with great indignity.' But he has not (apparently) informed the House that the statement, that two peace-messengers had been made prisoners and kept in irons at Etshowe for some weeks, was perfectly true, after it had been repudiated, on behalf of the Government, as 'incredible,'

Note 22, page 50.

The following is copied from the original letter of Lord Chelmsford :—

‘From Lord Chelmsford,

‘Commanding Her Majesty’s Forces in South
Africa.

‘June 28th, 1879.

‘Message to Ketchwayo.

‘Your three messengers, Umgewelo, Umtiyibela, and another have delivered your message, and the paper signed by C. Vijn, Trader.

‘All I have to say in answer is :—

‘You have not complied with all the conditions I laid down. I shall therefore continue to advance, as I told you I should. But, as you have sent me some of the cattle, and state that the two cannon are on their way, I consent not to cross the Umvolosi River’ [‘to-morrow,’ originally, but corrected with Col. Crealock’s initials] ‘to-day, to give you time to fulfil the remainder of the conditions.

‘Unless all my conditions are complied with by to-morrow evening, you must take the consequences.

‘I return the tusks you send, to show you I shall still advance. I will keep the cattle a few days, to show I am

while Sir M. Hicks-Beach ‘told the House of Commons last night (May 8) that he had heard nothing of Col. Pearson, acting on the advice of a Missionary, having put a flag of truce messenger from Cetshwayo in irons, except from statements in the press, which he did not believe.’ (Plymouth Correspondent of *Cape Argus*, May 31, 1879.)

willing to make peace if you comply with the conditions laid down.

‘I am willing that the men collected now at Ulundi, whom I have seen, should to the number of a Regiment (1,000) come to me and lay down their arms, as a sign of submission. They can do so at a distance from me of 500 yards and then retire; their lives are safe; the word of an English General is sufficient to ensure it.

‘The arms in possession of the men around you now, taken at Sandhswana, must be given up by them.

‘CHELMSFORD,

‘L.G.

‘The four messengers sent about 20th June have never been to the General, J. N. Crealock.’

It will be seen that Lord Chelmsford still makes, as a preliminary condition for further discussion of the terms of peace, the utterly impracticable demand that Cetshwayo should compel 1,000 of his warriors to submit to the humiliation of coming in person and laying down their arms. Moreover, he hardly ‘gives the King still two days more,’ as Mr. Vijn says, to comply with all his conditions, but till ‘to-morrow evening,’ the messengers being still at his camp.

Among the three tusks sent in by the King as a token of sincerity, and rejected by Lord Chelmsford, there was one remarkably fine one, supposed to have been the fellow of that sent to the coast column, which is described as ‘an enormous one in point of size, being seven feet in length, and about half a yard in circumference at the

girth. It is the finest specimen of an elephant's tusk that has probably ever reached England, and must have belonged to an animal of prodigious dimensions.' This tusk was accepted by Gen. Crealock, and was sent home by Sir G. Wolseley to the Sec. of State for the Colonies—by which act, according to native usage, as well as by Lord Chelmsford's accepting the Prince Imperial's sword, we were pledged in honour and good faith; on 'the word of an English General,' to amicable relations with the King himself.

Note 23, page 50.

The following was the letter now written by Mr. Vijn in Cetshwayo's name to Lord Chelmsford (*Supp. to London Gazette*, Aug. 21, 1879):—

‘June 30, 1879.

‘The King called me this morning to write this letter to your Worship, General Lord Chelmsford:—

‘He brings with bearers a *degen*’ [*i.e.* ‘sword,’ misprinted *dezen* in the *Gazette*, and in other papers ‘dozen’!] ‘as has belonged to the Prince of England (so they say, I do not know, of course); to-morrow morning the two 7-pounder guns and a lot of oxen will leave to-morrow morning to bring at your Worship's feet.

‘For CETEWAYO,

‘C. VIJN, Trader.

‘Sir—P.S.—If the English army is in want for the country, please do me a favour to call for me by bearer, that I might get out of the country. I went into the country to buy cattle for blankets.

‘And be your obedient servant

‘C. V.

‘P.S.—My really believing is, that the King wants to fight,¹ but the princes or his brothers they want peace; also the people wants to fight.

‘The bearers are Mfunzi, Ukisimane [misspelt, ‘Um-vousie Englishman’].’

The following note was written in pencil on the envelope :—

‘P.S.—Be strong, if the King send in his army, they are about 20,000.

‘In haste, your obedient servant,

‘C. V.’

Note 24, page 51.

‘A large herd of white cattle was observed being driven from the King’s Kraal towards us, but was driven back shortly afterwards.’—Lord Chelmsford, *London Gazette*, Aug. 21, 1879.

It is plain that the cannon, which were found after the battle of Ulundi, thrown aside in a *donga* (gully) between Maizekanye and Ulundi, must have been on their way down to be surrendered, as the King states, and must have been stopped at the same time as the white cattle, and by the same power, viz. the resolute will of the Zulus themselves.² In the Blue-Books, as far as I

¹ ‘I at first was of this opinion; but afterwards, when I knew the King better, I changed my mind completely on this point.’—C. Vijn.

‘Dabulamanzi may be taken to represent the Zulu Nation in his question, as he saw the King carried into captivity,—‘What has he done that he should be punished? It is not he that has been beaten, but his soldiers.’—*Cape Times (Natal Witness)*, Sept. 27, 1879).

² ‘When Lord Chelmsford called for the cattle, and guns and

have seen, no one has been generous enough to recognise this fact on behalf of the King.

In fact, Cetshwayo seems to have done all he could to show his sincerity in asking for terms of peace through more than a dozen sets of messengers. He sent in the cattle left to himself from those captured at Isandhlwana—the two cannon—his own white cattle—the splendid tusks of ivory to both columns—the Prince's sword. But no account was taken of all this. The 'tusk' and the 'sword' were coolly 'annexed'; but no spark of generous feeling was kindled in the breasts of those who had resolved to crush him. As he could not do the impossible things demanded of him before terms of peace would be even discussed, the hideous war was still carried on by Christian men in the name of England; the cry was still '*Delendus est!*'

Note 25, page 51.

On July 1 Mr. Vijn wrote another letter to Lord Chelmsford, which he may not have had an opportunity of sending, as he has forwarded what appears to be the original, from which the following is copied :—

'Sir,—I went into the Country Oct. 30, 1878, for buying Cattle. Just when my goods were sold, war commenced, and, of course, they did not spare me; they took

the two cannon, the King sent to fetch the cannon from Maizekanye. And, as they were taking them together with the King's white cattle, a choice herd which had belonged to his father, the soldiers stopped the cattle, and the cannon were left lying there on the way; and so the army fought, and burnt the kraals, and there was an end of it.'—*Magama.*

my cattle, oxen, wagon, and guns, killed two of my servants. We went up to the King, and He refused to kill us, but took very good care for us.

‘Now I must tell you what has happened yesterday (30th June, 1879). The King did send some days ago about 110 oxen back again (all the oxen which were left taken during the war, many died and many killed) to the General Lord Chelmsford. Yesterday he did send about 100 of his white oxen, but they were not crossed the White Umfolozi river yet, they were turned back by force from his soldiers named (Uncanda Inpinvu) Nkandampemvu crying for war, saying they should not be given to the Whites, when they (his men) were in alive; also they shall refuse to give the guns and ammunition taking during the war—they want to fight—but the King and his Brothers, also (Umjamman) Mnyamana, &c. they do not trust their men, because, when they once run away, they wont return again.

‘I remain

‘Your obed^t Serv’

‘C. VLIN

‘(For my life keep this secret to natives).’

Note 26, page 51.

This fact must be remembered when it is stated that after the Battle of Ulundi the Zulus ‘forsook’ their King and went to their homes. They did so, it appears, on all occasions, whether of victory or defeat. In fact, they were merely an *armed people*, not a ‘standing army,’ as is commonly supposed.

‘They (the Zulus) say that at the time when Ulundi was burnt, the King had told his army not to fight with the Whites, if it found them stationary, since then probably they would have made a fortification, and the army would suffer badly. According to this word a large part of the Zulu force did not fight, since they saw that the Whites were stationary. They say that they went off to the King [? according to their oath—they might know where to find him, though Mr. Vijn did not]; and he ordered them to disperse, as he did not wish his people to come to an end, for they had now fought a good deal and had suffered greatly, and it did not matter if he himself was caught.’—*Magama*.

The Zulus said that, some time before the Battle of Ulundi, Cetshwayo tried to send a message to Sobantu (Bp. of Natal), to say that ‘the Whitemen were pressing him hard, and he wished Sobantu to come with a carriage and take him, so that he might not come across the White Army, but give himself up in Natal, without being laid hands on.’ The messengers were stopped by Bp. Schreuder, who said that ‘they must not take the message, they would be blamed if they did, for he himself had been blamed because it was said that he was sending words to Sobantu’ [which he never did].

Note 27, page 52.

It thus appears that Cetshwayo went away on July 3, the day before the Battle of Ulundi, and did not, with some of his brothers and chiefs, witness the battle from a neighbouring hill, as he is generally supposed to

have done. The Zulu prisoner (Note 16) told Capt. Shepstone [*London Gazette*, Aug. 21, 1879], 'The Ndaba-kaombe was with the King, as his body-guard, at the Umlambongwenya Kraal, *from which he saw the battle.*' This man, however, said evidently what he believed, and not what he knew, since he was not in attendance on the King, as Mr. Vijn was. But the prisoner adds, in accordance with Mr. Vijn's statement—'The King said he wanted to make peace, and sent three days ago 140 of his white cattle as a peace-offering to the Great Chief leading the White Army. These cattle were turned back at the White Imvolosi at Nodwengu by the Nkandampemvu regiment, who refused to let them pass, saying they "preferred to fight" and "would not have peace." The King was then at Ulundi, and some of them were killed the day before yesterday [July 2] by the King's orders, for the army to eat. . . . We were all by order up at the Umlambongwenya Kraal the day before yesterday, when the King addressed us, and said that, as the Nkandampemvu regiment would not let the cattle go in as a peace-offering, and as we wished to fight, the White Army being now at his home, we might fight, but we were to fight the Whitemen in the open.'

Lord Chelmsford writes [*London Gazette*, Aug. 21]—'Two messengers from Cetshwayo were seen by me about mid-day [June 30]. I have the honour of enclosing a copy of the message sent to him, which at their request was reduced to writing [given below]—likewise a copy of the written communication received by me through Mr. Vijn, the Whiteman with the Zulu Chief [see Note 23].

The messengers brought with them the sword of the late Imperial Prince Louis Napoleon, which, for safe custody, was sent back to the fort here. The messengers were desired to take charge of the cattle which had been sent in to me at Emtonjaneni, as I wanted to return them now I was advancing; but they refused to take them on the plea of the delay it would cause in their return to the King.'

The following is the account of the death of the Prince and the recovery of the sword, obtained by Magema in Zululand :—

'Mnukwa, an Innceku (household-officer) of the King says—"We were watching as scouts, though not by the King's orders, and were seated on a small rise, when we saw the Whitemen coming late in the afternoon. There was a river there, the iJojosi, and several small gullies, at the place where we killed them. We went into a gully, unseen by them, and crept along it, being in number about 40 or 50. When we got near to them, we fired without their seeing us, just as they were about to mount their horses. We fired many shots, but they all missed. Four Whitemen had already mounted, and these escaped; but the other three and a dressed native had not yet mounted. The Prince was in the act of mounting when his horse threw him, being startled at the noise of our guns. When the horse had thrown him, it ran away with his gun, which fell out some way off. When he had fallen on the ground he drew a revolver and fired twice, but missed. Xabanga, one of ours, flung an assegai at him as he sat on the ground, and struck him in the

breast. Then Gwabukana came and stabbed him, and the son of Maganga also and others. He never made the least attempt to run away. We assegaied the other three also, including the dressed native; we did not shoot any. Then I took up from the ground the Prince's sword, which had been left by our people, who were plundering his articles of dress."¹

'When Mfunzi and Nkisimane came back, and brought to Cetshwayo in the evening the word of Gebuza (Mr. F. E. Colenso) about sending in the sword, Mnukwa was at hand, and the King obtained the sword at once from him, and sent it in the next morning by Mfunzi and Nkisimane. But he was afraid to say that the son of Sobantu (the Bishop) had advised him to send it, lest the English Authorities should be angry.'²

The letter of Lord Chelmsford was as follows [*London Gazette*, Aug. 21]:—

'Camp "Amakeni"

Monday, 30th June, 1879.

'Lord Chelmsford sends following message to Ketchwayo.

¹ 'The watch, it was found, had been destroyed, so that only the wheels remained of it; they thought that it was a case for money, and expected to find coins inside it.'—*Magema*.

A native, sent by Col. Villiers recovered 4 guns, 1 revolver, 10 sovereigns, 10 half-crowns, 2 cartridge-belts, trousers, coat, and waistcoat, shirt, penknife, &c.

² The statement in the *Cape Times* (*Natal Witness*, Sept. 30), 'Cetshwayo asserts that the first intelligence he had of the death of the Imperial Prince was conveyed by Lord Chelmsford's demand for a return of the sword of his Imperial Highness,' is wholly incorrect. Lord Chelmsford never, so far as appears, demanded the sword, nor acknowledged the receipt of it to Cetshwayo in any way.

'1. If the Induna "Mundula" brings with him one (1,000) thousand Rifles taken at Sandhswana, I will not insist on 1,000 men coming to lay them down, if the Zulus are afraid to come.

'He must bring the two cannon and the remainder of the cattle; I will then be willing to negotiate.

'2. As Ketchwayo has caused me to advance by the great delay he has made, I must now go as far as the Umvelosi River to enable my men to drink. I will consent, pending negotiations, to halt on the further (Ulundi) bank of the River, and will not burn any kraals until Thursday the 3rd July—provided no opposition is made to my advance on the Umvelosi; by which day, the 3rd July, *by noon*, the conditions must be complied with.

'3. If my force is fired upon, I shall consider negotiations are at an end. And, to avoid any chance of this, it is best that Mundula come to my camp to-morrow at daybreak or to-night, and that the Zulu troops withdraw from the river and its neighbourhood to Ulundi.

'4. I cannot stop the General with the coast army until all conditions are complied with; when they are so, I will send, as speedily as possible, a messenger to him.

'CHELMSFORD,

'Lt.-General.'

The above letter, it will be seen, contains a somewhat more reasonable demand—Lord Chelmsford here waiving the point on which he had previously insisted, *viz.* that a thousand Zulu warriors should submit to the personal indignity of coming in and laying down their arms—a

thing which it was utterly out of the King's power to compel them to do—and requiring only that Mundula (the headman of the Nodweagu Kraal) should 'bring with him 1,000 Rifles taken at Sandhlwana,' which, notwithstanding the present temper of his men, might possibly have been carried out by the King, with the help of his brothers and councillors, or, at all events, might have been attempted.

This being the case, it is unfortunate that *this letter never reached Cetshwayo*. On being shown a copy of it, as it appeared in the *London Gazette*—the *only* letter from Lord Chelmsford to Cetshwayo which appears there—Mr. Vijn at once exclaimed 'That is not the letter Lord Chelmsford sent; that letter I never saw; it never reached the King.' As the two messengers who took in the sword, and at whose request this letter was written, were Mfunzi and Nkisi mane, two thoroughly trustworthy men, it is difficult to explain the non-delivery of the letter in question, dated June 30, with which they may have started on July 1. However, it is certain that this letter—whose demands would have strongly tried his power over his people, but were not wholly beyond the bounds of possibility, as the former demands were—never reached the King, and he must not be charged with having rejected it, as when Lord Chelmsford says (*Lond. Gaz.*), 'This day (July 2) no messengers arrived from the King,' and again, 'No message has been received from Cetshwayo (July 3).'

Since the above was written the mystery has been explained by Magema bringing back from Zululand Lord

Chelmsford's letter, which Mfunzi gave him,¹ having never delivered it to the King, under the following circumstances.

‘This letter from Lord Chelmsford had never been opened by anyone till it was opened by me, Magema, in Mfunzi's Kraal this 18th October, 1879.

‘This letter was written to the King, to be read by the Whiteman who was there with him, and who would interpret all the words of it to the King. He (Mfunzi) and Nkisimane had set out from the King to carry that sword of the Prince with which they were sent by the Zulu King and People, and they brought back this letter from the General. When they arrived, they were told by the Indunas that “the Whiteman had gone away, and the letter was of no use now, as there was no one to read it.”

‘But Mfunzi says the Zulu People were hopeless and desperate in their trouble, and the hearts of the Indunas were deadened like stones, since they now saw that there was no help for them, and that the Zulu House must go to the ground. Mfunzi's words had no effect upon the Indunas, they did not listen to them at all. It seems to me, therefore, that the contents of this letter never reached the King, because the Indunas did not put faith in the words which Mfunzi brought, when he tried to explain them as well as he could, which was very imperfectly. Perhaps they deceived him purposely, or perhaps they did not and were themselves deceived, when they

¹ The copy given above has been transcribed from the original, now in the possession of the Bishop of Natal, which varies in some unimportant particulars from that given in the *London Gazette*.

said that the Whiteman had gone away, if he was still there. As to Mfunzi himself, they would not allow him to go in person to the King, in accordance with the Zulu custom, that no one must appear before the King who has just come from the enemy, being unclean.'

The fact is that Mfunzi and Nkisimane, if they started with this letter on the day when it was dated (June 30) must have reached the Zulu force in the midst of the excitement arising from the white oxen and cannon having been stopped by the Nkandampemvu when on their way to Lord Chelmsford (Note 25).

Note 28, page 54.

The following is a copy of the original letter of Sir G. Wolseley, which must have been either taken direct to the King by the messengers, or sent on to him by the five Chiefs addressed, and by him handed over to Mr. Vijn, as it must have been in any case, to be read and interpreted.

'Message from Sir G. Wolseley, K.C.B., G.C.M.G., &c., &c., &c., Governor of Natal and the Transvaal, and General Commanding the Forces in South Africa

'To MNYAMANE

SEKETWAYO

TYINGWAYO [NTSHINGWAYO]

USIBEBU [ZIBEBU]

UMQUANDI

} by KWABARA
MANYONI.

'Sir Garnet Wolseley desires you to meet him as soon as possible at Emmangweni. If you do not come to meet

him, you will be regarded as an enemy of the English. If you do come to meet him, you will be treated as a friend and your cattle secured to you. Such cattle as you may have belonging to the King are to be sent to Sir Garnet Wolseley at Emmangweni. All the coast chiefs and Dabulamanzi the King's brother have surrendered.

‘ Sir Garnet Wolseley does not wish to make war with the Zulu People; he wishes on the contrary to protect them and see them happy. He wants you to go to his camp at Emmangweni to represent the people in settling the country, and looks upon you as the mouthpiece of the people under you, and is therefore anxious that you should come and see him.

‘ The Swazis are now collecting on the Pongolo River, and, if Sir Garnet Wolseley orders the Swazis to advance, they will soon clear out the Ngome forest. The Amatongas have sent messengers to Sir Garnet Wolseley saying they will not allow anyone to pass from Zululand through their territory.

‘ As you cannot now make any further resistance to the English or their Native Allies, you had better come in to Sir Garnet Wolseley before it is too late; you can help him in settling the Country, of which the English have no intention of annexing any portion.

‘ By command,

‘ CHELMSFORD,

‘ L.G.

‘ 14th July, 1879.’

Note 29, page 54.

In the above letter (Note 28) Sir G. Wolseley

desires Mnyamana, &c. to 'meet him,' to 'come and see him,' in which case they would be 'treated as friends' and might 'help in settling the country'—they 'had better come in to him before it is too late.' Not a word is said about bringing in their arms, and especially their guns, as a token of 'surrender.'

In point of fact the 'meeting,' which was held on July 19, was not altogether successful, since none but unwarlike coast chiefs attended, besides Dabulamanzi. Accordingly another notice was issued for a meeting on Aug. 10 at Ulundi, afterwards changed to Aug. 15; and Official Notices report as follows :—

'Yesterday I held satisfactory interview with the principal chiefs of the Coast District, informing them generally of plans for settlement of the country. Consider it necessary to return to Ulundi and occupy with troops, myself proceeding there. I have sent messengers to all chiefs to *meet me there* (Ulundi) about 10th of next month to *settle country*.

'Under Col. Villiers, Swazis will cross Pongolo River further north, accompanied by Macleod, political agent.'—Sir G. Wolseley, *Telegram*, July 21 (*Guardian*, Aug. 13).

'Five thousand Swazis ready to attack him (Cetshwayo)—probably will increase to 10,000, before crossing Pongolo River.'—Sir G. Wolseley, *Telegram*, Aug. 2 (*Guardian*, Aug. 27).

'Macleod reports that the Swazis have collected, and are ready to cross the Zulu frontier.

'Vice-Consul Thompson reports an interview with full Council of Amatonga Chiefs, who promise to carry

out the General's wishes [by] refusing to allow Cetshwayo to take refuge in their territory.'—Chief of the Staff, Aug. 4, 1879.

'The Swazis were preparing to cross the Pongolo River on the 15th.

'Mnyamana, the Zulu Prime Minister, Ntshingwayo, these and three other important chiefs, with a large following, came in and surrendered to-day, bringing 650 head of the King's cattle. They are detained [!] until the rest of the cattle and arms are brought in. Two of the King's brothers, Sukane and Mgidhlana, also surrendered to-day.'—Do., Aug. 15.

Also the *Natal Mercury* states, Aug. 7 :—'We have been informed on excellent authority that, soon after the arrival of H.E. Sir G. Wolseley, he gave orders for 5,000 Swazis to hold themselves in readiness to cross into Zululand. He has also issued an order to be circulated amongst the Tongas, offering a reward for the capture of Cetshwayo.'

There is no doubt that the Swazis had been called out by Sir G. Wolseley's orders through Capt. Macleod, and (as Mr. Vijn says) the Zulus dreaded the onslaught of these ferocious savages upon their wives and children, with which they were threatened in the name of a Christian People. It is plain also that the Tongas did not, as Sir G. Wolseley's letter to the five chiefs would imply, 'send messengers' of their own accord to say that 'they would not allow anyone to pass out of Zululand through their territory,' but only 'promised to carry out the General's wishes' impressed upon them by Vice-Consul

Thompson. Under these circumstances it is not a little surprising that Sir M. Hicks-Beach should have spoken in Parliament as in the following extract he is stated to have done.

‘Upon being asked by Mr. Anderson what truth there was in a statement that had appeared in the newspapers to the effect that certain English Officers had been deputed to stir up the Swazis and the Tongas against the Zulus, Sir M. Hicks-Beach said “the gentlemen referred to had been employed, not in stirring up the tribes mentioned against the Zulus, but in doing their best to prevent their joining the Zulus.”’—*Cape Argus*, Sept. 9.

But Mr. Archibald Forbes, who was with the Headquarters, states as follows (*Guardian*, Aug. 6) :—

‘Capt. Macleod has been commissioned to stir up the Swazis to aggression on the Zulus, stimulated by the price of 5,000 cattle placed on Cetshwayo’s head. Leigh has been deputed to the Tongas, to kindle among them a mercenary friendship, and constitute them our King-catchers.’

Upon which the *Guardian* (Aug. 13) very justly remarks :—‘Meantime, it is due to his (Sir G. Wolseley’s) reputation that Englishmen should utterly and indignantly disbelieve the report that he has set a price on Cetshwayo’s head. Observe what the case is. The man is not a rebel—not an invader—not a pretender—not a fugitive British criminal. He is a King whose authority we have recognised, and whose country we have invaded because he will not disband an army which he and his countrymen consider the foundation of their power and safety. He has not taken advantage of our unguarded

state while it was unguarded. He has not even answered invasion by counter-invasion. He has merely stood gallantly on his defence.

‘Even with this provocation, what should we have said of Cetshwayo if he had promised a large reward to any of our Zulu subjects who should murder Sir B. Frere or Lord Chelmsford? We should have classed it among the most disgraceful of his savage acts, worthy of the worst of barbarians.

‘And yet, such is the state of mind in which some people approach a native war, that we see it stated, without an expression of surprise or horror, that a Christian Gentleman and Officer has been guilty of an act which, without these provocations, is absolutely unworthy of the worst of barbarians.’

And the following is a brief report of what was said in Parliament on this subject (*Guardian*, Aug. 20):—

‘On Thursday Mr. Anderson asked whether there was any foundation for the statement that Sir G. Wolseley had put a price on Cetshwayo’s head. Sir M. Hicks-Beach replied that the statement did not appear in any communication received from South Africa.

‘Mr. Anderson, thinking this reply unsatisfactory, moved the adjournment of the House, and asked whether this country was to be dragged down to a lower depth of infamy than it had already reached in connexion with this war by employing brigands and assassins to murder King Cetshwayo—a gallant King, who was carrying on a war in defence of his country. Sir M. Hicks-Beach would like to know what the Government or anyone else

had said to justify the hon. member in charging Sir G. Wolseley with hiring assassins and murderers. Mr. Courtney said the right hon. gentleman seemed to misunderstand the question. The hon. member for Glasgow desired to give him an opportunity of making an indignant denial. But the right hon. gentleman did not deny the charge at all. Sir P. O'Brien suggested that the Government should telegraph to the Cape for information. Upon which the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked how that was to be done seeing that the Cape telegraph was not yet laid down. The subject then dropped.'

Mr. Archibald Forbes is now in England, and it does not appear that he has withdrawn the above statement as incorrect.

As Mnyamana, &c. did not bring in their arms, which was a well-known condition of 'surrender,' and accordingly is here insisted on, 'they are detained until the rest of the cattle and arms are brought in.' It is very plain that they did not really come in to surrender at all, in the proper sense of the word, but merely came to 'meet' or 'see' Sir G. Wolseley, induced by the specious language addressed to them, supposing that they might help, by advice or otherwise, in settling the country, but never expecting to be 'detained.'

Whether after the Battle of Ulundi Dabulamanzi 'surrendered' by bringing in his guns, does not appear. The Zulu prisoner says [*Lond. Gaz.* Aug. 21]: 'I have never heard that Dabulamanzi wanted peace or wanted to go over to the White people'—but he refers to the time before the battle. Also the Correspondent of the *Natal*

Witness, dating 'Umbalazi Plain, July 28,' says:—'The rumour is current here that Dabulamanzi wanted to escape and was shot in the leg by John Dunn.' And the *Witness* of Aug. 26 has the following—'A gentleman on Gen. Clifford's staff, who has been at Ulundi, gives us to understand that Ketshwayo's chief indunas, Mnyamana and Sigitwayo [?Ntshingwayo], who came in to discuss the terms of peace, were seized and kept prisoners in defiance of the laws of war. He also informs us that Dabulamanzi has got into disgrace, and been sent back in charge of Mr. Robertson to Kwamagwaza, because, instead of acting as a decoy for Ketshwayo, he conveyed to his chief a message, warning him that he would be sent to Robben Island if he surrendered.'¹

The *Natal Colonist* (Aug. 28) quotes the following from the *Times of Natal* in reference to the above:—'We are requested by "a gentleman on Gen. Clifford's staff, who has been at Ulundi," to contradict the false statements contained in yesterday's *Witness*, as to Ketshwayo's chief indunas having been seized, &c. We have his authority for stating that the only bit of truth in the entire paragraph is that Dabulamanzi has been left in charge of Mr. Robertson. Every other statement which it contains is a pure fabrication.'

In spite, however, of the above contradiction, it is very clear from the facts above stated, as well as from the following extract from the report of Sir G. Wolseley's

¹ 'Dabulamanzi is now living at his kraal. But he was in great disgrace with the Whitemen because it was said that he had sent to Cetshwayo to warn him to hide himself. And, in fact, Dabulamanzi had done this.'—*Magema*.

meeting with the chiefs at Ulundi by the 'Special War Correspondent' of the *Times of Natal* (Aug. 27), present 'with Sir Garnet's Headquarters at Ulundi,' that the statement in the *Witness* is substantially true.

'After the names of the principal men had been taken down, the *darbar* was opened by John Shepstone, who asked why they had not come in before, and had brought in only cattle, leaving their guns and assegais, which they were told especially to bring. The old chief Mnyamana answered that "after the Battle of Ulundi they were so scattered that they had even now not had sufficient time to get all the cattle together. They had, however, thought it best to come in at once with what they could get, and, as they were sincere in their desire for peace, they would go back and get together all the guns, assegais, and rest of the cattle, both theirs and the King's." Upon being asked whether there were not some royal herds of white cattle to come in, they replied "No—they had all been taken away by the King, but plenty of others still remained to be brought in." The cunning old fellow then turned to Dunn, and said that he would, he knew, bear him out in the statement that the King and Nation had lost lots of oxen, &c., by lung-sickness, and that of those still remaining the greater portion were away beyond the Maizekanye direction. He was then asked whether he got the message sent to him lately about surrendering, &c., and whether that did not mention about guns and assegais especially.¹ Several of

¹ Sir G. Wolseley's letter (Note.28) says nothing about 'guns and assegais.'

them began to talk at once, evidently apologizing [?], but mixing up the purport of every message which had been sent them since the war commenced. They were then asked "how it was another chief named 'Umvumyana' [? Mavumengwana or Vumandaba] had not come in with his guns and cattle from across the Black Imvolosi"—to which they replied that "he was coming to-morrow."

'This ended the first part of the *indaba* (business), Shepstone informing them that *the five principal chiefs would have to remain here until the guns, assegais, and rest of the cattle were brought in.* This gave rise to a lot of talk and objection, as they said that "they could not exercise their authority as well here as if they were allowed to go again, neither could they remain here, as the water was all polluted by the dead bodies of their comrades.' These objections were, however, overruled, and so the matter ended.

'After a short time, during which separate chiefs spoke, publicly and privately, to Dunn and Shepstone, the meeting broke up, the cattle were handed over to us, and all, except the five principal ones, scattered about and returned to their kraals during the afternoon, Cetshwayo's two brothers and the five hostages going into Dunn's camp and remaining with him.'

The following is the account of the matter given by Ntshingwayo, one of the five 'principal chiefs.'

'As to the going to Sir G. Wolseley of Mnyamana, Ntshingwayo, and the other Indunas, they had been sent by the King to sue for peace, bringing with them a large number of cattle, of which ten were Mnyamana's.

'I asked Ntshingwayo "You and Mnyamaza, what was your object in going to the Whitemen?" Said he "We had been sent by the King; we had ~~not~~ ~~run~~ away to the Whites. We had gone simply to ask for his head, that he might live and not perish. But, ~~as we were~~ going there, we saw the force (going out to capture the King) and were surprised.¹ A great number of (representative) Zulus went with us. When we came to the White Chiefs there, Mr. John (Shepstone) came forth and other White Chiefs, but the Governor (Sir G. Wolseley) did not appear. Mr. John asked "What's the meaning of this? Where is the King?" We said "We did not know; we had left him at Ziwedu's." Said they "That son of Panda, we should not have harmed him; we should only have admonished him." Said we "We have come to ask for his head; for, even as to what we have been doing, I for my part should not say that we went in for war." Said he "Put here Sihayo and the King—for (said they) we think that King of yours will be hurt by you." All we desired was to place him somewhere, to live as a private person, and not as King. After that talk it was said "We now make you prisoners, you five Indunas." We begged to be allowed to go and live at another place, at Ulundi. It was refused; but the Zulus were allowed to go away and leave us.'—*Magema*.

The Correspondent of the *Times* (apparently on the Staff of Sir Garnet Wolseley), dating 'Utrecht,

¹ They well might be surprised, since that was the day appointed for their 'meeting' Sir G. Wolseley, to talk over matters and settle the country.

Sept. 11, 1879,' writes as follows with reference to Mnyamana :—

'All the first five chiefs called up to sign the terms signed willingly, with every mark of approval, until Mnyamana's turn came. Mnyamana was formerly Prime Minister to Cetshwayo, and so firmly set are the roots of old instinctive dread and respect among the body of the Zulus that even now unusual deference is shown to Mnyamana, who in consequence assumed airs of unbecoming independence. Accordingly, when this ambitious chief found himself marked out for no especial honour, but rather signally slighted, disgust took possession of his soul. He thought the territory given to him too small for his importance, and he declined it. He said he would rather live under (Oham) Hamu. Sir Garnet told him in reply that he was by no means sorry that he should thus act—that *he was not by birth a great chief, and that he had been put into a high position only by Cetshwayo's favour.* Sir Garnet added he should be very glad to give Mnyamana's territory to a chief in whom he had more confidence, and *who by natural rank was more fitted to govern.* Accordingly next day the kingdom of Mnyamana was taken from him and given to another.'

The statements above italicised, with respect to Mnyamana's 'natural rank,' are wholly incorrect, and must have sounded ludicrously in the ears of the Zulus, as showing the sublime ignorance of the Great Chief, who had come to settle the country, of the real state of things among them.

Mnyamana's father became under Chaka the Chief of a very large Tribe. He died a natural death, and was succeeded by the young son of his deceased elder brother, who was made by Chaka Induna of the Umbelebele Military Kraal, and so continued under Dingane. Soon after Panda came to the throne Mnyamana killed his cousin, because, he said, the Tribe had been built up by his own father, not by his uncle. He was recognized as Chief by Panda, and made by him Induna, first of Umbelebele, and then of the Tulwana Regiment, in which were enrolled under his command eight of the King's sons, including Umbulazi, Hamu, Ziwedu, Siteku, and Cetshwayo. During the whole of Panda's reign, therefore, Mnyamana was one of the most important Chiefs in Zululand—I saw him as such when I visited Panda at Nodwengu in 1859—and all that Cetshwayo did was to make him, very naturally, Chief Induna after Masipula's death in 1873.

The Correspondent of the *Natal Mercury*, dating 'near Ulundi, Oct. 18,' says—'Mnyamana, the late King's Prime Minister, is not at all satisfied, and declares that he was entirely misinterpreted in what he said about living with (Oham) Hamu.'

Note 30, page 55.

In point of fact Cetshwayo had not 'turned out the Missionaries;' but one of them says [2252, p. 22] 'That which moved us Missionaries chiefly, feeling it unsafe for ourselves in Zululand, was the unsettled boundary question and the conviction that the illegality and

insolence of the Zulus would compel the English Government to an armed demonstration, if not to a war with the Zulus. That which can seduce and more other Missionaries to leave Zululand for Natal was that H.E. Sir T. Shepstone advised us to go out, and so I went out 15th April this year (1878).'

The following extract shows the view which Missionaries themselves take of the present state of things in Zululand (*Times of Natal*, Oct. 27, 1879).

'If Sir G. Wolseley, the representative of a Christian Government, will concede to us the same rights and privileges as we had under the now deposed heathen King, and further, through the British Resident in Zululand, protect our lives and property from violence, as Cetshwayo did, we shall therewith be content :—

It is certainly a strange result of such vast expenditure and so much bloodshedding on both sides that at the present moment those Missionaries, who have most helped to bring on the late war by their denunciations of Cetshwayo to Sir B. Frere,¹ have been practically excluded

¹ Bishop Wilkinson, described as 'Bishop of Zululand,' and as 'having spent six years in Zululand'—though in reality, as I believe, he has spent only about three years in Zululand itself,—'he only remained two years, and then returned home,' Letter in *Church Times*, Oct. 10, dated 'Kwamagwaza, Zululand, Aug. 14, 1879'—and very soon abandoned his work in that country altogether, so that the administrators of the Mackenzie Memorial Fund complained (*Guardian*, Jan. 19, 1876) that he had 'left the diocese, at a critical time of its existence, without a head,'—and who is now 'living at St. Michael Carhayes Rectory, near St. Austell, Cornwall,' has also 'lifted up his heel' against Cetshwayo (*Western Morning News*), as also has the Rev. J. G. Morrow at Folkestone, described as 'a returned Missionary from

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had said to justify the hon. member in charging Sir G. Wolseley with hiring assassins and murderers. Mr. Courtney said the right hon. gentleman seemed to misunderstand the question. The hon. member for Glasgow desired to give him an opportunity of making an indignant denial. But the right hon. gentleman did not deny the charge at all. Sir P. O'Brien suggested that the Government should telegraph to the Cape for information. Upon which the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked how that was to be done seeing that the Cape telegraph was not yet laid down. The subject then dropped.'

Mr. Archibald Forbes is now in England, and it does not appear that he has withdrawn the above statement as incorrect.

As Mnyamana, &c. did not bring in their arms, which was a well-known condition of 'surrender,' and accordingly is here insisted on, 'they are detained until the rest of the cattle and arms are brought in.' It is very plain that they did not really come in to surrender at all, in the proper sense of the word, but merely came to 'meet' or 'see' Sir G. Wolseley, induced by the specious language addressed to them, supposing that they might help, by advice or otherwise, in settling the country, but never expecting to be 'detained.'

Whether after the Battle of Ulundi Dabulamanzi 'surrendered' by bringing in his guns, does not appear. The Zulu prisoner says [*Lond. Gaz.* Aug. 21]: 'I have never heard that Dabulamanzi wanted peace or wanted to go over to the White people'—but he refers to the time before the battle. Also the Correspondent of the *Natal*

Witness, dating 'Umbalazi Plain, July 28,' says:—'The rumour is current here that Dabulamanzi wanted to escape and was shot in the leg by John Dunn.' And the *Witness* of Aug. 26 has the following—'A gentleman on Gen. Clifford's staff, who has been at Ulundi, gives us to understand that Ketshwayo's chief indunas, Mnyamana and Sigitwayo [?Ntshingwayo], who came in to discuss the terms of peace, were seized and kept prisoners in defiance of the laws of war. He also informs us that Dabulamanzi has got into disgrace, and been sent back in charge of Mr. Robertson to Kwamagwaza, because, instead of acting as a decoy for Ketshwayo, he conveyed to his chief a message, warning him that he would be sent to Robben Island if he surrendered.'¹

The *Natal Colonist* (Aug. 28) quotes the following from the *Times of Natal* in reference to the above:—'We are requested by "a gentleman on Gen. Clifford's staff, who has been at Ulundi," to contradict the false statements contained in yesterday's *Witness*, as to Ketshwayo's chief indunas having been seized, &c. We have his authority for stating that the only bit of truth in the entire paragraph is that Dabulamanzi has been left in charge of Mr. Robertson. Every other statement which it contains is a pure fabrication.'

In spite, however, of the above contradiction, it is very clear from the facts above stated, as well as from the following extract from the report of Sir G. Wolseley's

¹ 'Dabulamanzi is now living at his kraal. But he was in great disgrace with the Whitemen because it was said that he had sent to Cetshwayo to warn him to hide himself. And, in fact, Dabulamanzi had done this.'—*Magema*.

meeting with the chiefs at Ulundi by the 'Special War Correspondent' of the *Times of Natal* (Aug. 27), present 'with Sir Garnet's Headquarters at Ulundi,' that the statement in the *Witness* is substantially true.

'After the names of the principal men had been taken down, the *darbar* was opened by John Shepstone, who asked why they had not come in before, and had brought in only cattle, leaving their guns and assegais, which they were told especially to bring. The old chief Mnyamana answered that "after the Battle of Ulundi they were so scattered that they had even now not had sufficient time to get all the cattle together. They had, however, thought it best to come in at once with what they could get, and, as they were sincere in their desire for peace, they would go back and get together all the guns, assegais, and rest of the cattle, both theirs and the King's." Upon being asked whether there were not some royal herds of white cattle to come in, they replied "No—they had all been taken away by the King, but plenty of others still remained to be brought in." The cunning old fellow then turned to Dunn, and said that he would, he knew, bear him out in the statement that the King and Nation had lost lots of oxen, &c., by lung-sickness, and that of those still remaining the greater portion were away beyond the Maizekanye direction. He was then asked whether he got the message sent to him lately about surrendering, &c., and whether that did not mention about guns and assegais especially.¹ Several of

¹ Sir G. Wolseley's letter (Note. 28) says nothing about 'guns and assegais.'

them began to talk at once, evidently apologizing [?], but mixing up the purport of every message which had been sent them since the war commenced. They were then asked "how it was another chief named 'Umvumyana' [? Mavumengwana or Vumandaba] had not come in with his guns and cattle from across the Black Imvolosi"—to which they replied that "he was coming to-morrow."

'This ended the first part of the *indaba* (business), Shepstone informing them that *the five principal chiefs would have to remain here until the guns, assegais, and rest of the cattle were brought in.* This gave rise to a lot of talk and objection, as they said that "they could not exercise their authority as well here as if they were allowed to go again, neither could they remain here, as the water was all polluted by the dead bodies of their comrades.' These objections were, however, overruled, and so the matter ended.

'After a short time, during which separate chiefs spoke, publicly and privately, to Dunn and Shepstone, the meeting broke up, the cattle were handed over to us, and all, except the five principal ones, scattered about and returned to their kraals during the afternoon, Cetshwayo's two brothers and the five hostages going into Dunn's camp and remaining with him.'

The following is the account of the matter given by Ntshingwayo, one of the five 'principal chiefs.'

'As to the going to Sir G. Wolseley of Mnyamana, Ntshingwayo, and the other Indunas, they had been sent by the King to sue for peace, bringing with them a large number of cattle, of which ten were Mnyamana's.

'I asked Ntshingwayo "You and Mnyamana, what was your object in going to the Whitemen?" Said he, "We had been sent by the King; we had not run away to the Whites. We had gone simply to ask for his head, that he might live and not perish. But, as we were going there, we saw the force (going out to capture the King) and were surprised.¹ A great number of (representative) Zulus went with us. When we came to the White Chiefs there, Mr. John (Shepstone) came forth and other White Chiefs, but the Governor (Sir G. Wolseley) did not appear. Mr. John asked "What's the meaning of this? Where is the King?" We said "We did not know; we had left him at Ziwedu's." Said they "That son of Panda, we should not have harmed him; we should only have admonished him." Said we "We have come to ask for his head; for, even as to what we have been doing, I for my part should not say that we went in for war." Said he "Put here Sihayo and the King—for (said they) we think that King of yours will be hurt by you." All we desired was to place him somewhere, to live as a private person, and not as King. After that talk it was said "We now make you prisoners, you five Indunas." We begged to be allowed to go and live at another place, at Ulundi. It was refused; but the Zulus were allowed to go away and leave us.'—*Magama*.

The Correspondent of the *Times* (apparently on the Staff of Sir Garnet Wolseley), dating 'Utrecht,

¹ They well might be surprised, since that was the day appointed for their 'meeting' Sir G. Wolseley, to talk over matters and settle the country.

Sept. 11, 1879,' writes as follows with reference to Mnyamana :—

'All the first five chiefs called up to sign the terms signed willingly, with every mark of approval, until Mnyamana's turn came. Mnyamana was formerly Prime Minister to Cetshwayo, and so firmly set are the roots of old instinctive dread and respect among the body of the Zulus that even now unusual deference is shown to Mnyamana, who in consequence assumed airs of unbecoming independence. Accordingly, when this ambitious chief found himself marked out for no especial honour, but rather signally slighted, disgust took possession of his soul. He thought the territory given to him too small for his importance, and he declined it. He said he would rather live under (Oham) Hamu. Sir Garnet told him in reply that he was by no means sorry that he should thus act—that *he was not by birth a great chief*, and that *he had been put into a high position only by Cetshwayo's favour*. Sir Garnet added he should be very glad to give Mnyamana's territory to a chief in whom he had more confidence, and *who by natural rank was more fitted to govern*. Accordingly next day the kingdom of Mnyamana was taken from him and given to another.'

The statements above italicised, with respect to Mnyamana's 'natural rank,' are wholly incorrect, and must have sounded ludicrously in the ears of the Zulus, as showing the sublime ignorance of the Great Chief, who had come to settle the country, of the real state of things among them.

Mnyamana's father became under Chaka the Chief of a very large Tribe. He died a natural death, and was succeeded by the young son of his deceased elder brother, who was made by Chaka Induna of the Umbelebele Military Kraal, and so continued under Dingane. Soon after Panda came to the throne Mnyamana killed his cousin, because, he said, the Tribe had been built up by his own father, not by his uncle. He was recognized as Chief by Panda, and made by him Induna, first of Umbelebele, and then of the Tulwana Regiment, in which were enrolled under his command eight of the King's sons, including Umbulazi, Hamu, Ziwedu, Siteku, and Cetshwayo. During the whole of Panda's reign, therefore, Mnyamana was one of the most important Chiefs in Zululand—I saw him as such when I visited Panda at Nodwengu in 1859—and all that Cetshwayo did was to make him, very naturally, Chief Induna after Masipula's death in 1873.

The Correspondent of the *Natal Mercury*, dating 'near Ulundi, Oct. 18,' says—'Mnyamana, the late King's Prime Minister, is not at all satisfied, and declares that he was entirely misinterpreted in what he said about living with (Oham) Hamu.'

Note 30, page 55.

In point of fact Cetshwayo had not 'turned out the Missionaries;' but one of them says [2252, p. 22] 'That which moved us Missionaries chiefly, feeling it unsafe for ourselves in Zululand, was the unsettled boundary question and the conviction that the illegality and

insolence of the Zulus would compel the English Government to an armed demonstration, if not to a war with the Zulus. That which caused me and more other Missionaries to leave Zululand for Natal was that H.E. Sir T. Shepstone advised us to go out, and so I went out 15th April this year (1878).'

The following extract shows the view which Missionaries themselves take of the present state of things in Zululand (*Times of Natal*, Oct. 27, 1879).

'If Sir G. Wolseley, the representative of a Christian Government, will concede to us the same rights and privileges as we had under the now deposed heathen King, and further, through the British Resident in Zululand, protect our lives and property from violence, as Cetshwayo did, we shall therewith be content :—

It is certainly a strange result of such vast expenditure and so much bloodshedding on both sides that at the present moment those Missionaries, who have most helped to bring on the late war by their denunciations of Cetshwayo to Sir B. Frere,¹ have been practically excluded

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‘It was known before the troops entered Zululand that Etshowe was to be occupied, and Mr. Oftebro gave me the keys of the house and church, and asked me to do what I could to save his property, in particular his beautiful orchard, the pulpit, &c. I accordingly made it my business to be one of the first to enter Etshowe. With the exception of a sofa, from which the chintz covering had been rudely torn [by whom?], I found the place exactly as Mr. Oftebro had left it; the Zulus had touched nothing’—nearly nine months after Mr. Oftebro had quitted it.

In fact, some time must have elapsed, after the Station at Etshowe had been occupied (Jan. 23) and turned into a fortress by the British troops, before the Mission Stations were destroyed by the Zulus, and then not by the King’s orders. Bp. Schreuder writes on March 3 as follows [2318, p. 35]:—

‘The King says “Look here! I have taken care of the deserted Mission Stations, and not allowed them to be destroyed, thinking that the Missionaries in time would return to them, such as Mr. Robertson’s at Kwamagwaza and Mr. Oftebro’s at Etshowe. But we now see what use the Missionaries make of the Station-houses; Robertson has come with an Impi (army) to the Etshowe Mission-Station, and there is made a fort of it, the houses being turned to advantage for our enemies. Seeing this, my people have on their own account destroyed the other

Mission Stations, and, although I have not ordered this destruction, still I cannot complain of it, seeing that the houses on the Stations will serve as shelter for our present invading enemy. I am in a fix what to do with your Station (Entumeni); for it is reported amongst us (the report is said to originate from a man from John Dunn) that the column at Ntunjambili (Kranzkop) is to cross and march to Entumeni and turn the Station into a fort, (like) as Robertson has had the Etshowe turned into a fort. In that case I shall, much against my wish, be obliged to destroy the house at Entumeni, as a matter of self-protection—the last thing I ever thought of doing, as I have no (grudge) ill-will against you or your Station.” This is the substance of the King’s message to me with respect to my Station, Entumeni.’

On April 1, 1879, Mr. Fannin writes [2318, p. 65]:—

‘I have had a private conversation with the recently [? on March 21, p. 60] arrived Entumeni men at Bp. Schreuder’s. . . . Mr. Robertson’s Station at Kwamagwaza has been utterly destroyed, the houses burnt, and the church-walls undermined and broken down. The Zulus feared it might be made a fortress of, like Etshowe. They are angry with Mr. Robertson for taking an active part in the War by accompanying the invading column. *No harm has been done to the other Mission Stations.*’

Probably these natives had not heard of the other Stations having been already destroyed, as seems to follow from Bp. Schreuder’s statement. But, as Mr. Vijn heard that the King had fined those who had destroyed Kwamagwaza, it may be that this Station was first destroyed,

from Zululand through the action of Chief John Dunn, though, of course, the prohibition may be removed. It is known, indeed, that an Agent of the Norwegian Missionaries suggested to Sir B. Frere that such reports should be procured from the Missionaries, saying 'What you want, I suppose, is an indictment.' But it is difficult to see how *any* earnest Missionary can voluntarily put himself under the rule of an *English* polygamist, whose manner of life he must necessarily condemn, directly or indirectly, in teaching his subjects, thus undermining their loyalty and respect for their ruler, and placing himself in very awkward relations to the White Chief under whom he lives. And John Dunn's district is understood to include more than half of Zululand.

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Note 32, page 76.

The following account of the capture of Cetshwayo is taken from a statement in the *Cape Times*, Sept. 11, 1879, from information furnished by Mr. Longcast, formerly the Rev. Mr. Robertson's wagon-driver, but described as 'a first-class Interpreter of the Head-Quarters Staff, who has lived twenty years in Zululand, and who is acquainted with every phase of life in Zululand,' and who is now stationed with Cetshwayo at the Castle, Cape-town.

'We felt certain that the Zulus knew where the King was, and, if they would only give us the information, he would be caught in a few hours. *We tried threats and everything else during the hours of our bivouac, until daylight next morning, but without result.*

'That afternoon we successfully descended a very steep hill, and visited a kraal where the King had been that very morning. The chase was growing most exciting, and we immediately crossed the river Mona, and ascended a steep hill on the other side, on the crest of which was the kraal of Mbopa. Here we were thrown off the scent, and our hopes were dashed to the ground.

Having ascertained that Mbopa's son was with the King, we made Mbopa and all the people of his kraal prisoners, and carried them to the kraal of the son, which was five miles distant. . . . We [Lord Gifford and party] then returned to the rendezvous and rejoined Major Barrow. In our absence he had brought together about 40 Zulus, and we set to work to see if we could

destroy that also for the reason given; but, being at the time in communication with the Bishop, the latter successfully persuaded him to leave it standing.

'It was known before the troops entered Zululand that Etshowe was to be occupied, and Mr. Oftebro gave me the keys of the house and church, and asked me to do what I could to save his property, in particular his beautiful orchard, the pulpit, &c. I accordingly made it my business to be one of the first to enter Etshowe. With the exception of a sofa, from which the chintz covering had been rudely torn [by whom?], I found the place exactly as Mr. Oftebro had left it; the Zulus had touched nothing '—nearly nine months after Mr. Oftebro had quitted it.

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*us, Major Barrow cleared the district of cattle. After the two days' cattle-lifting*¹ Lord Gifford went off with his party to make another effort to capture the King. *We could get nothing from the Zulus. We were treated the*

¹ After the King had been captured and peace had been proclaimed, we still find the English Force harrying the Zulus (*Natal Mercury*, Oct. 15, 1879):—

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very different, whose history is written in characters of blood. The *Correspondent of the Times of Natal* (Nov. 10, 1877), writing from Durban, Nov. 1, says 'Common sense among them, the Zulus is that Cetshwayo will suffer no punishment, but their sense of respect and loyalty to his name is still very strong.' Magema, from information received in Zululand, adds the following facts.

Magema says that Mbopa told the King, when he came with Mbopa to Mbopa's kraal. The Indians and the Zulu People knew well enough where he was hiding; but they concealed him. Mbopa's people were flogged, but they did not conceal him, and the Inkceko (King's servants) were flogged, but they did not betray him.

When the King was in his flight making for the Ngome forest, he came to Mbopa's kraal across the Black Mountains. Just after he had arrived, the Whitemen came to searching for him. Mbopa went out to speak with them. They asked for the King, but Mbopa declared that he had not seen him at all. They insisted that the King was with him. Mbopa swore a great oath that he was not there, and that he did not know where he was. So they went on their way searching for him. At a kraal further on they found a man and questioned him very severely, according to their mode of flogging and threatening to kill. That man pointed out to them the Kraal of Mbopa, which they had passed. When they got back to it, they surrounded the kraal, and called Mbopa, and asked him how it was that he had deceived them. By this time Mbopa had taken the King out of

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The account above given, based on the statements of Mr. Longcast, must be regarded for the present as most correct where it varies from that of the *Daily News*, which supplements the former as follows (*Guardian*, Sept. 24, 1879):—

'On Aug. 27 he (Lord Gifford) took Cetshwayo's sleeping-mat at a kraal where the King had slept. Two lads were found there, and, as they denied all knowledge of Cetshwayo's whereabouts, they were blindfolded, and a volley fired into the air. The ruse succeeded, and one, exclaiming "My brother is shot!" promised to lead Lord Gifford to the King's retreat. Led by this boy he threaded the defiles of the forest at night, and, after a wild and perilous ride, reached at dawn of the 28th the spot, which was in an open glade. Fearing the escape of the King to the surrounding forest, Gifford sent back intelligence, and waited till night to make the capture. While lying hidden he watched the King slaughter an ox, and then descried a body of cavalry on the ridge opposite the kraal. This

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In fact the seven Missionaries, who, at the suggestion of the Durban Agent of the Norwegian Missionaries, prepared for Sir B. Frere their 'indictment against Cetshwayo' [2232, p. 11, &c.], repeat, one after another, the same tale of *two* converts—not 'Missionaries'—having been killed; to whom Messrs. Oftebro and Robertson add a *third* native 'Christian,' but without mentioning, as Mr. Schmidt does [p. 20] that he was 'a *lapsed* baptized Zulu,' or, as Mr. Volker does [p. 24], that he 'had been baptized seven years ago, but was not a good Christian, and accordingly lived at the kraals more than at the Station.' One of these two converts was killed by Gaozi (one of Sir G. Wolseley's Chiefs) in consequence of Mr. Oftebro having mentioned his wish for baptism to the King without his own Chief (Gaozi)'s knowledge and against his wishes; the other had been 'smelled out' as having caused the death of certain persons by poisoning the carcase of a dead beast of which they ate, and was killed by a violent rush of their enraged friends. In neither case had the order for execution issued from Cetshwayo, though he approved of the latter *ex post facto*, as he considered that the man was guilty.

But these two were the only cases which the Missionaries could cite of native converts who had been killed—though not *as* converts—during the five years of Cetshwayo's reign. And at his accession (1873) 'the Norwegians had 9 Stations in Zululand, the Hanoverians 10, and the Church of England 3 or 4' [2220, p. 340]; while a Correspondent of the *Church Times* (Oct. 10, 1879), who dates from 'Kwamagwaza, Zululand, Aug. 14,' and had been (apparently) informed by Mr. Robertson, speaking of

* For Notes, see opposite page.

gross caricatures which have appeared in the English Pictorial Journals, and one of which at least has been imposed on the editor and readers of one of them as a genuine likeness of Cetshwayo.

The fact is, however, that his whole appearance and behaviour have drawn expressions of respect and admiration from British Officers, his captors, as well as from those who saw him on the road from Ulundi or have since visited him at Capetown. Thus the *Times* account says (*Guardian*, Oct. 8, 1879):—

‘Cetshwayo’s personal appearance is quite unlike any of the so-called portraits, which have appeared in the pictorial press. He is an exceptionally fine specimen of the

the Church of England Mission alone, says ‘Little by little this Mission has grown until 300 or 400 Christians in Zululand may be claimed as belonging to it.’

¹ ‘Lord Elcho called Cetshwayo “an armed gorilla,” and stated that “he flayed men alive, covered them with honey, and, while they were still alive, planted them with ants’ nests”—*for which statement there is not a shadow of foundation in fact.* “A cruel and crafty gorilla” was the designation applied to Cetshwayo by Lord Elcho in the course of the discussion on Sir G. Wolseley’s appointment. In the face of loud cries of “Shame!” and “Withdraw!” the hon. member was compelled to substitute language more in accordance with the truth.’—*Cape Argus*, June 28, 1879.

² ‘He (Sir John Astley) said a great many wrong-headed people thought that we never ought to have attacked the Zulu Nation. But he for one was of opinion that we could never have maintained peace unless we had done what we did. Now that we had caught “that old rascal” Cetshwayo, it behoved us to teach him better manners. If he could not learn them we must shut him up in a cage. He should very much like to have the keeping of Cetshwayo for a week.’—*Cape Argus*, Nov. 1, 1879.

get any information from them. For a very long time we could not get anything out of them. *They were as uncommunicative under the threat of being shot as they were impenetrable to our seductive promises.* At last, however, in the controversy one of the speakers accidentally dropped the information that one of the King's own servants was amongst the group. He was instantly taken aside by Major Barrow, and quietly questioned through my interpreting. We extracted from him that he had left the King that very morning, and *after a little persuasion* he promised to put us on the following morning on to the King's trail; it was too late that day to do anything further.

'At daybreak a party of us went to Mbopa's kraal and took all the people—except the old gentleman, who was not at home—prisoners, and, *as they would give us no information*, which we knew they possessed, we burnt the kraal and took the cattle. We then returned to the main body of Lord Gifford's party, and there a *small boy* told us that beer was constantly being carried to the King, and that the men must know where he was. By *proper persuasive measures* [? flogging] one Zulu was induced to make a confession, and promised to take us to where the King had been the day before, and where he was still. The Kafir led us into the bush, but, as we foolishly had not fastened him, he gave us the slip. We sent a few shots after him, but missed him. We scoured the bush thoroughly, but never saw King, prisoner, or anybody else.

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'Lutshi says that Mbopa hid the King, when he came with Zibeba to Mbopa's Kraal. The Indunas and the Zulu People knew well enough where he was hiding; but they concealed him. Mbopa's people were flogged, but yet they concealed him; and the Inncekus (King's servants) were flogged, but they did not betray him.

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was Major Marter, who was commanding a party of dragoons. He had received Lord Gifford's intelligence, and moving down on the opposite side effected the King's capture. At 2 P.M., too sore to ride and too foot-sore to walk, Cetshwayo was brought to the camp in an ambulance cart. On the road [? eleven of] his followers tried to escape, and five were shot.'

'Escort with Cetshwayo just arrived; King walked into camp; has only 12 followers, of whom 5 are women. Dragoons captured originally 23; but Friday evening 11 tried to escape; 5 were shot, others escaped when coming through thick bush at dusk, prisoners not bound.'—Special War Correspondent of *Times of Natal*, dating 'Ulundi, Aug. 31, 1879.'

As five of the eleven, out of the King's party of twenty-three, who tried to escape in the evening dusk on the day after their capture, were shot, it is easy to see what would have been, almost to a certainty, the fate of Cetshwayo himself, if Lord Gifford had carried out his plan of making the capture at night (the hour fixed, it is said, being 8 P.M.), and if the King had made an effort to escape, as he would assuredly have done, in the evening shade and uncertain moonlight. A rifle-shot would in all probability have laid him low, and relieved Sir G. Wolseley and the Government of the difficulty of deciding how to deal with him, in the face of the English People and of all civilized and Christian men. In this case this unfortunate and noble-minded King would have perished without the chance of justice being done to him by word or act—his name blackened and his whole character and

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argument, that we were the first to cross the river. If we saw everything prepared for outrage and violence, we should naturally prevent it, if we could. This was said to be an unjust war; but Sir H. Bulwer, whom it was customary for Liberals to praise to the disadvantage of Sir B. Frere, confirmed Sir B. Frere's facts [*not all of them*].—*Cape Argus*, Oct. 7, 1879.

In fact the seven Missionaries, who, at the suggestion of the Durban Agent of the Norwegian Missionaries, prepared for Sir B. Frere their 'indictment against Cetshwayo' [2232, p. 11, &c.], repeat, one after another, the same tale of *two* converts—not 'Missionaries'—having been killed; to whom Messrs. Oftebro and Robertson add a *third* native 'Christian,' but without mentioning, as Mr. Schmidt does [p. 20] that he was 'a *lapsed* baptized Zulu,' or, as Mr. Volker does [p. 24], that he 'had been baptized seven years ago, but was not a good Christian, and accordingly lived at the kraals more than at the Station.' One of these two converts was killed by Gaozi (one of Sir G. Wolseley's Chiefs) in consequence of Mr. Oftebro having mentioned his wish for baptism to the King without his own Chief (Gaozi)'s knowledge and against his wishes; the other had been 'smelled out' as having caused the death of certain persons by poisoning the carcase of a dead beast of which they ate, and was killed by a violent rush of their enraged friends. In neither case had the order for execution issued from Cetshwayo, though he approved of the latter *ex post facto*, as he considered that the man was guilty.

But these two were the only cases which the Missionaries could cite of native converts who had been killed—though not *as* converts—during the five years of Cetshwayo's reign. And at his accession (1873) 'the Norwegians had 9 Stations in Zululand, the Hanoverians 10, and the Church of England 3 or 4' [2220, p. 340]; while a Correspondent of the *Church Times* (Oct. 10, 1879), who dates from 'Kwamagwaza, Zululand, Aug. 14,' had been (apparently) informed by Mr. Robertson, speaking of

* For Notes, see opposite page.

gross caricatures which have appeared in the English Pictorial Journals, and one of which at least has been imposed on the editor and readers of one of them as a genuine likeness of Cetshwayo.

The fact is, however, that his whole appearance and behaviour have drawn expressions of respect and admiration from British Officers, his captors, as well as from those who saw him on the road from Ulundi or have since visited him at Capetown. Thus the *Times* account says (*Guardian*, Oct. 8, 1879):—

‘Cetshwayo’s personal appearance is quite unlike any of the so-called portraits, which have appeared in the pictorial press. He is an exceptionally fine specimen of the

the Church of England Mission alone, says ‘Little by little this Mission has grown until 300 or 400 Christians in Zululand may be claimed as belonging to it.’

¹ ‘Lord Elcho called Cetshwayo “an armed gorilla,” and stated that “he flayed men alive, covered them with honey, and, while they were still alive, planted them with ants’ nests”—*for which statement there is not a shadow of foundation in fact.* “A cruel and crafty gorilla” was the designation applied to Cetshwayo by Lord Elcho in the course of the discussion on Sir G. Wolseley’s appointment. In the face of loud cries of “Shame!” and “Withdraw!” the hon. member was compelled to substitute language more in accordance with the truth.’—*Cape Argus*, June 28, 1879.

² ‘He (Sir John Astley) said a great many wrong-headed people thought that we never ought to have attacked the Zulu Nation. But he for one was of opinion that we could never have maintained peace unless we had done what we did. Now that we had caught “that old rascal” Cetshwayo, it behoved us to teach him better manners. If he could not learn them we must shut him up in a cage. He should very much like to have the keeping of Cetshwayo for a week.’—*Cape Argus*, Nov. 1, 1879.

noble savage, of well-proportioned and fully developed frame, with a good-natured, broad, open face, of the prominent Zulu type. Major Poole speaks favorably of his general amiability, and says he has given little trouble, except on one or two occasions when he showed a sulky disposition, and demanded to have an entire ox roasted for his daily meal.¹

And the *Cape Times* says (*Natal Mercury*, Sept. 24):—

‘In spite of his immense proportions I never saw a finer specimen of the races of South Africa or amongst them so intelligent a face. Those who have seen the photographs “from a painting” are made to believe that he is monstrous in face and form—a huge carcass with a fiendish countenance. He is nothing of the sort. His limbs are certainly enormous, but they are still symmetrical, and the great breadth of chest probably prevents his corpulence from being hideous. The face is massive, open, and good-natured, and lights up quickly at a pleasant thought or a humorous suggestion. There is not a line upon the forehead or beneath the eyes to suggest he has passed through years of deep anxiety or great excite-

¹ These ‘one or two occasions’ may have occurred at Capetown. But an officer has stated that he became ‘sulky’ or, rather, his face fell, when his escort from Ulundi turned off under secret orders to Port Durnford, instead of taking him, as he had hoped, and as indeed had been publicly announced, to Maritzburg,—as also that on that march he asked one day for meat, and, being told that there was none, he asked ‘Why don’t you kill a beast?’ to which it was replied ‘We have no power to do so,’ and he said ‘But the cattle here are mine, and I give you leave to kill one’—but his wish was not complied with.

ment of any kind. He is altogether unlike Macomo, Sandili, or Kreli. Sandili was probably taller than he, but never had the breadth of chest or the same fine cast of features. The eyes, large and lustrous, would—in the glance I had—indicate a restless energy and quickness of comprehension. All those who see the King will be astonished that one in such good condition and with so good a face should have ever been the great war spirit of the land. But no unofficial person will be permitted to see him, if the authorities can prevent it.

‘He seems to think he has been harshly treated; for (he says) he only fought and was defeated, and it is not fair that he should be sent down with treatment very much like that of Langalibalele, who was an insurgent, whilst he is a King. According to all accounts, Cetshwayo, if permitted to argue out what he is entitled to, will be able to do so with remarkable effect.’

Note 33, page 79.

‘By reason of the fighting between the Ngobamakosi and the Tulwana regiments a quarrel arose between Cetshwayo and Hamu, Cetshwayo blaming Hamu very much and asking ‘Why had the Ngobamakosi been stabbed with assegais?’ For it was Hamu who had ordered that stabbing of the Ngobamakosi, bidding the Tulwana to stab the youngsters, Hamu being Induna of the Tulwana and Sigcwelegcwele of the Ngobamakosi. Hamu in his turn was very angry, saying ‘Why did the youngsters fight with the veterans?’ and he went away home in great wrath, saying that Sigcwelegcwele should

be killed before he would be appeased. And, as all Zululand sided with Hamu in this matter, Cetshwayo sent a reprimand to Sigcwelegcwele, bidding him fly to the forest, and the Ngobamakosi to guard him, as the Zulus would kill him. Therefore he and the Ngobamakosi fled, and lay hid at the Ngoye, until all who had fought had been fined, Sigcwelegcwele himself being fined 100 head. And so that quarrel ended and Sigcwelegcwele returned home.'—*Statement of Mgabugabu of the Nokenke regiment.*

The Rev. Mr. Stavem, Norwegian Missionary, states [2252, p. 19] that in this fight 'more than 100 Zulus were killed and many more wounded.' Sir B. Frere says (*Correspondence with the Bishop of Natal*) '*many hundred men were killed*' on this occasion. Mr. F. E. Colenso, who was on the spot on the second Sunday after the fight, was informed by Mr. Mullins and Mr. J. Dunn, who helped to remove the dead, that about 50 at the outside were killed.

Note 34, page 80.

There is good ground for believing that the number of those killed on this occasion has been enormously exaggerated, as where Sir B. Frere speaks [2222, p. 226] of 'the massacre of *many hundreds* of Zulu girls and their relations, of which the sickening details will be found in the Parliamentary Blue-Books of April, 1877 [C. 1748], pp. 199-216,' and elsewhere speaks of 'the unparalleled acts of barbarity committed by Cetshwayo's order in the butchery of a number of young women' [2242, p. 17], of 'the slaughter of a *multitude* of poor unmarried girls and

women' [2260, p. 24], and again [2316, p. 18] of 'a barbarous massacre of a *large number* of women and girls' and 'of his young women being *assegaid by hundreds*.'

But Mr. Osborne, Resident Magistrate of Newcastle, who reports the matter to the Natal Government [1748, p. 197], says '*several* girls were killed in consequence' of their having violated the Zulu Marriage Law; and Sir T. Shepstone in his account of the Installation in 1873 says [1137, p. 21] 'contravention of these regulations is visited by the severest penalties.' Mr. Osborne writes afterwards [p. 216] 'From all I have been able to learn, Cetshwayo's conduct has been, and continues to be, disgraceful. He is putting people to death in a shameful manner, especially girls. The dead bodies are placed by his order in the principal paths, especially at points where the paths intersect each other (cross-roads).¹ A *few* of the parents of the young people so killed buried the bodies, and thus brought Cetshwayo's wrath upon themselves, resulting not only in their own death, but destruction to the whole family.'

Government messengers report [p. 198]: 'We heard that the King was causing *some* of the Zulus to be killed on account of disobeying his orders'—rather, for disobeying the national 'regulations'—respecting the marriage of girls, and *we saw large numbers of cattle which had been taken as fines*. Otherwise the land was quiet. Would the land have been 'quiet' if many hundreds' of

¹ It was not so very long ago that in England the bodies of criminals, who had been executed, were hung in irons on gibbets, as a warning to others not to offend.

girls had been killed ? It is probable that in most cases the penalty was a fine of cattle, and that in the case of those killed there was some aggravation of the offence.

The Rev. Mr. Robertson says [2220, p. 345], 'I heard of many being killed, and a man (Lutshitshi) told me that the *Impi* to which he belonged killed no fewer than three.'

Two Zulus, seized and imprisoned as spies, but afterwards liberated, state that they *heard* that many were killed, but did not know of a single instance within their own circles of relatives, friends, and acquaintances.

Sir H. Bulwer writes as follows [1748, p. 198] :—'In the course of last month a report reached this Government that the Zulus had been putting to death *numbers of girls and young men*, who had disobeyed the King and broken the Zulu laws of marriage.

'It appears that, *according to an old custom*, the King at certain periods authorizes certain regiments to marry girls of a particular age, the girls being obliged to marry into those regiments whether they wish to do so or not; and in conformity with this custom the King, some months ago, at the Festival of Firstfruits (Umkosi), authorized the Ndhlonhlo and Dhloko regiments to marry.

'To avoid compulsory marriages with men of these regiments, various devices were resorted to by marriageable girls and by their relatives and lovers.

'The King, on the deceptions being discovered, ordered (so it was reported) *large numbers of girls and others connected with them to be killed*, and their bodies to be placed

across the highroads, in order that travellers might see the King's displeasure at the laws being broken.'

Sir H. Bulwer says 'so it was reported,' but he does not say by whom. And there are no official reports in the Blue-Books which give the least intimation about 'large numbers of girls and others' having been killed, since Mr. Osborne speaks only of 'several girls' and 'a few of the parents,' and the messengers of 'some of the Zulus.'

Cetshwayo's reply (Nov. 2, 1876) to Sir H. Bulwer's message of remonstrance on this occasion is *the only instance*¹ on record in which he has ever failed in paying all due respect to his English 'Father,' showing plainly irritation of mind at being interfered with from without, at a difficult time, in doing what he deemed to be his duty as King. For, in ordering these executions, he was merely enforcing (as Sir H. Bulwer says) 'an old custom,' and not, as Sir B. Frere represents it, a new law laid down by himself. From his point of view the exercise of such severity was as necessary to maintaining his authority, and therefore also securing the welfare of his people, as the decimation of a mutinous regiment might appear to a General, or as the slaughter of hundreds of Langalibalele's people, hiding in caves or running away, the destruction of the tribe and plunder of all their property, and the eating up of the Putini tribe, appeared to the Natal Government necessary for maintaining its

¹ Sir B. Frere [2220, p. 26] says 'we have not a shadow excuse for doubting that he is in *his later utterances* expressing his real intention to resume the most sanguinary of his predecessors' practices'—as if there had been *many* such messages!

authority and assuring the safety and welfare of the colony in 1873. But, whatever may have been Cetshwayo's offence in respect of this message, it had been subsequently condoned by the interchange of friendly communications between himself and Sir H. Bulwer, though Sir B. Frere raked it up again from the past in support of his proceedings.

In that message,¹ however, Cetshwayo says [1748, p. 216]: 'I shall not agree to any laws or rules from Natal, *and by so doing throw the large kraal which I govern into the water.* My people will not listen unless they are killed; and, while wishing to be friends with the English, I do not agree to give my people over to be governed by laws sent to me by them.'² And on Jan. 1, 1878, he gives an illustration of his difficulties in his message with respect to the fight at the Umkosi (Note 57), saying [2072, p. 96]—'Cetshwayo reports to H.E. that two of his regiments have had a fight, and many of his people have been killed, at which he is much annoyed.

¹ 'This message was brought, not by his own men, who would have softened down any harsh expression in delivering their master's meaning, but by two Government messengers, one of whom was a Zulu refugee, living in this colony, of the party hostile to Cetshwayo.'

² The rest of the message was as follows [1748, p. 216] :—

'The King' said in reply—"Did he ever tell Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone) I would not kill? Did he tell the Whitepeople I made such an arrangement? Because, if he did, he has deceived them. I do kill; but I do not consider that I have done anything yet in the way of killing. Why do the Whitepeople start at nothing? I have not yet begun; I have yet to kill; it is the custom of our Nation, and I shall not depart from it.

'Why does the Governor of Natal speak to me about my

He reports this to H.E., to show that, although he warned them that he would severely punish any regiment that caused any disturbance at the Umkosi, *he cannot rule without sometimes killing them*, especially as they know that they can run to Natal.'

Mr. Mullins has stated that the number of girls killed might be set down as '*ten* at the outside.' But it now appears (Nov. 9, 1879) from information gained by Magema in Zululand, from respectable witnesses, that the number did not exceed *five* or *six*, instead of being 'many hundreds.'

'I asked Ntshingwayo how many girls were killed in 1876. He said he did not know, as he was not then in attendance on the King. But they were only a few; in his own district not a single one was killed; he had only heard of the matter by report.

laws? Do I go to Natal and dictate to him about his laws? I shall not agree, &c. [quoted above].

'Have I not asked the English to allow me to wash my spears since the death of my father Mpandè (Panda) and they have kept playing with me all this time, treating me like a child? Go back and tell the English that I shall now act on my own account, and, if they wish me to agree to their laws, I shall leave and become a wanderer; but before I go it will be seen, as I shall not go without having acted.

'Go back and tell the Whitemen this, and let them hear it well. The Governor of Natal and I are equal [*? silingene*, 'we are in like positions']: he is Governor of Natal, and I am Governor here.'

The fact is, however, that he had done nothing whatever towards 'washing his spears' according to Zulu custom, either before or after this message (Nov. 2, 1876), until the Invasion of Zululand, having neither attacked the Swazis, his old enemies, nor the encroaching Boers.

‘I asked Mnukwa, the Innceku (King’s household-servant) who said that “To the best of his remembrance not many girls were killed ; in the case of most of the offenders cattle were eaten up. Perhaps *five* or *six* at the outside were killed, and these had done something very bad indeed, having secretly married soldiers without the King’s permission, and having been passed off deceitfully as wives of elder brothers of those whom they had really married ; on that account they were killed, and the kraals who did that were also punished.”

‘Many of the Zulus said the same. But Mfunzi and Lutsha and the son of Klaas and others said that it was not the King who killed those girls, but Hamu, Siteku, Qetuka, Mavumengwana, and certain others, who were vexed that those girls of the inNgcengce, who had long ago—it was said three years previously—been permitted by the King to marry, still refused, because they desired to marry young men, whereas those who said that they ought to be killed, said so because it was they themselves who wanted the girls for themselves as wives.’

APPENDIX.

THE ZULU MILITARY SYSTEM.

The following account of the Zulu military system was furnished to the Bishop by two Zulu soldiers :—

‘ In Zululand a new regiment is formed as follows :— The boys, when they think themselves big enough to enlist—say from sixteen to eighteen years old—collect at the military kraals, each going to that to which his father belongs, and there they stay, milking the cows into their mouths. This is a sign that they wish to be enlisted, and when the Izinnceku (King’s officers) of the military kraals see that a good many of such boys have collected, one of them reports the fact to the King, who then gives permission for the boys to be brought before him. There is no penalty for those who do not join, although, of course, they are not thought much of. Such men may marry whenever they please, and they put on the head-ring by permission of the head man of their kraal (as is the custom in Natal). If, however, a man has once enlisted, and at some future time fails to appear when his regiment is called together for any purpose, it will then be inquired, “ What has become of him ? ” And if he cannot give a good reason for his absence he may perhaps be killed by

his regiment, but not by the King. A man who has enlisted also may not marry until the King gives leave to his regiment.

‘ Well, the King gives the order to collect the boys to the officer who has reported them, who delivers it to the Indunas (officers) of the different military kraals. The boys are then collected at the different military kraals, and on the appointed day messengers are sent to the King to say they are now coming. Thereupon the King has cattle killed for them, so that when they arrive they find the meat ready. The King then gives them a name, and appoints a head-ringed man as Induna over them, and either makes them into a separate regiment and orders them to build for themselves a new military kraal, or incorporates them with one of the regiments already formed, when they share the existing kraal. If, however, when the boys appear, the King thinks them too young, he may send them back to their homes to keep the cattle, till they grow bigger, as happened to the present set of boys—the Umsizi—who showed themselves to the King last year in the summer. When the boys have built their military kraal, they disperse again to their homes, for the Zulu soldiers are not kept collected together always; they just live at home with their families. Each regiment, however, has its own military kraal, presided over by two chief Indunas. It is the correct thing for the men to spend a certain time each year at their military kraal, thereby paying their respects to the King. This, however, is voluntary; the men go when they like and stay for as long or as short a time as they like. There will be

usually at one kraal say from ten to twenty men at a time. This applies to the military kraals generally; at the kraal where the King is living there are usually from fifty to sixty at a time, belonging to different military kraals. The men, while in residence, are occupied in the ordinary affairs of the kraal—*e.g.* repairing the huts or cattle kraal, planting amabele (Kafir corn), &c. There are no fixed times for the calling together of the people besides the Umkosi, or Feast of Firstfruits. But the King calls them if he wants them for anything—perhaps one regiment, perhaps two, as he sees fit—either to build a new kraal or to move an old one, or for hunting parties, or to hoe his amabele crops. . . . When the time for the Umkosi draws near (about December) the King announces it, and the regiments all collect at the different military kraals for about twenty days before the appointed day, which time they spend in hoeing the King's amabele gardens in the morning, afterwards in preparing their dress, tails, feathers, &c., and in learning new dances and songs for the occasion. People learn to fight in Zululand at home, in their fathers' kraals, when they are quite little; for, when they are out herding cattle, two boys will have a quarrel and fight it out, or boys of one kraal will divide into two parties and fight with sticks, or those of one kraal will fight with those of another, and so they learn.

'The Umkosi is always held at Nodwengu, the kraal of the late King Umpande (Panda). The King walks over from Ulundi early in the morning, escorted by the Ngobamakosi regiment, which was about to be enrolled,

and had been specially given to Cetshwayo by Umpande before his death. The Umkosi lasts one day only, all the regiments in turn dancing before the King. No weapons are carried at the Umkosi for fear of accidents; the men have a stick only. There are present at the Umkosi all the women of the King's household, and indeed all, or very many, of the unmarried and unencumbered women of Zululand. Anyone may go who likes, but no one would think of going with young children to such a crush. The girls in Zululand are also formed into regiments—that is to say, they just live at home and work for their fathers only; but all those of about the same age are called by one name (those now growing up are the Umtiyane, "Ensnarers"), and may not marry until the King gives leave. When he does give leave they may marry any they like, except the young men of the regiments which have not yet received permission. Sometimes the King gives permission to a regiment of young men and to a regiment of girls at the same time; but it does not follow that the young men all get wives, as the girls may prefer men of other (previously permitted) regiments, or the young men may not possess any cattle, in which case, of course, no fathers will give them their girls.'

A PROTEST AGAINST THE ZULU WAR.

The following letter was forwarded by the Aborigines' Protection Society to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies :—

'SIR,—We desire to address you on the subject of the lamentable and disastrous war which this country is waging with the Zulus.

'In common with a large number of our fellow-countrymen, we deeply lament that the nation has been placed in the unhappy position of invading the territories, sacrificing the lives, and capturing or destroying the property of a people who have shown a desire to cultivate friendly relations with England. We also desire to remark that the national responsibility in connection with this war has been greatly increased by the unfavourable reception which, we are informed, has been given to Cetywayo's overtures of peace.

'We learn with deep regret that at public meetings lately held both in the Cape Colony and in Natal, a war policy has been enthusiastically advocated. The war is no doubt popular in the South African colonies ; but whether it would be equally so, if the colonists were required to bear the heavy and increasing burthens which it will entail, may well be doubted. We protest against a system which involves this country in the

responsibility of spending its blood and treasure in a war which it has emphatically condemned.

‘We earnestly hope that her Majesty’s Government will seize the earliest opportunity of offering such terms of peace as the Zulu chiefs and people may reasonably be expected to accept.

‘We have the honour, &c.,

(Signed)

‘S. GURNEY,

‘President of the Aborigines’ Protection Society.

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authority and assuring the safety and welfare of the colony in 1873. But, whatever may have been Cetshwayo's offence in respect of this message, it had been subsequently condoned by the interchange of friendly communications between himself and Sir H. Bulwer, though Sir B. Frere raked it up again from the past in support of his proceedings.

In that message,¹ however, Cetshwayo says [1748, p. 216]: 'I shall not agree to any laws or rules from Natal, *and by so doing throw the large kraal which I govern into the water.* My people will not listen unless they are killed; and, while wishing to be friends with the English, I do not agree to give my people over to be governed by laws sent to me by them.'² And on Jan. 1, 1878, he gives an illustration of his difficulties in his message with respect to the fight at the Umkosi (Note 57), saying [2072, p. 96]—'Cetshwayo reports to H.E. that two of his regiments have had a fight, and many of his people have been killed, at which he is much annoyed.

¹ 'This message was brought, not by his own men, who would have softened down any harsh expression in delivering their master's meaning, but by two Government messengers, one of whom was a Zulu refugee, living in this colony, of the party hostile to Cetshwayo.'

² The rest of the message was as follows [1748, p. 216] :—

'The King' said in reply—'Did he ever tell Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone) I would not kill? Did he tell the Whitepeople I made such an arrangement? Because, if he did, he has deceived them. I do kill; but I do not consider that I have done anything yet in the way of killing. Why do the Whitepeople start at nothing? I have not yet begun; I have yet to kill; it is the custom of our Nation, and I shall not depart from it.

'Why does the Governor of Natal speak to me about my

He reports this to H.E., to show that, although he warned them that he would severely punish any regiment that caused any disturbance at the Umkosi, *he cannot rule without sometimes killing them*, especially as they know that they can run to Natal.'

Mr. Mullins has stated that the number of girls killed might be set down as '*ten* at the outside.' But it now appears (Nov. 9, 1879) from information gained by Magema in Zululand, from respectable witnesses, that the number did not exceed *five* or *six*, instead of being 'many hundreds.'

'I asked Ntshingwayo how many girls were killed in 1876. He said he did not know, as he was not then in attendance on the King. But they were only a few; in his own district not a single one was killed; he had only heard of the matter by report.

laws? Do I go to Natal and dictate to him about his laws? I shall not agree, &c. [quoted above].

'Have I not asked the English to allow me to wash my spears since the death of my father Mpande (Panda) and they have kept playing with me all this time, treating me like a child? Go back and tell the English that I shall now act on my own account, and, if they wish me to agree to their laws, I shall leave and become a wanderer; but before I go it will be seen, as I shall not go without having acted.

'Go back and tell the Whitemen this, and let them hear it well. The Governor of Natal and I are equal [*'silingene*, 'we are in like positions']: he is Governor of Natal, and I am Governor here.'

The fact is, however, that he had done nothing whatever towards 'washing his spears' according to Zulu custom, either before or after this message (Nov. 2, 1876), until the Invasion of Zululand, having neither attacked the Swazis, his old enemies, nor the encroaching Boers.

'I asked Mnukwa, the Innceku (King's household-servant) who said that "To the best of his remembrance not many girls were killed ; in the case of most of the offenders cattle were eaten up. Perhaps *five* or *six* at the outside were killed, and these had done something very bad indeed, having secretly married soldiers without the King's permission, and having been passed off deceitfully as wives of elder brothers of those whom they had really married ; on that account they were killed, and the kraals who did that were also punished."

'Many of the Zulus said the same. But Mfunzi and Lutsha and the son of Klaas and others said that it was not the King who killed those girls, but Hamu, Siteku, Qetuka, Mavumengwana, and certain others, who were vexed that those girls of the inNgcengce, who had long ago—it was said three years previously—been permitted by the King to marry, still refused, because they desired to marry young men, whereas those who said that they ought to be killed, said so because it was they themselves who wanted the girls for themselves as wives.'

APPENDIX.

THE ZULU MILITARY SYSTEM.

The following account of the Zulu military system was furnished to the Bishop by two Zulu soldiers :—

‘ In Zululand a new regiment is formed as follows :— The boys, when they think themselves big enough to enlist—say from sixteen to eighteen years old—collect at the military kraals, each going to that to which his father belongs, and there they stay, milking the cows into their mouths. This is a sign that they wish to be enlisted, and when the Izinnceku (King’s officers) of the military kraals see that a good many of such boys have collected, one of them reports the fact to the King, who then gives permission for the boys to be brought before him. There is no penalty for those who do not join, although, of course, they are not thought much of. Such men may marry whenever they please, and they put on the head-ring by permission of the head man of their kraal (as is the custom in Natal). If, however, a man has once enlisted, and at some future time fails to appear when his regiment is called together for any purpose, it will then be inquired, “ What has become of him ? ” And if he cannot give a good reason for his absence he may perhaps be killed by

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